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ABSTRACT: REPRESENTING MATERNITY IN PHILOSOPHY 
 
Few living philosophers would conjecture that women cannot be philosophers; however, 
the classical notion that those who ―generate life‖ cannot ―create ideas‖ continues to inform 
philosophical notions of maternity. It is unfair to require exclusion on the basis of sex; however, 
the inconvenient possibility is that Aristotle‘s notion of maternity promotes skepticism, not about 
the political status of women, but about the merits of political ―equality‖ as an over-arching, 
regulative ideal which applies to all relationships. As Arendt notes, while the opposition of two 
worlds so long associated with the feminine and the masculine risks consolidating sexist 
ideologies, the possibly greater risk occurs when philosophers personalize metaphysics. Arendt 
sidesteps some of these thornier issues propagated by Aristotle‘s notion of ―maternity‖ by 
replacing ―maternity‖ with ―natality.‖ ―Natality‖ gestures towards the infant‘s promise to be 
unpredictable; in doing so, the concept highlights how infants complicate our attempts to 
extrapolate identity from biological circumstance. Like Arendt, Klein uses the context of 
reproductive biology to highlight the manner in which ambiguity permeates memory and identity 
but, unlike Arendt, encourages her readers to analogize from maternity rather than natality. By 
widening the scope of her lens of analysis to include maternity, Klein destabilizes the 
philosophical habit of regarding birth from the point of view of he who is born but does not bear. 
Kristeva‘s ―subject in process‖ is this same trajectory fully realized. Destabilizing the boundary  
between the creation of ideas and the generation of life permits philosophy to return to its 
conceptual progenitors, the physical and the metaphysical, with the legitimate hope of 
reproducing a most fertile offspring: s/he who generates life and creates ideas.    
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INTRODUCTION 
NEGATING BIRTH AND THE ORIGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
Introducing the Problematic 
 
In modern philosophy, the predominant philosophical prejudice is that ―mothering‖ 
prevents ―philosophizing.‖ Recall Kant or Nietzsche who, like Aristotle, assume that mothers 
who create ideas are either inhuman or hermaphroditic. Plato strongly opposes such transparently 
contingent, politically pernicious sexual prejudice. He terms sexual equality a pragmatic issue and 
suggests that, once women are freed from the demands of earthly necessity she, like any man, is 
fully capable of creating ideas and, once she is so free, twice the number of people are available 
to serve the needs of the State. Plato‘s political views on sexual equality are remarkable because 
they are progressive, but they are also remarkable because they are premised on the repudiation of 
the maternity. Plato‘s dialogue the Theatetus articulates the determining metaphysical opposition 
between mothering and philosophizing, not only for his own work, but for generations of 
philosophers to follow. The perplexing deduction is that, philosophically speaking, sexual 
equality and sexual inequality both appear to be premised on the opposition of the generation of 
life to the creation of ideas; in other words, both egalitarian and in-egalitarian political regimes 
appear to be premised on the repudiation of maternity.  
 Plato conceptualizes the concrete, political objective of sexual equality by 
challenging the widely accepted belief that mothers share a bond with their children that is 
incommensurate to the bond she shares with citizens or strangers. Plato likens the mother-child 
bond to a lure which traps women in to ‗earthly necessity.‘ On the basis of this perceived trap, 
Plato demonstrates little hesitation in recommending that infants be removed from their mothers 
at birth. In his mind, removing children from their mothers at birth is neither a crime, nor a moral 
wrong it is the requisite for a harmonious state. Plato locates the source of conflict in the state 
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inside earthly immanence. Earthly immanence threatens to disrupt Plato‘s harmonious state in 
more ways than one; earthly immanence requires that humans labour to satiate their appetites, but 
it also requires that humans negotiate the temptations of physical pleasures. In Plato‘s view, these 
pleasures are the duel temptress and wardens of the smooth functioning of the state. Without the 
demands made by earthly necessity, humans would cease to exist and so too would his state. The 
ambiguity proper to earthly immanence seems to embody it self in women and the children they 
produce. Women and children are the future of the state, but, in their very existence, they threaten 
to create conflict between their suitors and their partners. Rather than prohibit sexual reproduction 
or allowing the standard conventions of monogamy and marriage to dictate its parameters, Plato 
proposes that women be held ―in common‖ to all men and the state. The children produced from 
these same couplings are themselves held in common to all men and the state. Plato regulates 
earthly immanence by regulating women and children. 
 While fending off opposition and protest on the one hand, Plato must tend to an 
equally menacing ontological threat on the other: the mother-child ―bond.‖ The ―bond‖ is 
intangible but threatens to be more impervious than the sinewy cord it replaces. The very act of 
speaking of the bond poses a serious threat to the sexual-equality agenda he favors. The bond is 
invisible, but tangible, private, but publicly acknowledged, unwritten, but requires deciphering. 
The perceived bond between a mother and her child is profoundly ambiguous. Plato is resolute. In 
speaking of the bond and the necessity of severing it he rarely, if ever, demonstrates ambivalence; 
instead, he proceeds with hubris.   
 In the utopist treaty the Republic, Plato prescribes transitioning the custody of 
guardian children to the State at birth in the following manner: 
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They will provide for their nurture, and will bring the mothers to the fold when 
they are full of milk, taking the greatest possible care that no mother recognizes 
her own child; and other wet-nurses may be engaged if more are required. Care 
will also be taken that the process of suckling shall not be protracted too long; 
and the mothers will have no getting up at night or other trouble, but will hand 
over this sort of thing to the nurses and attendants. . .
1
 
 
Plato insists that, once the umbilical cord is cut, infants should be transferred to their 
guardians. If a mother stays too long with her infant, the broken ―cord‖ morphs into a ―bond‖ 
whose strength matches that of the sinewy artery which used to form the physical, uterine link 
between mother and child. Plato regards time as his worst enemy. The more the bond is allowed 
to develop, the more likely mother is to be dragged into the depths of earthly necessity. Once she 
is dragged to these depths, her ability to create genuine ideas is irrevocably impaired; however, 
Plato does not consider all children to be a threat to all mothers; instead, he only regards a 
mother‘s own child to be a threat to her potential human freedom. Instead, Plato recommends that 
infants be removed from their mothers just long enough that they cannot tell their own from 
another. Once a mother is no longer to distinguish her child from another, she is still a mother and 
thus still able to transfer her maternal attitude and behaviors to other children. Once the mother is 
able to regard every child as if it were her own, Plato considers her ready to return to servicing 
the state. The liberated woman continues to be a ―mother,‖ never to her own child, but to every 
child as if it were her own. In this process, the labour of earthly necessity associated with rearing 
children is neatly parceled off to those who demonstrate little, if no ability, for creating ideas. 
 Plato‘s utopist state requires that mothers mother every child as if it were her own 
because his utopia requires the full prohibition of private ownership, including the private 
ownership of children or mating pairs.
2
  Plato predicts that preventing the private ownership of 
mating pairs and infants will limit sexual competition and a potent source of conflict. Ultimately, 
when the conventions of monogamous sex are dissolved and women are liberated from the sexual 
differences which prevented their full participation in society, men and women will differ only in 
                                                     
1
 Plato, The Republic, Book V, pages 222-224. 
2
 Ibid, see especially pages 452-457 
 10 
their in/ability to generate life. Once difference is diminished to its bare parts, Plato imagines the 
state will resemble an instrument from which a sound will resonate akin to the harmony produced 
by the variations established in harmony. He terms this diminished, harmonious difference 
between the sexes a ―close and universal proximity.‖3 Plato is one of the first philosophers to 
imagine sexual equality. His import to contemporary, progressive political policy should not be 
overlooked; however, his narrow notion of political equality requires that mothers renounce their 
child, embrace every child as if it their own, mandatory polygamy and promiscuity, and servitude 
to the state. 
 Aristotle does not object to Plato‘s utopist vision on the basis that it augments or 
diminishes the wrongful oppression and exploitation of women or children; rather, Aristotle 
predicts that state-sanctioned promiscuity, polygamy and adoption will generate more rather than 
less conflict. The adoption of children is only of interest to Aristotle to the extent that it 
sometimes better serves children. Unlike Plato, Aristotle believes that adoption no more changes 
the bond between a mother and her child than if they had they been in close proximity. Further to 
his point, Aristotle adds that adopting a child no more removes a mother of her full obligations 
than sole guardianship.  
 The difference between a good mother and others is not whether or not she adopts her 
child, but whether or not she adopts her child‘s interests as her own.4 Aristotle describes this 
virtuous mother in how   
they love them and do not seek to be loved in return (if they cannot have both), 
but seem to be satisfied if they  see them prospering; and they themselves love 
their children even if these owing to their ignorance give them nothing of a 
mother‘s due 5 
 
                                                     
3
. Republic, 157 
4
 See Aristotle‘s discussion of adoption in the Laws and the Nichomean Ethics, Book VII in which 
he claims that adoption helps to strengthen and deepen our love for others in community, all the while 
insisting that it must emanate first from the family.  
5
 Ibid, 161 
 11 
The claim that mothers ―give without wanting in return‖ becomes a key premise for 
Aristotle. According to Aristotle, mothers should neither expect something in return from their 
children nor should mothers expect something in return for their child; instead, she is meant to 
remain grateful for the experience of mothering itself; without it, he considers her neither human 
nor animal. Aristotle‘s rendering of the family mirrors conservative, modern notions of private 
property, the family, and the state. As Oliver notes in Subjectivities without Subjects, while 
Aristotle‘s rendering of the ―happy family‖ continues to hold persuasive power, the reality is that, 
when women are confined to space of the domestic by social cultural norms and economic and 
political realities, the ideal rendering is but a screen to an oppressive, exploitative, and morally 
wrong social reality but it does not necessarily follow that her liberation from the space of the 
domestic is emancipation realized 
 Plato prescribes adoption to benefit the state and the consequence is sexual equality. 
Aristotle prescribes adoption to benefit the state and the consequence is sexual inequality. In their 
respective notions of private and public property, mothers are deemed providers rather than 
proprietors. In Plato‘s utopia, women who mother must make accommodations to re-secure her 
status as an equal, but these concessions require mandatory adoption, sexual promiscuity, and 
servitude to the State. In Aristotle‘s state, women who mother must choose to mother and 
renounce her political equality or choose to mother and renounce her humanity.  Mother‘s gift of 
giving life, thrust on her by the conventions of the social and the determination of the biological, 
throws her into a sea of servitude more determining than indentured slavery and expels her 
outside the catchments of citizenship and firmly into the confines of domesticity. For Aristotle 
and Plato, maternity renders women ―unequal.‖  
 
The Birth of Modernity and Modern Birth  
 Despite early modernity‘s increasingly inclusive notions of political equality, it was not 
always the case that modern notions of political equality included women and or women who 
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mothered. Women who mothered outside the conventions of paternal-sanctioned law bore a 
misfortune second only to their children. As Kant notes, the bastard child  
 is thus born beyond the pale or constitutional protection of the Law. Such a    
 child is introduced, as it were, like prohibited goods, into the Commonwealth,  
  as it has no legal right to existence in this way, its destruction might also be   
 ignored; nor can the shame of the mother when her unmarried confinement is   
 known, be removed by any legal ordinance. 
6
 
 
When Kant describes the situation of women and children under the domain of law, he 
reveals that if her child fails to meet the standards of the law, her child is deemed 
indistinguishable from defective livestock. Her political powers to contest such a determination 
are non-existent. Her infant is protected by nothing less and nothing more than the contingencies 
of conventions determined entirely by the opposite sex. Despite her or her infant‘s possible 
potential personhood, the fact that she partakes in the ―generation of life‖ trumps any claims to 
ethical autonomy, citizenship, or genius. Kant concludes that women who mother are subject to 
the law rather than subjects of the law. His analysis of the situation is descriptive rather than 
prescriptive and yet, like many of his contemporaries, the duty to separate the is from the ought is 
neglected in the case of women. As I maintain in my chapter on Kant, he makes no secret of his 
unenlightened prejudices towards those who mother.  
 In contemporary times, the trend continues. Disproportionately high rates of poverty 
amongst women-headed households, both in the West and abroad, are testimony to our collective 
failure to actualize full sexual equality. From the point of view of the poor, some might argue that 
even the most basic human rights have not yet been realized.
7
 The moral imperative is to devote 
resources and imagination towards advancing a notion of ―maternity‖ beyond one which requires 
mothers to renounce either her maternity or her equality. In this regard, Plato‘s notion of political 
                                                     
6
 the Philosophy of Right, ―The Right of Punishing and of Pardoning‖ 169 
7
 See the government of Canada‘s 2007 report of Human Trafficking and Slavery, 
http://gvnet.com/humantrafficking/Canada.htm 
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equality can seem preferable to Aristotle‘s because it requires full sexual equality and permits and 
fosters the political advancement of women; however, Plato maintains that women should be 
afforded the opportunity for equality despite her ability to generate life. The repudiation of the 
generation of life remains a corner stone of sexual equality policy. Plato‘s prescription for 
overcoming maternity exacts a high cost including: sexual servitude to men, full obedience to the 
state and the state regulated, mandatory adoption of all children.  
 
 Women Reading the Ancients   
 Arguments intended to demonstrate a natural inequality between the sexes are easily 
refuted by living mothers, past and present, who have regularly demonstrated their ability to 
create genuine ideas. Since ancient times, mothers have served as political participants, 
organizers, and leaders, contributed to the formal and informal process of law, created works of 
genius, and exemplified ethical virtue time and again. The force of empirical fact outweighs any 
un-founded and out-dated notions of sex-inequality. The case for sexual equality is emboldened 
even further if the role of Plato in the history of philosophy is acknowledged. As has already been 
discussed, Plato imagines sexual equality without needing to be persuaded by empirical fact. The 
influence of Plato in the history of philosophy is indisputable. It can be assumed that any modern 
philosopher contemplating sexual equality unfamiliar with the empirical situation in which 
mothers create ideas is at least familiar with Plato‘s argument for sexual equality. Therefore, it 
can be assumed that any living, Western philosopher who does not support sexual equality has 
chosen to take this position, not because he lacks good reason or empirical examples, but for 
some other reason. 
 The general assumption regarding the incommensurability between motherhood and 
sexual, political equality is analogous to the general assumption held by modernity regarding 
earthly immanence and human freedom described by Arendt in the Human Condition. As Arendt 
makes evident, ―maternity‖ is an integral component of earthly immanence and, like its 
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component, maternity is overcome at the peril of humanity. She suggests that humanity fairs 
better when it affirms, rather than negates, the distinction between two worlds. Her insight is 
shared by a series of contemporary thinkers, including Klein and Kristeva, who write after the 
birth of modern times and its attendant forms of evil and cruelty. Their shared concern is that 
―political equality‖ masquerades a hateful, violent, distrust of the ambiguity which lies at the 
heart of the juncture between earthly immanence and human freedom and that this same hateful, 
violent distrust is akin to fascism itself. The consensus in this group is that the task is to imagine a 
notion of the political freedom which is not premised on the value of full equality.   
 Arendt leads the way. In the Human Condition, she claims that the Platonic, modern 
ideal of sexual equality fails to affirm the manner in which earthly immanence permeates 
identity.
8
  Arendt maintains that Plato‘s notion of maternal identity in which women are required 
to hand over her nascent infant to another and commence work is politically possible, plausible 
and even preferable to a situation in which women‘s destiny is determined by earthly immanence; 
however, she does not agree that sexual equality will be accomplished by repudiating earthly 
immanence. Repudiating earthly immanence fails to acknowledge the context of labour, work and 
action which springs from a community of others living and thinking in tandem with the demands 
of the earth. Arendt postulates that our identity springs from the context in which each one of us 
was once an infant affirming earthly necessity in its wants and needs while transcending these 
same demands in its promise to be unpredictable. The give and take of getting and wanting and 
transcending determining needs is the essence not of humans, but of humanity. Humanity is, at its 
core, communal. For Arendt, ―we‖ are not an entity which is formed or regulated by a state; 
rather, ―we‖ are the outcome of the community of others who receive infants. Accordingly, 
Plato‘s notion of sexual equality imagines a communalist utopia without also imagining the 
                                                     
8
 The Human Condition, pages 46-57. See especially her sections on Plato and the viva 
contemplate and her counter-concept of vita active, what she claims to be the true essence of human 
freedom. 
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reality of community. Arendt warns that we deny the truth of interdependence and community at 
our peril.  
 Arendt reverses Plato‘s narrative account of birth as an increasing distance from the 
womb of generation and likens our first birth to a template upon which our second birth is made 
possible. Any changes to the conventions surrounding maternity will require more than a simple 
command from the top down: remove infant from mother!  Maternity is a vehicle tied to a trop 
with a cord. If Arendt is to be believed, we break this cord at the demise of those persons, 
communities and the state which appear and disappear in the immanence of Mother Earth. Arendt 
develops her argument while simultaneously remaining prescient and prudent about the risks of 
being misinterpreted by her feminist critics. Arendt is sentient to and anticipates many of the 
likely challenges to her notion of political freedom. She is well aware that feminists will oppose a 
notion of equality that precludes the possibility of sexual equality. The reasons for her position 
and my own reasons for defending her position on sexual equality will be developed at length in 
this dissertation, especially in chapter three. For now, rather than focus on her pre-emptive strikes 
against such criticism, it is just as prudent to highlight her pre-active creative conceptualization 
which is intended to speak to the concerns expressed by her critics, namely that human freedom 
would preclude women from identifying as women or mothers in the political domain.  
 Arendt postulates the concept of ―natality‖ over the concept of ―maternity.‖ 9 
―Maternity‖ has the benefit of associating identity with embodied inter-relatedness, but it tends to 
trigger associations of the conservative rendering of required domestic service and political sex-
inequality. ―Natality‖ associates identity with embodied inter-relatedness and tends to trigger 
associations of our infantile exposure and dependency on others, and our nameless and 
unpredictable future. Arendt can conceptualize a notion of feminine identity which touches on the 
scene of birth but, by emphasizing the natal rather than the maternal, she accentuates that mothers, 
                                                     
9
 The Human Condition, 9 Note Arendt‘s affirmation of Augustine‘s City of God which she 
interprets as: ―the new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt {…} only because the newcomer is 
capable of acting. 
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like all others, are born and thus unpredictable, free and singular. Mothers generate life and create 
ideas. Nothing should preclude mothers, or any others, from being fully human and thus enjoying 
the task of labouring the earth, the demands and rewards of work, and the promise of political 
freedom.  
 When Arendt turns her attention to the maternal situation specifically, she reminds us 
that in the past and in the present and more than likely in the future, reproduction is highly 
politicized because States depend on predictable demographics for their economies. Arendt 
explains the propensity for constructing essentialist notions of maternity, not in terms of the 
history of philosophy, but in terms of the function of maternity in the production of families and 
states. From within this context, she challenges us to imagine ―mothers‖ as distinct from their 
social and cultural function as reproducers of life. She concludes that the promise of equality for 
mothers will not be contemporaneous with the introduction of accessible birth control. (Forced 
abortion and sterilization and forced maternity are both devices used by repressive states). 
Mothers are subject to the social and legal mores which surround the production of human life, 
but they are also the subjects who speak and act in a domain in which the social and legal mores 
which surround the production of human life are constituted. The ethical, social and political 
demands which come with the birth of an infant are not resolved by ―technology‖ but by a 
spectrum of discourses and practices which directly involve women, mothers and others. Arendt 
sets the state for a political imagination in which mothers and all others are agents. The catch, 
perhaps predictably, is that her agency will be premised on her repudiating her own maternity. 
Arendt makes negating the identity conferred by earthly immanence a prerequisite to human 
freedom.  
 Arendt, like Plato, insists that women who wish to enter the domain of political 
freedom leave their maternal identities behind. If there is an alternative, neither Klein, nor 
Kristeva, nor Arendt make mention. Instead, Klein claims that the repudiation of maternity is as 
old as culture itself. In her estimation, the task is not to overcome the repudiation of maternity; 
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rather, the task is to be more honest about the role of repudiation in the formation of identity. The 
crucial distinction is not whether or not the repudiation of maternity is required for the formation 
of identity; instead, the crucial distinction is in how repudiation is accomplished. When 
repudiation is real, a tragic human history is the inevitable outcome. Klein invites us to explore 
and understand and develop any insight into the real repudiation of real women. Without such an 
undertaking, the result is predictable: more violence against women. By willingly risking such an 
undertaking into that fine line between violence/criminality and creativity/intelligence, we 
willingly risk to alter the course of history, and with it, a world in which those who generate life 
will be encouraged to create ideas. The unlikely revelation will be that women are not mothers. 
Those who believe otherwise have not quite grasped the insight which lies behind the juncture we 
have until now termed ―generation‖ and ―creation.‖ The insight is an invitation to explore a 
―universal‖ philosophy should not refuse. If Klein and Kristeva are to be believed, we are all of 
us mothers.  
 Amongst Klein‘s psychoanalytic contemporaries, the consensus is that violence against 
women can only be understood by deconstructing the symbolic which favors the repudiation of 
maternity. In this symbolic, ―mothers‖ tend to be deemed a non-entity or a threat to philosophical 
notions of unity, non-contradiction and autonomy while simultaneously rendering her a trope for 
philosophical notions of everything philosophy is not including the body and sexuality generally 
speaking. Deconstructing the symbol of the mother in discourses which privilege a masculine 
ontology makes evident that ―mothers‖ are so often made to stand in as a living symbol that she is 
regularly confused for the symbol itself. To the extent that philosophy is complicit in the process 
of confusing mothers for the symbol she is thought to embody, philosophy is complicit in 
violence against women in all of its complexity, especially the experience of ambivalence and its 
pair, the metaphysical phenomenon, ambiguity.   
 Philosophy is right to worry that our existence is founded on tenuous ground. 
Ambiguity does and should inspire ambivalence. Ambiguity is the potential home of moral 
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uncertainty and indifference. If there is anything certain about our origin it is the indeterminable 
quality which pervades identity but, as Klein suggests, the problem is not with ambiguity but with 
the fear and distrust of ambiguity. Klein‘s relative comfort level with ambiguity and ambivalence 
allows her to travel in previously unexplored spaces of thinking and living. Despite her 
sometimes offensive method and manners, she helps evolve philosophical discourse in a direction 
it was incapable of doing on its own. Klein is able to navigate this course by analogizing 
metaphysics to sexuality.  
 Klein analogizes metaphysical encounters with identity and maternity to the encounters 
she negotiates with children and their attempt to understand ―sexuality.‖ In her experience, 
censorship of ―sexuality‖ leads to forms of stupidity and destruction while a controlled dispensing 
of truth about sexuality leads to forms of autonomy and creativity. When the western cannon of 
philosophy, which names Plato and Aristotle as its forefathers and Kant and as its progenitors, 
repudiates maternity the unintended consequence is not the love of wisdom, but unintended 
thoughtlessness and destruction. Klein urges us to interpret philosophy‘s representation of birth in 
a different lens. Klein accomplishes this task by taking child‘s play seriously.  
 Child‘s play is important for children and for adults because, according to Klein, 
what the child understands in a way that adults might not is that his self-understanding is 
inextricably linked to how he interprets his (sexual) origin. Child‘s play is the uncensored, 
narrated, dialogue with the story of our exiting earthly immanence and our entrance into human 
freedom. It happens that Klein is most interested in how a child understands the event of his 
parents conceiving him; however, the interest is equally applicable to the manner in which we 
understand our philosophical origins. According to Klein, what our parents did and do ―behind 
closed doors‖ is a euphemism for the desire to know what cannot be seen or known or had. The 
less capable we are of contending with ―sexual‖ insecurities, the more likely we are to develop 
into a psychotic. Klein equates psychosis with the inability to think and the inability to think the 
inability to cope with ambiguity. The more at ease we are with this space of ambiguity and 
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ambivalence the more likely we are to be able to think. The more likely we are able to think, the 
more likely we are to imagine ―mothers‖ in a manner that captures the complexities inherent to 
the relationship of the generation of life to the creation of ideas. 
Klein‘s analysis leads her to conclude that all of us, long before we had a say in the 
matter, longed for and hated our mothers. Mothers stand before their infants as omnipotent beings. 
Their bodies determine our survival, our happiness and, eventually, our possible escape. The 
knowledge of how it is that we got what we want and got away lays buried in us like a dead secret. 
In order to become a fully thinking and thoughtful adult we have to learn how to satisfy our 
desires while simultaneously suppressing our desires. The process of negotiating our wanting and 
getting and not wanting and not getting requires a symbolic. A symbolic allows us to become 
somewhat autonomous in the sense that it permits us adults to find a way of destroying the body 
birthed us in our dependent, deaf and dumb and blind, infancy while satisfying a cannibalistic 
appetite for life itself. As Klein notes, when this process backfires, the creative interpretation of 
the journey towards autonomy is all too literal. In its literal version, it is violent, hateful and 
stupid. In its creative version, the transition from infancy into adulthood requires converting, 
displacing and creating mother‘s body in a loving, intelligent, but not always happy manner. I 
venture to claim that this symbolic is, in some sense, metaphysical. 
The difference between negating and translating the symbolic is the difference which 
amounts to everything. The very possibility of knowing, loving, and creating depends on this 
difference. As Klein claims, ―symbolism comes to be the foundation of all fantasy and 
sublimation but, more than that, it is the basis of the subject‘s relation to the outside world and to 
reality in general.‖10 She adds that the recuperation and resolution in the symbolic is the trial upon 
which ―the degree of success with which the subject passes through this phase will depend on the 
extent to which he can subsequently acquire an external world corresponding to reality.‖11  When 
                                                     
10
 Love, Guilt and Reparation, 210 
11
 Love, Guilt  and Reparation, 221 
 20 
Klein brings to light the work of the ―symbol,‖ she brings to light the relevance of her 
psychoanalytic work to the philosophical impasse on maternity, generation and creation. For this 
same reason, my project culminates in Klein‘s anticipation of Kristeva.  
 
Restating the Problematic; Confusing Repudiation for Censorship 
 
When I began this project, I did not anticipate the consistency with which the canonical 
writers of Western philosophy would insist that the generation of life is antithetical to the creation 
of ideas. The following chapters are my attempt to reveal the stakes of repudiating maternity and 
to gesture towards a productive juncture for re-thinking meta-physically about maternity and the 
attitudes and dispositions we call ―mothering.‖ The ability to imagine beyond the physical and to 
garner meaning from this journey is the essence of philosophy. If in fact maternity is a physical 
experience, there is then as much as now no self-intuitive reason why philosophers should not 
think metaphysically about mothers and this includes mothers themselves. The work of 
psychoanalysis makes clear the risks of dissociating the generation of life from the creation of 
ideas. In the present, the memory of our mothers and its import to the feminist(s) project(s) 
include the experience of mothering.  
It is a historical contingency that mother‘s bodies, and thus women, have been confused 
with the maternal function. It is, perhaps, an equally contingent historical feature that the 
maternal function has for so long been confused for something besides that which is infused with 
ethical, political and philosophical relevance. We all are oppressed, violated, and denigrated as a 
direct result of how we imagine, represent and understand our relation to our mothers. Within the 
confines of the discourse of philosophy, there is an imperative to imagine the future which 
includes the creation of life proceeding from she who also generates life. 
In a genius all her own, Kristeva illuminates the paradoxes which lie at the heart of 
thinking through maternity and the memory of mother which lies in all of us. Her shared hope is 
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that a commitment to understanding the journey of child‘s play and its corollaries the symbolic 
and identity will allow entry into previously explored terrain. Her relevance to my own efforts to 
deconstruct philosophy‘s concepts of generation and creation rests squarely on her evolving 
concept of the ―maternal‖ which complicates essentialist notions of sex and gender and rigid, 
dysfunctional distinctions between generation and creation. I conclude my dissertation by 
suggesting that Kristeva advances a philosophically sound and robust notion of identity that is 
premised on the recognition rather than the censorship of the repudiation of the maternal. 
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CHAPTER I 
ARISTOTLE’S MOTHER: FAILED AND BOTCHED MALE OR THE EXEMPLAR OF 
VIRTUE? 
 
 
Abstract: Aristotle has long been accused of justifying his sexually in-egalitarian politics 
on the basis of his seemingly sexist biology and metaphysics. The assumption is that Aristotle‘s 
biology and metaphysics promotes a world view in which the feminine is associated with all 
things inferior and the masculine with all things superior; however, Aristotle does not map his 
politics onto his biology and metaphysics with the careful deliberation and political agenda he is 
so often accused. In fact, in many cases Aristotle‘s sexist notions are intuited more than they are 
reasoned. In those cases in which Aristotle consciously upholds a world view in which women 
are not equal to men, what Plato terms ―close and universal proximity,‖ Aristotle reasons that 
women cannot and should not be equal to men because, so long as they become the mothers they 
ought to be, they should adopt the needs of others as their own; because they adopt the needs of 
others as their own, they are not equal to others. Aristotle‘s ―mothers‖ count as less than/more 
than one. On the surface, Plato‘s sexually egalitarian society appears more just but, on deeper 
analysis, the cost of this same justice can seem high, if not unjust to the extent that it requires 
sexual promiscuity and mandatory adoption in service of the State. Arendt and Kristeva argue 
that Aristotle‘s notion of maternity, rather than consolidate misogynist discourses and practices, 
actually helps problematizes and radicalize an even more hateful, violent and ignorant ideological 
practice: sexual equality!   
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“Failed and Botched Males”; Confusing Bios for an Ethos of Vice 
 
A number of contemporary feminists contend that Aristotle‘s philosophy is prejudiced 
against women who mother.
12Aristotle‘s stipulation that females are ―failed and botched males‖ is 
the most frequently referenced evidence of his apparently sexist philosophy.
13
 This same 
literature assumes that Aristotle equates ―failed and botched males‖ with ―females,‖ the ―female 
principle,‖ ―mothers‖ and ―women.‖  The assumption continues that Aristotle renders mothers 
synonymous to the female principle, ‗an excessive materiality without form which lacks the male 
principle‘s formative, regulating, ideational power‘ and that, on this same basis, Aristotle requires 
her exclusion on the basis of the generative function she seems to embody.  
Minorities of his readers disagree; they argue that Aristotle‘s philosophy goes beyond 
colloquial representations of women as mothers and does more to trouble than it does to 
consolidate colloquial representations of the female and male principle. They note that Aristotle‘s 
rendering of the female principle accentuates the manner in which the female principle is 
rendered an actively passive principle rather than as a merely passive principle opposed to the 
male active principle.
14
 They urge us to distinguish his ethics and biology from his politics and 
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turn our attention to Aristotle‘s reluctant admittance of the male‘s principle dependence on the 
female principle‘s ―imperfection‖ to sustain the creation of life.  
In either instance, the assumption is that Aristotle‘s biological description of ―failed and 
botched males‖ serves, intentionality or unintentionally, as a foundation for his political and 
ethical writings. While the majority conclude that Aristotle‘s apparent conflation of the male and 
female principles with men and women are the basis of his misogynist politics, and the minority 
of feminists conclude that Aristotle‘s rendering of the male and female principle illuminates a 
reticent but possibly revolutionary ethic, both interpretations assume that Aristotle‘s rendering of 
the female and male generative force fits squarely on (intended or unintended) political and 
ethical prescriptions. As Deslauriers demonstrates, while the phrase ―failed and botched males‖ 
has long been associated with the position that ―sex differences not only explain but justify 
differences in political power between men and women, ―this assumption is unwarranted because 
Aristotle regularly “assumes rather than argues for that claim.‖15  
To the novice reader, the eagerness with which Aristotle‘s sympathetic and antipathetic 
readers attach so much significance to the catch-phrase ―failed and botched males‖ is perplexing 
only because of its relative obscurity in the overall text. The phrase appears only once in On the 
Generation of Animals and, even after several close readings, was hard to locate. It phrase is 
barely visible in its context: a lengthy, animated text which, on surface, appears noticeably 
reticent on the topic of ethics or politics. After several close readings, the only explicitly 
evaluative claim I could find resembled a medical prescription more than it did an ethical or 
political one. The passage recommends that, in order to facilitate pregnancy, privileged human 
females should, at least temporarily, opt for the lifestyle of animals and servants over the 
sedentary life of luxury to which they are accustomed because 
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a difference is also found between man and the other animals in respect of gestation, for 
 animals are in  better bodily condition most of the time, whereas in most women 
 gestation is attended with discomfort. Their way of life is partly responsible for this, for 
 being sedentary they are full of more residual matter; among nations where the women 
 live a laborious life gestation is not equally conspicuous and those who are accustomed to 
 work bear children easily both there and elsewhere; for work consumes the residual 
 matter, but those who are sedentary have a great deal of it in them because not only is 
 there no monthly discharge during pregnancy but also they do no work; therefore their 
 travail is painful. But work exercises them so that they can hold their breath, upon which 
 depends the ease or difficulty of child-birth. These circumstances then, as we have said, 
 contribute to cause the difference between women and the other  animals in this state. 
16
 
 
Not only are Aristotle‘s medical prescriptions in agreement with contemporary, reliable 
medical studies in obstetrics and gynecology, they are striking for their resolute commitment to 
empirical studies rather than social norms and customs. Aristotle makes no effort to soften the 
tone of his prescriptions nor does his conviction that women, no matter what their social-status, 
are animals like any others. Given his commitment to empirical science, we are hard pressed to 
claim that either his tone or his prescription is sexist or overly normative. However, this does not 
mean that the charges of sexism against the banner ―failed and botched males‖ are unwarranted. 
There are several reasons why Aristotle‘s biological work might provoke his contemporary 
readers to charge him with sexism. These charges are best understood by placing them in the 
larger context of his indisputably chauvinistic writings in the Politics. 
In The Politics, Aristotle regularly assumes that men are suited for membership in the 
political domain and women for membership in the private domain. The fact that women are 
relegated to the private domain because she gestates, births, and nurses young life is a fact of 
social, cultural and political norms and values and, if Aristotle understands this contingency, it is 
not apparent. Claiming that women are not suited for political thought and action because she has 
been refused membership in the political domain is unfair, uninformed, and contrary to reason. It 
need only be mentioned that, despite the tendency to exclude men from the domain of the private 
and women from the domain of the public, men and women, past and present, have demonstrated 
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sufficient competence and incompetence in the work associated with private and public life. 
When a person or group who directly benefits from either men or women‘s exclusion prescribes 
their exclusion, suspicions of conflict of interest are well warranted. A crucial distinction must be 
made between claiming that mothering is antithetical to demands of political thought and action, 
claiming that women should mother, and claiming that women who mother should be prevented 
from doing politics.  
There are no true or fair grounds for relegating women to the private domain; however, it 
is less clear if there are true or fair grounds for objecting to relegating the labour of mothering to 
the private domain. Philosophers and others have long agreed that the relationship of a mother to 
her child is, at minimum, significantly dissimilar to the relationship she has to others. The 
dispositions and duties proper to her relationship to her child are, on many levels, significantly 
different, and even sometimes incompatible to the dispositions and duties associated with 
economic or civic life; to treat her child as a contracting agent or a competitor, would not only 
cause harm and suffering for the child, it would likely be an indicator of a mother‘s psychosis. 
The problem is when the relevant features of her unique relationship to her child are used to 
premise her exclusion from political life; women, like any others, can adopt multiple roles in 
multiple domains. Aristotle rarely, if ever, acknowledges this possibility, despite the fact that it 
must have been a reality of the times. He makes no distinction between the uniqueness of the 
maternal relation and his reasons for excluding this unique relationship from political equality, 
and hence, human freedom. The burden lies on Aristotle‘s advocates to make a tenable distinction.  
In the case of Arendt and Kristeva, the risks associated with confusing and conflating the 
dispositions and behaviors proper to one domain with another is accomplished by giving 
historical reference. It is the contention of Arendt, Kristeva, and even Klein, that there is 
something ―fascistic‖ about confusing one domain with the other. They believe that Aristotle 
anticipates something of this concern in his critique of Plato‘s utopia, long before the reality of 
modern fascism. (It is unfortunate that he confused the women who mother with the notion of 
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maternity; but it is our possible fortune to unpack this error). Aristotle‘s imagines a scenario in 
which the generation of life, and by extension, embodied experience, informs and permeates 
ideation, and by extension judgment, genius and wisdom, and again, by extension, family, social 
and political life. For this same reason, Aristotle once more deserves our sustained attention. 
Aristotle pioneers an imaginary topography of a dynamic of ―private‖ and ―public‖ which 
will ultimately augment, rather than diminish a philosophy which imagines women as mothers 
and agents in the political domain. For the likes of Arendt, Cavarero and Kristeva, our relation to 
our mothers is a metaphor that we will never fully comprehend, but which informs our identity in 
a profound sense. To imagine mothers and the people who they also happen to be in complex, 
nuanced renderings is to imagine a more complex, nuanced, and hence, intelligent and evolving 
notion of identity. From the beginning, mothers are the interface between our existence and our 
total flourishing. Our dependence on ―mother‖ for life is, as they claim, the template for the 
possibility of speech and action. Our first birth permits our second birth as ―citizens.‖ Protecting 
the first relation between dependent and care giver from the demands of the political thought and 
action and distinguishing it from the relation between equal citizens which is constituted by 
speech and action in the network of social relation is crucial to protecting a tenable notion of 
political freedom and action. The ―political‖ -that space of contestation and realization of 
something essentially human-is best served not by including or excluding the relation between 
dependent and care giver, but by allowing it to appear as a difference which is a dynamic 
distinction rather than a dichotomy.  
By refusing to oppose human freedom with earthly immanence, Aristotle‘s philosophy 
abstains from hard and fast dichotomies and intertwines the social, political relationship with 
embodied, affective experience. As Kristeva describes, Aristotle is ―that other philosopher of the 
―modes of life‘ (bio) and ―one of the most coherent and least contradictory of the great thinkers‖ 
because he is the first to think of an ―authority‘ based not upon the notion of social domination, 
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but rather upon that of a ―nature‘ made of ―differences.‘‖17 At best, Aristotle‘s rendering of 
earthly immanence and maternity does not require a severing from our mother‘s body, nor does it 
require that mothers mother their own children.
18
 Instead, it allows for the possibility of 
imagining our first birth as the onset of ourselves as earthly beginnings in an embrace which, 
ideally, accompanies us as another self towards the possibility of becoming human and free. For 
Aristotle, it is from within, and not against, the event of generation that we develop into beings 
who can bear ourselves into the space of thought and action.   
The constant challenge will be to imagine a dynamic of first and second birth which does 
not require mothers to thrust her infant into the space of appearance and remain behind. In 
Aristotle‘s estimation, once a woman gives birth, she chooses to be a mother and remain behind, 
or, she chooses to be no one at all, neither human nor animal. In contradistinction, Plato imagines 
the possibility of women entering the domain of the public but only by shedding their role as 
mothers. Plato figures women in ―close and universal proximity‖ to men once they have been 
stripped of the inclination to mother what they generate.
19
 In this scenario, women are ―in 
common‖ not to every man.20The feminist literature which targets Aristotle‘s phrase ―females are 
failed and botched males‖ not only misrepresents On the Generation of Animals, it overshadows 
Aristotle‘s nuanced rendering of the relation between our first relation to mother in the private 
domain and our second relation to others in the political domain. In summary, it is wrong to claim 
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 29 
that Aristotle harbors hatred towards what gestates, labours, and nurses infant life. Aristotle 
imagines a space of earthly dependence, inequality and unconditional love which is distinct from 
the space of political freedom. If we are able to distinguish women from the mothers they become, 
there is much more to be salvaged than if we require that women renounce the mothers they once 
were.  
 
Hot-house Politics: The Flower Pot Theory of Reproduction 
My interpretation is in the minority. Aristotle‘s rendering of the female principle and its 
proximity to his rendering of maternity is overly problematic for most of his feminist-critics. (His 
women readers who resolutely do not identity as feminists are quite sympathetic to his rendering 
of generation, the female and the maternal). The over-riding concern seems to hinge on the phrase 
―failed and botched males‖ in On the Generation of Animals. One of the more out-spoken 
thinkers on this matter is Battersby. She claims Aristotle considers women 
…failed and botched males who, through lack of heat during conception and the 
subsequent period of fetal growth, failed to develop their full potential as 
members of that species. Thus, although women are human (and thus have the 
minimal characteristics, or essence, of a human), they are also lacking: they are 
not its end or final cause.‘ 21  
 
Oliver comes to a similar conclusion. She writes that Aristotle provides  
… one of the first known theories of epigenesis of the embryo. He maintained 
that the embryo developed [. . . ] as a result of the combination of male and 
female principles: [. . .] The male principle contributes the soul while the female 
principle contributes the less perfect body (738.b.25). The male element creates 
the individual or person within the maternal body. On this account, the maternal 
body provides merely the fertile soil within which the male seed implants and 
grows. The female principle is passive while the male principle is active.
22
  
 
Battersby and Oliver term Aristotle‘s theory the ―flower pot theory‖ of sexual 
reproduction. For both Battersby and Oliver, Aristotle‘s concept equates women with unformed 
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matter and passivity and equates men with formative ideas and activity. This interpretation relies 
on a series of assumptions which are extraneous to On the Generation of Animals. I am not 
suggesting that interpretation, of any text, should be restricted to the front and back cover. I am 
not suggesting that such an interpretation would be possible, as modern hermeneutics and 
deconstruction makes clear. Instead, my point is intended to be far simpler and more narrow-
although I concede that it risks being too narrow. My argument is that, in On the Generation of 
Animals, does not equate men and women with the male and female principle. In fact, there is not 
one instance in On the Generation of Animals in which Aristotle interchanges the terms male and 
female with men and women. I quote at length, but the notion is rather simple. Aristotle writes: 
Male and female differ in their essence by each having a separate ability or 
faculty, and anatomically by certain parts; essentially the male is that which is 
able to generate in another, as said above; the female is  that which is able to 
generate in itself and out of which comes into being the offspring previously 
existing  in the parent. And since they are differentiated by an ability or faculty 
and by their function, and since instruments or organs are needed for all 
functioning, and since the bodily parts are the instruments or organs to serve the 
faculties, it follows that certain parts must exist for union of parents and 
production of offspring. And these must differ from each other, so that 
consequently the male will differ from the female.  (For even though we speak of 
the animal as a whole as male or female, yet really it is not male or female in 
virtue of the whole of itself, but only in virtue of a certain faculty and a certain 
part- just as with the part used for sight or locomotion- which part is also plain to 
sense-perception.)
23
 
 
Aristotle‘s description of male and female is striking for its succinct, distilled, and nearly 
mechanical rendering of sex identity. It is only later and in other texts that Aristotle broadens and 
deepens his rendering to include human sexuality and gendered identity. But, from within the 
narrow confines of this text, I am hard pressed to identify a sexist tone. While science is a 
discourse amongst others and there is no disputing that science can be sexist, there is good 
science and bad science. There is a general consensus that good science works hard to minimize 
metaphorical ambiguity with the aim of capturing the clearest, most reliable patterns and 
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predictions about the natural world. In this sense, I find it all the more remarkable that a thinker 
writing long before the advent of the dawn of the current authority of scientific discourse could 
give an account of male and female sex identity that is so current and cogent.  
Aristotle‘s aim is to distinguish, amongst a broad range of species, the features which 
determine sexual reproduction to be possible. He concludes that the male sex has one set of 
reproductive organs and the female sex has another. In most species, if not all species, sexual 
reproduction (as opposed to asexual reproduction) occurs when male and females use their sexual 
organs to communicate genetic information. A successful communication yields an offspring 
which is made of equal parts of its ancestors. Typically, this offspring develops in the female‘s 
body (with the seahorse and perhaps other animals being an exception to the rule). Typically, if 
this offspring is a mammal, and in some cases, a bird a reptile or an insect, it will be nurtured by 
its mother until it is ready for an independent existence. If the flower pot theory is somehow 
sexist, Battersby and Oliver‘s are reticent about their knowledge of another non-sexist and 
scientifically accurate account. The more accurate interpretation seems to be that the hidden 
accusation behind naming this account the ―flower pot theory‖ relies on the assumption that there 
is something anti-feminist in claiming that mother‘s bodies are passively acting matter.  
This equation can seem anti-feminist if it is assumed that passively acting matter is being 
equated to the person who is a woman and mother. However agreeable it may or may not be, On 
the Generation of Animals Aristotle abstains from any such equation. Instead, while he claims 
that her reproductive organs render her possibly capable of generating life, he does not claim that 
generating life renders females mothers. As I will demonstrate in a moment, Aristotle‘s 
description of mothering and childbirth is anything but guaranteed by the reproductive function 
she performs. Instead, in On the Generation of Animals Aristotle recommends that human 
mothers are best served if they adopt a passive attitude toward gestating and bearing life. By this 
he means that giving birth requires women to relinquish their control and allow the event to 
unfold: staying relaxed and calm is a practice that is advocated by birth technicians all over the 
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world, again, because it is in strong agreement with empirical evidence. Aristotle claims that, if 
humans are inclined to be the humans they are, and less inclined to be the animals they also are, 
they are more likely to feel pain and less likely to complete a successful birth. He must make such 
a suggestion because humans are not naturally animal-like. As such, women who mother are 
neither likely to behave like the animals they also are, and even less likely to behave like the 
matter that determines their sex identity. For Aristotle, only those women who take on the 
exception burden of ethical mothering life are, in Aristotle‘s estimation, possibly human; 
unfortunately, the tendency is still to assume that Aristotle did not appreciate the difference 
between getting pregnant, giving birth, and being a mother.  
 
Failed and Botched Males; Confusing Bios for an Ethos of Virtue 
In Protevi‘s ―Given Time and The Gift of Life,‖ he fashions a meta-ethic from within the 
framework of Aristotle‘s On the Generation of Animals and the Metaphysics.24 First, he attempts 
to demonstrate that the impossible ideal is implicit in generation as ―the paternal-filial passage 
recaptured in the spermatic motions of the father.‖25 He claims that this ideal cannot be willed 
because if females only produced the likeness of males, then there would be no more females, and 
thus, no more males. Protevi concludes that Aristotle‘s ―female principle‖ is a reluctant 
admittance of her necessary imperfection, which is also her random, but guaranteed prevalence 
over the male‘s otherwise superior spermatic principle. This apparent ideal, which contains its 
own necessary counter ideal, is, in Protevi‘s analysis, not only the possibility of generation, but 
proper to a meta-ethic of life itself. The mother‘s (superior) inferior matter sustains the 
circumference of the circle is evidence to Protevi of some deeper testimony to an ethic implicit in 
paternity and maternity, an indeterminate place where, on Protevi‘s rendering, the generation of 
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life could not be distinguished from an ethic of a passive giving of life. Protevi claims that 
because ―life is preserved in the paternal-filial passage through the medium of matter of mother‖ 
On the Generation of Animals requires a ―normative operation.‖26 Ultimately, Protevi‘s poetic 
license causes him to get lost in the true poesies of Aristotle‘s work. Aristotle does not collapse 
generation with giving or generation with love. Rather, Aristotle will claim-though neither in the 
Metaphysics or On the Generation of Animals that birth prepares the way for a possibly virtuous 
way of living our familial and political lives.  
For Aristotle, the animal generates life, but only the human mother can love the life she 
generates. She does not give life. Life is generated. If she is a virtuous mother, she gives the gift 
of sustaining life, and, eventually, she gives the gift of no longer sustaining life, but thought and 
action requires the sustaining of life. Human mothers, once pregnant, can treat their bodies with 
respect or not but there is nothing they can do about the fact that life flourishes when it is 
nourishes, and perishes when it is starved. Only human mothers can ―give‖ the continuation of 
life. Even this is partly out of her control because only human mothers could not give life. Human 
mothers are rational when she gives and receives: she does so because she has regulated her 
appetites and desires, she does so because she has cultivated habits and virtues or vices and she 
does so mindful of the scope of her social and political relation and obligations. When mother 
gives, she gives as a self regulating, social person with a memory of the experience of giving and 
receiving and gaining and losing. When she generates life, she does so because her physical body 
has ovaries and breasts, because a man has penetrated her with sperm, and because she has eaten, 
slept, and gestated, succumbed to contractions, and survived labour. For Aristotle, she is not a 
mother until she embraces these physical events and loves and cares for her offspring. When 
Protevi claims that On the Generation of Animals requires ―the affirmation of excessive demands 
of justice,‖ without first establishing adequate grounds for reading it as a normative, rather than a 
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biological text, he fails to make way for distinguishing merely animal life from human life. 
Without seeming to be trite, we are left to wonder if his reading of On the Generation of Animals 
would, on his own conditions, require a ―normative operation‖ for the actions of a goat or a 
goldfish.
27
  
Battersby disagrees. She notes that it is ironic that some feminists ―assert that there can 
be no essence of a female‖ because they ―are unwittingly repeating the Aristotelian doctrine that 
links essence to some one defining property of a species that is common to all members of that 
species, but that cannot be found in females‖ and make ―femaleness as a deformation a 
conceptual necessity.‖ 28  But Protevi is not arguing that femaleness as a deformation is a 
conceptual necessity, rather, he is arguing that deformation is a conceptual necessity in a 
metaphysic that includes perfection. Both miss the more important weakness which relies on the 
assumption that Aristotle‘s biological, metaphysical, political and ethical writings share some 
essential form and content which permits his readers to make positive or negative inferences 
about men and women, and fathers and mothers. Aristotle‘s ethical and political works are highly 
focused on the economy of the gift, but On the Generation of Animals is a relief from the 
philosophical obsession with the social, normative and political domain proper to humanity.  
On the Generation of Animals is full of pages on the hypozoma, the viviparous and the 
oviparous, polydactylous quadrupeds, she-asses and catamenia, superfluous matter, seminal 
residue and hair that goes on growing after death.
29
 If there is a normative claim to be found, and 
I‘m only able to find one, it has to be Aristotle‘s plain-spoken discouragement of the tendency for 
sedentary practices during pregnancy. He encourages her to be more like the other animals and 
working women. Aristotle places human generators alongside other animals. Aristotle reflects on 
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the biological in an attempt to understand the possible logic dynamic of opposing forces which is 
the generation of life. On this basis, Kristeva gives Aristotle the title of ―that other philosopher of 
the ―modes of life‘ (bio) and ―one of the most coherent and least contradictory of the great 
thinkers‖ because he is the first to think of an ―authority‘ based not upon the notion of social 
domination, but rather upon that of a ―nature‘ made of ―differences‘.‖30 The thought of ―nature 
made of differences‘ will be an important trope for our departure into the works of Arendt and 
Klein. This nature made of differences is the thought of hylomorphism. 
 
Hylomorphism and Hypervigilance  
Hylomorphism is the thought of forming matter and enmattering form. Hylomorphism 
describes both the generative coupling analogous to sexual reproduction and the creative process 
analogous to artistic production. Aristotle likens the offspring of the male and female to the 
marriage of an idea in the soul of the artisan branded and molded in media.
31
 In natural 
production, the form is found in the parents where ―the begetter is the same in kind as the 
begotten, not one in number but one in form for man begets man.‖32 Aristotle is not claiming that 
the father‘s identity fully determines the child‘s identity. Aristotle‘s claim is narrow. Aristotle is 
claiming that the coupling of man and woman produces a human offspring. In both instances, the 
form preexists both; in both instances, the form is the outcome of dynamic process involving 
opposition; thus, in both instances, reproduction is not achieved through simple repetition, but 
through a complex marriage of repetition and difference. Every child conceived by two humans 
will be human, but some children will resemble their mother, others their father and others their 
aunt or an uncle. The child is a composite of his or her genetic inheritance just as the work of art 
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is a marriage of ideas and medium.
33
  Hylomorphism describes the process of forming 
compounds by describing the formation of matter and the enmattering of form. In claiming that 
an essence is sustained during the process of marrying sameness with difference, Aristotle is 
demarcating a limit point between a legitimate production and a monstrosity. A similar debate 
circulates in the scientific community as it delineates the boundaries between normal and 
abnormal weather patterns, safe and unsafe levels of pollutants, or the genetic mutation. 
Aristotle‘s claim is not that man, or the male principle, creates humans, but that humans generate 
humans and not pigs or cows or flies. When and if one entity creates a wholly other entity, it is 
generally a cause of discussion and, in most cases, a cause of concern. For Aristotle, the form is 
not only what brings the compound into being; instead, the form is what determines the name of 
the compound. As has been argued since, matter without form would be unintelligible, form 
without matter non-existent.  
The ―form‖ is not a proper name. Proper names are the jurisdiction of families and states 
and cultures and community and thus firmly outside the parameters of On the Generation of 
Animals. Aristotle‘s sole but crucial claim is that what is produced is a house or a man and not 
bricks or flesh. Despite the relative neutral and generally intuitive strengths of Aristotle‘s 
metaphysics, feminist thinkers tend to be critical of ―hylomorphism.‖ The concern is that 
feminine is opposed to masculine; masculinity is aligned with form, active power, and maleness, 
and femininity with matter, passive (possibly passive activity) and femaleness; last, this ontology 
mirrors the ideology which legitimates sexual inequality, oppression and violence against women 
then, as now. Once these premises are accepted, hylomorphism seems like a guilty ally that 
renders maleness and femaleness unequal partners in Aristotle's metaphysics.   
Lynda Lange adopts this position in ―Woman Is Not a Rational Animal,‖ when she 
claims that Aristotle's theory of sex difference is implicated in every piece of Aristotle's 
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metaphysical jargon. She concludes that ―it is not at all clear that it [Aristotle's theory of sex 
difference] can simply be cut away without any reflection on the status of the rest of the 
philosophy.‖ 34  Elizabeth Spelman seconds Lange‘s position by claiming that Aristotle‘s 
politicized metaphysics is reflected in his theory of soul, which, in turn, is used to justify the 
subordination of women in the Politics. Susan Okin likewise agrees and claims that Aristotle's 
functionalist theory of form was devised by Aristotle to legitimate the political status quo in 
Athens, especially slavery and the inequality of women. If these scholars are right, then 
Aristotle's theories are intrinsically sexist and have little if any potential value for feminists 
beyond the project of learning about the ways in which the philosophical tradition has devalued 
women. Once again, the assumption is that Aristotle ―flower pot theory of reproduction‖ renders 
women‘s bodies, like women themselves, nothing but the vessel for man‘s formative seed. The 
consensus amongst these critics is that hylomorphism is the conceptual framework that underlies 
most of Aristotle‘s metaphysics and physics which privileges maleness in the biological, 
metaphysical, political and ethical domain. This would be a cogent argument if it was not for one 
logical outcome. 
If Aristotle's gender associations were intrinsic to his concepts of matter (female) and 
form (male), and every composite substance is a complex of matter and form, then each substance 
would be a hermaphrodite. Whatever plausibility gender associations with matter and form might 
have with regard to animals is lost entirely when we consider artifacts like shoes and beds. More 
bizarre still, if Aristotle‘s politics was founded on his metaphysics and physics, it could hardly 
found the chauvinistic aristocracy proper to the Politics. In fact, it might be a world that better 
resembles our contemporary, post-modern, cosmos. If intrinsic gender associations with matter 
and form are incompatible with Aristotle's theory of hylomorphism, and extrinsic gender 
associations are compatible with that theory, then we must opt for the consistent interpretation. 
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Mothering is a Mother’s Virtue 
For Aristotle, the animal is female when her womb gestates eggs and her breasts produce 
milk. The animal is male mammal when he has neither a womb nor breasts that produce milk. For 
Aristotle, her ability to gestate, birth and nurse young life is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
criteria for being a ―mother‖ in the fullest sense. The true mother must contend with the female 
principle and the miraculous and mundane experience of being the one who ―generates life‖ but 
she must also do so in a manner that only a human is able. The hylomorphic is relevant to her 
thinking, acting person because it hinges on what it is to know, what it is to make decisions in the 
context of the social and political, and what it is to love wisdom and kin. They hylomorphic is 
also relevant to her because she will birth, nurse, and in most cases, nurture her infant. To the 
extent that women gestates, births, and nurses life, she is immanent to the pulse of generative life 
and the active-passivity typified by our earthly existence. The experience of pregnancy, labour 
and early infancy augments many women‘s sensitivity to their material bodies-if only by making 
her feel nauseous, tired, cranky or sensitive. It is impossible to describe the process of generating 
life as non-physical experience, just as it is impossible to describe mothering as a purely 
biological process. ―Mothering‖ is the absolute conjunction of biological and human. Aristotle 
does not assume that a woman‘s experience of generating life renders her a ―mother.‖ Instead, 
Aristotle maintains that ―mothering‖ is a virtue in the sense that it is something which she must 
choose to do. A woman aborts her fetus, and ceases to be a ―mother,‖ a woman miscarries, and 
ceases to be a ―mother,‖ a woman gestates life, but cannot love her offspring, and ceases to be a 
―mother.‖ Becoming a mother resists oversimplified biological determinism but becoming a 
mother also resists an oversimplified rendering of choice.  
A woman who becomes a mother evolves into an identity. This identity is ripe with the 
ambivalence and contradictions proper to undergoing a physical event that, in itself, demands an 
ethical decision. Without relying on restricted or narrow notions of rationality, Aristotle is able to 
articulate a tenable distinction between humans and d others animals. Aristotle articulates an ethic 
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in which the physical experiences associated with generating life must be managed with a self 
awareness that keeps us on a steady course in the midst of the inclinations of the ‗here and now.‘ 
For Aristotle, being ethical requires the capacity to moderate and overcome our earthly instincts 
and inclinations, but it also requires tapping into these same resources when the situation 
demands. The human is differently animal because it can envision multiple courses of action and 
choose the one that is or is not in accord with a concept of the good. It is for this reason that 
ethics is concerned with the praiseworthy (virtue) or the blameworthy (vice). It is also for this 
reason that humans, unlike other animals, can generate life while also choosing to embrace, or not, 
the demands of parenting. Aristotle considers the human who generates life but who chooses not 
to parent inhuman; he also considers the human who generates life but who chooses not to parent 
‗in-animal.‘ The human who failed to accept that his thoughts and actions were more than animal 
and less than perfectly rational is, in Aristotle‘s estimation, inhuman.  
For Aristotle, all persons have the power to think and act. The power to think and act is 
dictated by the constantly shifting parameters formed by the amalgamation of character, 
experience, and context. Our power is not ‗thing‘ which we reach in and access like a weapon or 
a tool; our power is the effect of well established ―habits.‖ In turn, our habits help establish the 
power we need to cultivate dispositions for thinking and acting in one way rather than another. In 
every instance, our community of mentors and others bear a strong influence on our habit of 
thinking and acting in one way rather than another. The virtuous person is never simply 
―virtuous,‖ the virtuous person strives, develops, and alternately fails and succeeds to 
demonstrate virtue in the context of his character, community and situation. His success and 
failure hinges on his ability to develop a passive potentiality; his success and failure does not 
refer directly to his choices or overt behaviors, but to our decision to adopt an attitude towards the 
unknown and the unpredictable. This ability to adapt is what Aristotle terms an ―inter alia.‖35 
                                                     
35
 See Aristotle‘s Metaphysics, especially sections 1046, 1047 and 1048 
 40 
―Inter alia‖ is the result of someone learning how to suffer ―pathos.‖ 36 For Aristotle, virtue (and 
vice) is the outcome of cultivated potentialities.  
Aristotle stipulates a notion of maternal virtue that is commensurate, but not equivalent 
to,   his more general notion of virtue. In his rendering, the woman who becomes a mother sits at 
a crossroads. The woman who mothers can behave like an animal and permit mere instinct to 
dictate her choices and behaviors. The woman who mothers can also behave as if she is not a 
mother at all. In either case, Aristotle deems her to be governed by vice rather than virtue. In both 
cases, she exemplifies an extreme so intense that she falls outside the spectrum of human. The 
mother who affirms the permeation of animal and who  integrates this same instinct into the 
cultural norms and values of her community and politic is a woman who will be most likely to 
bring her infant from the world of earthly necessity into the world of human freedom. Her infant 
is most likely to survive physically and survive and flourish in all that is meta-physical. In this 
sense, Aristotle‘s notion of maternal identity affirms a concept of a self that cannot be separated 
from its various attachments including the physical and the meta-physical. In this regard, 
Aristotle affirms that women are capable of the kind of reasoning required for virtue. Contrary to 
what might be expected by feminist-minded readers, Aristotle frequently suggests that women‘s 
unique intimacy with the complexity of navigating the demands of earthly necessity and its other, 
human ideation, culture and community, are uniquely situated to experience, and thus master the 
judgment required for virtue-a value he rates quite highly, if not most high.  The catch is that her 
unique ability is also, in Aristotle‘s rendering, her black-card from the world of political equality 
and all that it entails. The sting is that the same virtues are, in Aristotle‘s ideal world, taught by 
mothers to their sons and daughters.  
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Mothers Mother; the Politics and Pedagogy of Choice 
 
In diachronic terms, our first relation is to our mother. The first relation is our first 
appearance in the world in which we will become, in habit and action, an ethical person. Our first 
relationship to mother is our first entrance into a world in which we are developing beings in the 
context of the web of relationship that is regulated by an economy of giving and receiving. 
Aristotle stipulates that virtuous mothers take on the work of preparing us for this world, or 
passes us on to someone who will, by unconditionally loving what might otherwise be praised or 
condoned, all the while steering us in the right direction.
37
 Our virtuous mother introduces us into 
the cold hard world of calculative competition and self interest by educating us about how to 
protect ourselves without succumbing to the same self interest. The virtuous mother does so by 
loving us the way that, if we are lucky, another citizen may eventually love us. Every friendship 
we might have will, according to Aristotle, be an imperfect simulation of this first experience of 
being love like another self without regard for return. Most of our friendships will dissolve under 
the friction of utility or pleasure. 
38
 Our only -rare and unlikely- return to the experience of our 
first relation will be if we become excellent citizens and stumble across another who is most 
excellent. 
According to Aristotle, our mothers prepare us for a relationship which is only possible, 
but altogether rare, in the sphere of the political. If one becomes one of two good men alike in 
excellence and virtue, he will know what it is to give without regard for return. Two men alike in 
virtue can only give like a mother gives to her child require if they are free of the demands of 
necessity. The friendship, unlike the mother-child relation, cannot be forced by utility, pleasure, 
or necessity. A friendship between political-equals borders on perfect, but its imperfection is its 
perfection. The mother loves her child without regard for utility or pleasure in the context of 
necessity despite necessity and because she is a mother. The two men who love without regard 
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for return once extricated from necessity. Necessity ruins the perfect friendship and forms the 
basis of the mother-infant relation. Mothers love perfectly from within imperfection.  
A mother‘s love is anomalous one more time. While the perfect friendship can stand the 
test of time: it is impossibly impervious to unpredictability, crisis, and temptations for vice, it 
does require proximity and duration. Aristotle claims that the mother is, if need be, willing to 
offer her child to another family, never to see him again, if it seems right.
39
 The perfect friend 
could will no such action. Like the infant, the virtuous man must appear as a ―who‖ to his friend: 
the mother loves her child on first sight, but she knows nothing about his past or his future. He 
appears as a ―who‖ as quality without quantity. The man of perfect friendship must appear as an 
infant to his friend and as mother to himself: his friend must solicit in him his motherly instincts. 
He must love his friend like himself, as an infant, who is really a mother. The mother‘s love of 
her infant is perfectly imperfect.  
The appearance of the infant awakens a sense of responsibility to sustain and nourish life 
in a manner that is antithetical to the calculations of giving and receiving proper to relationships 
between citizens, strangers or friends. The virtuous mother loves her infant‘s life as it were 
another self. To love an infant requires a momentary, though sustained momentary, suspension of 
any pretense at political freedom. This not wanting political freedom, and wanting it for the other 
at any cost, is, for Aristotle a woman‘s transition into maternity .It is her second birth. The second 
birth into the ―ethical‖ is not reserved for women; rather, ―mother‖ is a metaphor and an exemplar 
of Aristotle‘s notion of perfect virtue. Most of us never achieve anything more than imperfect 
friendship; all of us who have been loved by a virtuous mother know the experience. For Aristotle, 
a man is born a second time when he learns to love like his mother. Two men of high rank can 
only know this most perfect love, the love a mother feels for her child in the bellies of necessity, 
by loving the other unconditionally. But he, unlike the mother, can only do it under the most 
sustained, manufactured and concentrated conditions. Giving and doing because we love another 
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who is equally cultivated and accomplished prepares us to be passively-actively receptive for true 
and free thought and action; however, there is one other way to do so but it is non-reciprocal. One 
must become a parent to know the virtue of imperfect perfection.    
Aristotle does not speak about paternal ethics as much as he does maternal ethics, at least 
not explicitly, unless of course we remember that the Nichomean Ethics is a book by Aristotle, 
the father, to his son, on how to understand their relationship, and how their interdependent-
dynamic is the core of all other relationships, especially relationships which will, as any virtuous 
father hopes, lead to a life of happiness rather than despair for his son. The human, male or 
female, who did not respond to the demand made by his child, would be neither ethical nor free. 
He could not make his appearance into the political. In this sense, Aristotle affirms the 
intersection of infancy, what breaths and cries but does not speak and our second birth as the 
development of breath into speech. Breath does not precede voice, it intertwines with voice. The 
parents nurture their infant and bring them from breath into speech. The parent‘s language 
straddles the realm of breath and the realm of speech delivering it one more time from earthly 
immanence into human freedom. Without her accompaniment, we are dumb and deaf to ourselves 
and the world. Aristotle affirms the interconnection. 
Aristotle‘s notion of birth suggests that we are born into a web of relationships of 
inequality and equality, and perfection and imperfection. These same relationships are governed 
by economies of debt and obligation. Those who are fortunate enough to be born into 
relationships dictated by norms and values of fairness and kindness will develop the expectation 
that they will be nourished and loved and encouraged to leave the homestead they were born into. 
Those less fortunate will likely expect that it should have been otherwise. We rightly expect 
relationships to be governed by equilibrium of give and take; we are ―political.‖ We become who 
we are in the context of this political context. We become who we are, which is not equivalent to 
anyone, in the context of this political context. This development is intensely libertarian and 
eminently social.  
 44 
We become who we are in the context of this relationship of giving and taking, wanting 
and having, needing and getting. We become who we are, but cannot know who we are, our 
daemon, except from the stories told about us by others. In fact, we seem to understand from an 
early age that we cannot know who we are without the narration told to us by others. We feel the 
lack and desire one another‘s narration to know who we are. Our thoughts and action may likely 
spring from our desire to enact a story that will be told to us by others about who we are. What is 
unique to me cannot be known to me in each individual ―remains hidden‖ to ―the person himself‖ 
and does not ―appear so clearly and unmistakably as it does to others. The ambiguity which 
pervades identity, and the lack that it entails, becomes of crucial import for Arendt, Klein and 
Cavarero. They use this trajectory to unravel the constative tone of Philosophy, a discourse they 
liken to the tragic myth of Oedipus. The story of our birth will not only unravel philosophy, but 
also their psychoanalytic reading of Oedipus.  
 
Neither our First nor Our Second; Birth is Not Philosophical 
The Ethics is a text of social, moral and political calculations that in every way privileges 
men of good, virtuous birth with a desire for excellence. It is also a text which highlights the the 
co-constitution of the public and the private and thereby illuminating the incompleteness of both 
spheres taken in isolation. It is a text which helps lay the foundation for the dynamic of first and 
second birth as a reinitiating of a new beginning as the shadowing of the self by the start it was 
never present for. It is an appeal for a political life in which the originality of each individual is 
guaranteed through a ―web of human relationships‖ consisting of memory and narrative destined 
for others.
40
 Aristotle not only opens the way to illuminating birth as revealing our fragile 
uniqueness, he illuminates birth as the revelation of our interdependence on others for knowing 
this fragile uniqueness. Our memory of having been born is concealed to us, but not to those who 
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witness our birth. We know who we are by appealing to others to tell us our story. Our first 
appearance is also the intertwining our second appearance. Our first appearance is the pre-
political and pre-historical condition of history, the story without beginning and end.‖41  
Our memory is not only incomplete, it is necessarily unreliable because it is narrated to 
us by others and yet stubbornly insists on appearing to us as if it originated in ourselves. Even the 
most self reflective thinker who understands this mirage appears to himself as the person whose 
life story originates in himself. Our own origin, our first appearance, is an analogy for history 
itself: it is what can only be seen by others who they cannot see themselves except through the 
narration of others. Our desire for history is our desire to know our origin, the very knowledge 
that is impossible to us except through others who themselves depend on us for self knowledge. 
Our ―daemon,‖ the distinct identity we leave behind in speech and action, is not only unknowable 
to ourselves, it is unpredictable.  
We are our beginnings. We cannot predict the thoughts and actions of ourselves or others. 
The unpredictability inherent in being human is also the affirmation of our selves as beings who 
are their beginnings. History is the culmination and fragmentation of the unpredictable footprint 
of thought and action. The possibility of this affirmation of beings who are their beginnings and 
who know themselves through the narrative work of others is political freedom. Aristotle‘s appeal 
for a political life in which the originality of each individual is guaranteed through human 
relationships consisting of narrative memory affirms a concept of a self that cannot be separated 
from its social, political relationships or its sensory, amorous identifications. The fact of our 
unpredictability and inter-connection is an affirmation, not a conflation, of our first relation as 
infants to mothers. Mothers are the beings who bring us from the world of needs and wants into 
the world of social relation and possible political freedom. Aristotle‘s rendering of mother‘s 
                                                     
41
Arendt writes, ―that every individual life between birth and death can eventually be told as a 
story with beginning and end is the prepolitical and prehistorical condition of history, the great story 
without  beginning and end‖ The Human Condition, 184.  
  
 46 
tenuous ontological status and permanent habitat in that space in-between generation and creation 
is inherently ambiguous; it is so ambiguous that even those of us reading his works in the present 
day with a mind to real, concrete feminist political concerns should take pause. Is it right to think 
that ―mothers‖ should be made political?  
Aristotle deems ―mothers‖ incapable of making an entrance into the political domain for 
several reasons. First, ―mothers‖ do not make a ―public‖ appearance because she remains hidden 
even to us and yet, we are aware that to know who we are, which is part of our preparation for 
entrance into the space of thought and action, we are aware of our lack of this knowledge and our 
dependence on her for making this possible entrance which affirms what is affirmed in birth: we 
are the beings who are our beginnings. This revelation cannot be an appeal for ―mothers‘‖ 
exclusion from political life, but it can be used to affirm political life as the development of the 
first relation. Aristotle‘s notion of maternity is a foray into identity in which life is coextensive 
with thought and a selfhood that cannot be separated from attachments. For Aristotle, mothers 
cannot be stripped of their desire to mother without a terrible violence: the violence of total 
disappearance. He suggests that women who choose to not mother their children are not really 
humans or animals; perhaps he is not being evaluative, but descriptive, as when we diagnose 
women with post-partum depression. Based on what women have to tell us about this experience, 
his description seems accurate. No matter the singularity with which these women experience the 
depression associated with becoming a mother, the common experience is the failure to feel a 
bond with the infant.  
The unfair political consequence is that Aristotle both describes and prescribes her 
condition to be determining. Aristotle‘s mother, with all of her virtue, can only make an 
appearance in the Nichomean Ethics as wives who bear their husband‘s offspring. They appear 
under his proper name and maintain their name only in their virtuous and fertile relation. She 
becomes pregnant and cares for life out of duty as a cause of her situation. The parent child 
relationship (upon which the state itself depends) is necessarily imperfect and unequal. If she has 
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no children, she has no marriage. If she has no marriage, or husband, she has no name. The 
husband and wife have come together to create and sustain life-this is their pleasure and their 
utility-but should they fail to reproduce, like any imperfect friendship, it too will perish. The 
husband requires his wife. The wife requires her husband. And the two of them require children. 
It is only to her child that she feels this perfect, though imperfect friendship. Aristotle claims that 
a mother would rather die than see her child perish. It is a claim that borders on a double truth. 
The child is a self who is more important than she is to herself; her child is her life, both in fact, 
and as an ethical ideal.
42
  
Aristotle is both prescribing and describing her situation; without her child, a mother has 
no station-her social connection as an adult woman, unless of independent wealth-is her status as 
wife and mother. This child is a self who is more important than she is to herself; her child is, 
quite literally, her identity. 
43
 It is this considering the other another self which two male citizens 
strive to simulate, but so rarely manage. For Aristotle, it is to imagine a near impossible freedom. 
Despite this, we can also see that, for Aristotle, a mother‘s proximity to the pulse of birth as 
multiple and varied implications to the thought of private and public life. What brings life from 
the earth, and creates life from what she generates, renders her a great inclination ―to seek and to 
nurture, in the context of her attachments, that which permits the flourishing of what is unique in 
her rather than that which, in these attachments, restrains and suppresses her pleasure.‖44 There is, 
even in our current political situation, a strong case to be made for a ―mother‘s‖ virtue. The task 
becomes imagining a case in which her virtue could bear a universal application, and never 
limited to women alone.  
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Who is counting? She who is Highest/Lowest, More than/Less than One 
Aristotle imagines what it would mean for two men to love another as a mother loves her 
child. He deduces that the love two men feel for one another can only simulate the love of a 
mother for her infant. The mother loves her child as ―another self.‖ She gestates, bears and nurses 
the life of ―another self,‖ another self who will, if he is a boy, be necessarily superior to her in 
rank. When she loves this other as another self, she is less than one. But this lack is also her 
perfect virtue. She is what acts by being what is acted upon, what blunts by cutting, what cools by 
heat, she is what causes the moving or efficient cause to itself receive, what pushes on the 
pushing, and crushed in crushing. ―Sometimes,‖ writes Aristotle, she is ―is altogether more acted 
upon than is the thing on which it acts, so that what is heating or cooling something else is itself 
cooled or heated; sometimes having produced no effect, sometimes less than it has itself 
received.
45
 (Her love is what separates her from being a slave). In her loving the other as another 
self, she births them once again. She gives life, and movement in the fullest sense, to what only 
knows how to be born and to move. She gives breath to life. It is an ideal that only two active 
rational men, with their slightly less intimate connection to earth necessity, can simulate in speech: 
their unique, embodied and relational freedom 
Aristotle claims that mothers are capable of greater virtue than men. Mothers are, for 
Aristotle, the ideal of excess in an ethics which prescribes the median between excesses. Only 
mothers are selfless enough to give without want of return, and to give what is most precious to 
them, their children, to others if it seemed necessary. Men who risk loving others as another self 
are, in most cases, fools.  In impossibly rare circumstances, two men could love without regard 
for return, as do men of perfect virtue who accidentally stumble across another equally perfect, 
but even then their friendship is threatened by the desire born from necessity. Mothers, unlike two 
male citizens of equal rank who randomly encounter one another in the open space of the political, 
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by definition, love without regard for return from within the very bowels of necessity: 
reproducing life, and nurturing this same progeny in the domestic domain, without any hopes or 
claims on political freedom or privilege.  
Aristotle‘s rendering of ethics as the intertwining of the embodied, emotive appetitive 
and the rationality that sustains, regulates and envisions is in most cases reflective of the ideal 
that many feminists want to have registered in philosophical conversations. The fact that women 
have tended to most fully experience the weight of living together in contexts on inequality, and 
subject to the rhythms and demands of necessity and our earth bound existence seems, in some 
Philosophical conversations, to be forgotten. But while Aristotle‘s philosophy makes a strong ally 
for contemporary feminist thinkers wary of the modern, autonomous, rational ego, it is equally 
suspect for its ability to affirm, if not sometimes champion, those very inequalities and 
oppressions and exploitations which feminist thinkers want and need to challenge: the elitism of 
the privileged white, educated, male citizen is sustained equally well by the modernist myth of 
rational autonomy as it is by the ancient Greek metaphysic.  
For Kristeva, it is Aristotle‘s affirmation of a self that cannot be separated from its 
various attachments ―political, psychical, sensory, amorous, or literary‖ that not only renders him 
a forerunner to a metaphysic which affirms the interconnection between self and others, nature 
and culture it is a forerunner to a metaphysic at its limits. Kristeva claims that when metaphysics 
takes on the task of conceptualizing ―mother,‖ not by repudiating her, but by attempting to affirm 
her, it tends to cause a crisis in metaphysics. A metaphysics which can imagine the identity which 
―to seek and to nurture, in the context of her attachments, which permits the flourishing of what is 
unique in her rather than that which, in these attachments, restrains and suppresses her pleasure 
while constantly rebelling against all kinds of fetters, constraints, prisons, camps, and other 
concentrations of the social that reduce her to a condition of banality,‖ is metaphysics as we no 
longer know it. 
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Aristotle’s Foreshadow: Maternity as Metaphysics in Crisis 
For Klein and Kristeva, the discourse of maternity is not only a discourse which 
accentuates the manner in which generation and creation imbricate one another, the discourse of 
maternity is a discourse in crisis. Maternity is essentially problematic for any notion of a 
autonomous, rational unified identity. Mother‘s body is the same body which refused to accept 
the iron law of inside and outside. Long before we had a say in the matter, we longed for and 
hated her omnipotence grip on us which conferred on us the heights of pleasure and which, and, 
at the very same time, threatened our possible existence as a separate individual. This is 
represented by Aristotle in the form of an identity of a person who is capable of embracing the 
impossible ideal: she loves perfectly, despite the fact of her inevitably imperfect relationship 
bound by necessity, who loves her child the way to male, equal, free citizens can only strive to 
simulate, is a person who might be worth emulating. 
For Arendt, it will become more evident why ―carnal birth‖ becomes central to engaging 
the complexities inherent in the identity of the ―maternal,‖ especially the maternal body. 
Arendt renders our first birth analogous, but distinct from, our second birth. In both cases, 
we are born from something that must be, for us, a sublime non-entity. We are born from an 
eternal recurrence. We become human by mediating this entity which is us, but from which we 
must distinguish ourselves. If we try to be her, we never become anyone. If we never try anything 
at all, and simply fall back into her, we rote in her embrace. Only by distinguishing ourselves 
from our beginnings by mimicking our first entrance, do we become fully human. In both cases, 
to be born is to be born from the same unknowable that first bore us. The agent is its actor and its 
sufferer, but nobody is its author. Thus, for Arendt the dynamic of birth as earthly immanence 
and human freedom rests in every way on our relation to mother and mother earth. For the 
feminist reader, this seeming conflation of women who mother and Mother Earth is typically 
where resistance begins.  
 51 
There is a legitimate wariness about associating women with mothers. If women are 
made to seem like mothers, then it begins to seem as if subjects become subjects by 
distinguishing themselves from her. In other words, it begins to seem as if women are themselves 
not subjects, but something from which subjects are born, a first, and possibly a second time. If 
we recall Aristotle‘s rendering of mothers as those beings who enable, but never themselves 
become, political agents, and, at the very same time recall the legacy which this rendering was 
used to establish the grounds for preventing women from political thought and action, we can 
why so many contemporary feminists are resistant to associating women with mothering. Given 
that these same representations of mothers in all of their multiple and varied forms have lent 
themselves to various political ideologies which oppress women, especially in her role as 
reproducer of life, then most feminists agree that this conflation of women and mothers needs-at 
minimum-unpacking-at most-dismantling.  
Contemporary feminists are legitimately suspicious of theories that affirm what appears 
like a mind and matter dualism (like earthly immanence and human freedom) because this same 
dualism is so often appended to prejudiced political ideologies; instead, Arendt maintains the 
ambiguous complexities which Aristotle first develops. Arendt, like the postmodernist, is 
generally suspicious of any claim to a unitary and substantial model of a self that presupposes a 
self conscious ego who translates into words the reality of the ―I.‖ Unlike the postmodernist, she 
is suspicious of the claim that we are only the production of a text that can neither appear nor be 
authored. For Arendt, the self who has no ―status whatsoever outside language,‖ is a self 
determined, in this case not by his earthly immanence, but by a community of others. Arendt 
cannot accept that ―texts‖ could manage even the illusion of coherence and unity. From within 
her critique of modernity, Arendt will claim that, by virtue of having been born, what is neither 
given to us by others nor fashioned in our own likeness, is neither possibly augmented nor 
diminished by others. Our possible human freedom is ours by virtue of having been born. The 
―who‘ which appears so clearly and unmistakably to others remains hidden from the person 
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himself, not as the consequence of culmination of words and movements, but as speech and 
action which reveals his ―wholeness.‖ His wholeness is what prevents the possibility of his being 
determined by others. He is given form by others, but his same self, by virtue of his birth, is the 
promise that he will transform his form. He is unpredictably human. And his birth is his first 
testimony of this human freedom.  
As I will demonstrate, Arendt goes even one step further and she does so by maintaining 
her connection with Aristotle. She portrays the scene of birth as a dynamic which includes 
mothers in their earthly immanence and their human freedom. Our own beginning commences 
from a being who is already underway. For Arendt and Aristotle, mothers are present for this 
revelation which is the revelation of the untrustworthiness of memory, and the revelation of the 
need to narrate someone‘s beginnings. Spectators respond to the need in actors to be narrated and 
completed. They do so in a relation of universal exposed naked unity. Mothers exist in relation to 
an infant who is not yet acting or speaking. She knows herself, by analogy, to be both the being 
that bears an infant and as a being who was once an infant in her beginning. Mothers witness the 
same birth that her infant cannot be present for. She narrates his beginning in the same fragile 
memory proper to anyone else‘s, and she, like all others, is not pure absence. Her infants‘ 
memory of her is tenuous, but she, like others, most often rises to the occasion to tell him his 
story –however well or badly she may fare. In most instances, she is not a spectator in the sense 
that others are spectators because she is present for the birth of her charge who is also her infant. 
Aristotle, unlike few philosophers before or since, tells the story of mother‘s story telling in a 
most mature, attentive manner. He tells the story as a virtuous father to his son Nicomachea. 
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CHAPTER II 
ARENDT: MOTHER IS NOT A POLITICAL ANIMAL 
 
 
Abstract: Arendt is critical of Plato‘s dynamic in which death arcs towards the eternal and birth 
toward the ephemeral but lauds the dynamic itself. She, like Plato, appreciates just how potent is 
the double meaning of ―birth‖ and agrees that the generation of life lends itself to imagining the 
creation of ideas. While her feminist contemporaries worry that the opposition of two worlds so 
long associated with the feminine and the masculine consolidates sexist ideologies, she chides 
them for personalizing metaphysics and opts instead to describe birth as a dynamic which negates, 
rather than affirms, identities rooted in the body. Like Plato and unlike many of her feminist 
critics, she only permits women membership in the political on the condition that they strip 
themselves of their sexed-identities In the end, Arendt moves out from Plato‘s shadow by 
emphasizing our total dependence on earthly immanence. The result is a notion of identity 
defined less by immutability and more by its ever-changing community of others interrupted by 
its own members, who, by virtue of being born, promise to be unpredictable. From beginning to 
end, Arendt configures birth as a political relationship which destabilizes maternity.  
 
Who and What; the Two Domains and the Three Activities 
 
There is no disputing that Arendt was an intellectual German Jew living in exile in New 
York, and yet she was none of these things. Understanding how both assertions can be true 
requires understanding Arendt‘s unique contribution to the political critique of modernity. Her 
notion of identity, her model of community, and her rendering of the political are all premised on 
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the assumption that people should not be confused for the things they come to be. It is her 
resolute conviction that we are only able to distinguish between our freedom, our ―who,‖ and our 
servitude, our ―what,‖ by maintaining a distinction between ―earthly immanence‖ and ―human 
freedom.‖ Arendt is so persistent about maintaining the distinction that Bonnie Honig describes it 
as an ―anxious repetition.‖46  
The distinction is highly problematic to a number of venerable feminists for multiple and 
varied reasons. Primary amongst these concerns is the historical fact that groups of persons have 
long been associated with earthly immanence and others with human freedom; those associated 
with the former have been exploited and oppressed on the presumption that those who seem to 
embody earthly immanence more than they do human freedom, for example, women, Africans, 
and Jews, are said to hold a stronger affinity to earthy immanence‘s other, human freedom have 
naturalized and legitimated their rule on the basis of their seeming transcendence over the earth 
(and earth-bound people). Arendt does not proceed because she is unaware of this historical fact.  
Arendt‘s knowledge of the feminist reading of the history of philosophy and political 
philosophy is apparent. She is prescient to Beauvoirs‘s rendering of immanence in the Second Sex 
in which she conjures the image of an Algerian mother in a small dark tent tending to the 
demands of domestic necessity while the men eat, sleep and exit to travel the planes of vast open 
spaces of light, the violence of war, and the political economy of commerce. Arendt understands 
that these Algerian women bear the burden of multiple kinds of ‗earthly immanence,‘ Colonial, 
gendered, and the bare weight of the earth itself. She takes witness to the masculine 
transcendence of earthly immanence by colonial and indigenous men, premised on the negating 
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of her person
47
. Nevertheless, Arendt insists on the distinction-so much so that her readers can 
easily begin to understand Honig‘s choice of the word ―anxious.‖  
Arendt maintains the distinction between earthly immanence and human freedom in spite 
of the over-determined likelihood of its controversy amongst feminists. She insists on the 
distinction on the premise that it attenuates, rather than secures identity-based oppression and 
prejudice. She reminds us to look at a larger picture in which modern man‘s anxiety and malaise 
is augmented, rather than diminished, as he strives to triumph over the earth by severing himself 
from its demands. Arendt cannot imagine a happy ending for the earth-bound mortal who desires 
to overcome earthly immanence. Rather than fear mother earth, she, like Bataille, feels that she is 
embracing all that is and cannot be otherwise and, in so doing, reverses the metaphysical, 
existential hierarchy of immanence over transcendence. Sovereignty is no longer won by 
conquering the earth, but by willingly labouring its demands and its subsequent rewards of 
satiated appetite, desire for birth and renewal, a lucid dream life, and of course, a fearless stance 
towards death.
48
 She recovers from the experience contending that earthly immanence is not a 
trap for women or anyone except those who fear and resent its almightiness: we moderns. 
Arendt suggests that much of modern man‘s suffering stems directly from his allergy to 
―birth.‖ ―Birth‖ is our beginning and end in earth. When modern man conceives life in a test tube, 
he is refusing this same beginning and ending. He desires to exchange the gift of life for 
something ―he made himself.‖49 Arendt notes that, as soon as he refuses this gendered, earth 
bound, immanently almighty gift of life, he finds himself thrown into a restricted economy of 
lack. When he offers a satellite to the sublime heavens, he, the terrestrial bound creator watches 
as it hovers; the higher his machines fly, the more he suffers from vertigo. When he returns to 
earth, and efficiently creates life with his own hands, the more he fears the revelation of his own 
origin. Arendt contends that, by demolishing the gates that kept the mysteries of earthly 
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immanence in check, modern man is left to drown in an appetite for what cannot be satiated. 
Modern man breaks free of the limit between earthly immanence and human freedom and his two 
worlds collapse into singular nightmare: lonely, insatiable meaninglessness.  
To illustrate her alternative notion of freedom, Arendt describes the ancient Hebrews, 
who, by labouring the earth, experienced bliss and satiation that only physical, laborious 
exhaustion affords. This same satiation allowed them to welcome the gift of life which allows 
humans to overcome their anxiety. Soothed by the eternal, lulling cycles of mother earth‘s 
generation and corruption, the ancient Hebrews did not fear death but understood its inevitable 
place in their lifecycle. This in turn allowed them to understand what can be formed and what 
must be conformed to, the courage to conform to nature and inform the world of the public: the 
world of speech and action which is the essence of human freedom, the highest principle. For the 
very same reasons, the Hebrews experienced life differently than the Ancients who, in Aristotle‘s 
account, measured their freedom according to the distance they maintained from the demands of 
earthly immanence.
50
 By assuming that earthly necessity forced persons into imperfect relations 
of want and need and thus prevented them from entering the domain of political thought and 
action, the Ancients failed to see that earthly immanence as the opportunity, rather than the 
barrier, to human freedom.   
Arendt suggests that, when we measure freedom in terms of our distance from the earth, 
we are all the more likely to measure humans, and human freedom, in quantifiable units. By 
keeping a distance from mother earth, it is easier to fool ourselves that she can be had, tamed, and 
controlled; by keeping a distance form mother earth, it is easier to make this same mistake with 
ourselves; we confuse the ―who‖ for the ―what.‖ If we instead dive into the heart of earthly 
immanence, we are soon forced to relinquish our hold, our ego, our need to control life itself. The 
surprising discovery for the modern is that, once he makes the plunge, the very freedom he so 
longed for is all of a sudden his to have. Arendt concludes that those who live a life of perfect 
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immanence are indistinguishable from the animals, and those who live a life at a remove from 
earthly immanence are delusional; only those who enter and depart from their earthly immanence 
by labouring, and then fashioning a world, experience genuine human freedom. Arendt refuses to 
let go of the distinction between earthly immanence and human freedom, not because she is 
ignorant to feminist concerns, but, rather, because she is convinced that the distinction protects a 
viable notion of human freedom. 
 
Only One of the Three Activities is Action 
Arendt stipulates a tripartite of human activity which maintains a dynamic relation 
between earthly immanence and human freedom; these three activities are labour, work and 
action. Labour is our most immanent mediation with the earth. It is analogous to the biological 
processes of living organisms following the cycle of life in which animal laborans produces non-
durables necessary to keep the human organism alive.
51
 It is the ―activity which corresponds to 
the biological process of the human body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism and eventual 
decay are bound to the vital necessities produced and fed into the life process by labour.‖52 By 
labouring the earth, we leave no trace of ourselves, but sustain a life which is identical to earthly 
life. In sustaining our life with our own hands, we experience the exhaustion, satiation, and 
abundance that only the earth can bestow. These affective experiences tend to yield an acceptance 
of birth and death. In fact, labour is indifferent to our birth and death. Laboring activity continues 
before ―we‖ arrive, in the activity of labouring an infant, and after ―we‖ are gone in the activity of 
death and dying. In this sense, man requires labour, but labour does not require man.  
Only work, writes Arendt, ―corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence, which 
is not imbedded in, and whose mortality is not compensated by, the species‘ ever-recurring life 
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cycle.‖53 Unlike labour, work interrupts the cyclic process of the life world which are required to 
establish the borders of continuity that allow us to create the semblance of worldliness. Arendt‘s 
distinction between labor and work is informed by Locke‘s notion of "the labor of our body and 
the work of our hands." This distinction is common in European languages; the Greeks 
distinguish between ponein and ergazesthai, the French between travailler and ouvrer, and the 
Germans between arbeiten and verken.
54
 But while work affords us the continuity and stability to 
permit the creation of human freedom, in all too many cases, the temptation is to sustain this 
continuity and stability at the cost of human freedom.  According to Arendt, this is the case in 
Platonic and Marxist utopic societies. When earthly immanence is overcome, and the activity of 
labour is diminished, life tends to be experienced as an exhausted, flattening trajectory without 
end or satiation. Such an activity is akin to labour without the arrival of an infant; this infant 
appears more like a still birth or a person who has become a thing than it does the promise of a 
future which cannot be predicted. Thus, Arendt concludes that the overcoming of labour is 
modernity‘s singular tragedy.  
Only by both affirmation labour and work is action possible. Without labouring the earth, 
we never satisfy our bodily appetites. Without work, we are worldless, without labour, we are 
anxious insomniacs, and without action, we are never more than a brutish animal. Together labor, 
work, and action are the fundamental activities of human life and form the vita activa. However, 
for Arendt only action is the differentia specifica of human beings which distinguishes us from 
animals (who are similar to us insofar as they need to labor to sustain and reproduce) and the life 
of the gods (with whom we share, intermittently, the activity of contemplation). In this respect, 
the categories of labor and work are counterpoints to the category of action; they differentiate and 
highlight the place of action within the order of the vita activa. The adult who knows the activity 
of action is born a first time to his mother in earthly immanence and a second time to a world of 
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others in the throws of human freedom; this is ―natality; the adult who never knows the activity of 
action is destined to a life of the ―infantile.‖ 
  
The Natal and the Infantile: Where birth must lie and how 
Arendt‘s most scintillating contribution to philosophy is her concept of ―natality.‖ 
Natality is our universal condition of having been born an infant in a world of others who have 
also been born. Because we are born, Arendt wonders, we have "initium;‖ because we are born, 
we are newcomers and beginners; because we are born, we take initiative and are prompted into 
action.
55
 The fact that we are prompted to that unpredictable activity that secures neither our 
survival nor our wish for continuity, but, instead, is performed without concern for either, is the 
"central category of political thought"
56
. Political thought is the possibility of acting freely and 
acting freely is "ontologically rooted" in the "fact of natality
57
 Action, our human freedom, is the 
only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter, and 
corresponds to the human condition of plurality. Plurality, she stipulates, is the fact that men, not 
Man, live and work alongside one another. Returning to the beginning of the circle once again, 
she reminds us that human freedom is premised on birth, our earthly immanence. 
It can comes as a surprise that Arendt renders our first birth in such unremarkable terms. 
Our first, carnal, earthly birth-the very essence of which Arendt will use as a conceptual device to 
think her way out of an apparently fascistic metaphysic. The metaphor of birth appears in her 
work in uninspired, colloquial imagery. She writes very little of it and, unlike her counterpart 
Aristotle, rarely with empirical curiosity or savvy. For Arendt, the most important feature of our 
first birth is that it is almost indistinguishable from the total cycle of life itself. Arendt focuses 
almost entirely the infant‘s experience and expressions during birth. The sounds he makes, which 
she claims express his common biological existence and cannot, are of interest to her. The fact of 
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his naked, namelessness is also of interest. In the end, the facts and features of his birth which 
seem to make him indistinguishable from any other, coupled with the fact of his totally 
unpredictable person, is all that matters. His arrival is the promise of a future which cannot be 
predicted. This double meaning is what Arendt terms the ―actualization of the human condition of 
natality.‖58 
The infant‘s first appearance is her affirmation of herself as the being who is her 
beginning. From the very depths of earthly necessity, the infant is born without history and 
impervious to a determinable future. She appears as a nameless, total, unique unity. She is her 
beginning. Her appearance promises that the world will never again be the same: it cannot know 
what she might say or do. Her possible actions lie in her like a diamond that cannot be mined 
without her spontaneous offering. Her actions appear ―in the guise of the miracle‖ as what cannot 
be expected.
59
  
As adults, we affirm ourselves as the infants we once were when we take initiative and 
are prompted into action. With word and deed we insert ourselves into the human world. Arendt 
likens this insertion to a second birth. In our second birth, we confirm and take upon ourselves the 
naked fact of our original physical appearance. Our second birth is antithetical to earthly 
immanence in the sense that it is not forced upon us by necessity, like labour, and it is not 
prompted by utility, like work. It may be ―stimulated by the presence of others whose company 
we may wish to join, but it is never conditioned by them; its impulse springs from the beginning 
which came into the world when we were born and to which we respond by beginning something 
new on our own initiative.‖60  The revelation which is the first birth perishes when birth is 
―overcome.‖  
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There are several ways in which we could imagine that the revelation which is our first 
birth could be lost. Arendt does not devote much time or attention to the manner in which the 
revelation is lost, except to say that this occurs when life ―is created in a test tube.‖ The risk is 
that we misinterpret her argument for an argument against culture, or an argument which too 
rigidly reifies an opposition between nature and culture. Instead, her argument and concepts are 
more nuanced. In fact, without appreciating the double meaning of ―birth,‖ everything about 
Arendt‘s world view is misinformed. Thus, the problem with ―creating life in a test tube‖ is not 
that some humans work hard to preserve life, rather, it is that they work too hard to preserve a 
value which seems inherent to life itself. Arendt‘s consistent train of thought is to argue that life 
itself has no value. The value of life, at least for humans, is that it promises something more than 
just life. When man creates ―life in a test tube,‖ he risks being unable to witness the miracle of 
conception, birth, and the infant because this miracle is not in these actions or entities themselves, 
but in what they promise.  
Arendt continues in her own words that modern man‘s tragic error is to assume that life, 
and not labour, is the creator of all values. Modern man glorifies a sheer dynamism of life process 
which excludes even the minimum initiative present in those activities which, like labouring and 
begetting, are urged upon man by necessity.
61
 He folds himself into mother earth and revels in the 
experience of her pure functioning. He confuses her limits for his own and fails to see that the 
skin of her sovereign body engulfs him. In confusing her powers of generation and corruption for 
his own, he places the burden of her demands on his solitary, mortal self, and prevents himself 
access to her abundance. Thus, neither the enormous increase in fertility nor the socialization of 
the process which substitutes individuals for subjects can eliminate the cruel privacy from the 
experience of labour.  
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As Arendt determines, ―animal labourans‖ is imprisoned in the privacy of his body and 
trapped by his own needs which cannot be shared. Arendt warns that these individuals form a 
society which, dazzled by the abundance of its growing fertility and caught in the smooth 
functioning of a never ending process, is no longer able to recognize the futility of a life which 
―does not fix or realize itself in any permanent subject which endures after its labour is past‖62 
With the unleashing of earthly immanence into the realm of the public, the life process, once 
checked by household, absorbs and suffocates the political domain. Without a division between 
the space of retreat and the space of appearance, everything becomes a ―family‖ matter and every 
event an opportunity to satisfy an insatiable appetite. The glorification of the life process is 
modern man‘s metamorphosis from a ―who‖ into a ―what.‖ This transformation is what Arendt 
names the transformation from the ―natal‖ into the ―infantile.‖ 
Arendt appreciates that we cannot return to the lost time of the Hebrews. Instead, she 
gestures towards modern man‘s exit from his labyrinthine suffering by repeatedly naming his 
emergence from the maelstrom of earthly immanence and insertion into the matrix of human 
freedom a ―second birth.‖ In doing so, Arendt intimates that the same labouring contractions that 
forced him from his dreamless sleep into the world of consciousness mirror his possible entrance 
into the world of human freedom. Although his ego recoils at the thought, she insists that he can 
only overcome his biological determinism by understanding what is alternately intimate and 
incommensurate between earthly immanence and human freedom. Modern man‘s exasperation 
with action is symptomatic to his allergy to the earth. While it has always been a great temptation 
for men of action no less than for men of thought to find a substitute for action in the hope that 
the realm of human affairs may escape the haphazardness and moral irresponsibility inherent in a 
plurality of agents, Arendt predicts that the more he refutes his earthly existence, the more he is 
trapped by this same exasperation. His fear of death renders him identical to those servants who 
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preferred servitude in the master‘s house with ―fine conditions‖ over the same harsh and 
unpredictable labour conditions which could give us what we really want: the experience of 
human freedom. 
Arendt‘s critics argue that she naturalizes the arbitrary and conventional norms which 
inform feminine identity and confuse women for mothers. They further that she does little to 
distance itself from renderings of earthly immanence and human freedom which are part and 
privy of the western, metaphysical tradition of producing sexist ontologies which equate earthly 
generation with femininity and ideational creation with masculinity and, last, and most worrisome 
of all, Arendt flat-out prohibits those who identify or who are identified as ―women‖ from 
protesting their pain, suffering and oppression on the basis of ―sex‖ because sex is said to be a 
feature of the ―earthly necessity.‖ 
  
Arendt’s Feminist Critics, her Critique of Feminism 
There are legitimate concerns about associating women with mothers. If women are made 
to seem like mothers, then subjects become subjects by distinguishing themselves from her; in 
other words, women are themselves not subjects, but something from which subjects are born 
from. We can recall Aristotle‘s rendering of mothers as beings who enable, but never themselves 
become, political agents. Given that representations of mothers in their multiple and varied forms 
have lent themselves to various political ideologies which oppress women, especially in her role 
as the generator of life, the conflation of women and mothers needs-at minimum-unpacking-and, 
in some cases total dismantling.  
As McLaren describes in Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity, feminists have 
taken mainstream, traditional philosophy to task for embracing the mind/body dualism and for 
associating women with the body and men with the mind.
63
 Early feminist work, such as the work 
of anthropologists Mary Douglas, Sherry Ortner, and Michelle Rosaldo, make a compelling case 
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that women have been associated with the body, nature and emotion and that these terms have 
been opposed to mind, culture, and reason, which are associated with men and that the former 
have been systematically devalued. While some feminists have focus on the body as a source of 
knowledge, a site or resistance, and a locus of subjectivity, the risk is always that this leads to a 
reversal and return of the trend of devaluing the body while sustaining the dualism of mind/body. 
In simple, the exulting of what once was exiled still prevents her entrance into the domain of 
action. The most pressing question for feminist readers of Arendt is, does Arendt‘s rendering of 
first and second birth secure or attenuate the conflation of women with mothering? As her critics 
take her to task for maintaining the distinction between human freedom and earthly immanence, it 
must be remembered that Arendt believes that it is the lack of the distinction, rather than not, that 
ossifies the prejudices and ideologies which inform sexism. 
 
Introducing Honig, Zerilli, Moore 
Honig, Zerilli, and Moore direct their critique of Arendt‘s toward her rigid distinction 
between earthly immanence and human freedom. Honig claims the distinction is an historically 
invidious division held apart by nothing more than by heaping one on to the other to resist the 
erosion of the distinction altogether. If Honig is right, Arendt‘s construction is not only unsound, 
it is insidious; if in fact Arendt prevents people from voicing dissent on the basis of their 
embodied, earthly, oppression, the distinction and prohibition compound their oppression. Honig 
suggests that, in Arendt‘s scenario, women are identified with the labour of generating life, and, 
on this same basis, are not permitted to voice dissent on the basis of being a woman. If this is in 
fact the case, then Arendt‘s notion of ―human freedom‖ is not only anti-political, it is complicit in 
a most pernicious form of oppression. 
Zerilli‘s critique is akin to Derrida‘s warning on the use of ―prohibitions‖ in metaphysics. 
In ―The Arendtian Body,‖ Zerilli claims that Arendt‘s distinction disguises the high stakes in a 
casually prohibitive vernacular. She quotes Arendt who claims that to ―pretend to be something 
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I‘m not, that would be kind of insane‖ because ―there is such a thing as a basic gratitude for 
everything that is as it is; for what has been given and was not, could not, be made; for things that 
are physei and not nomo.‖64 When Arendt warns that blurring the distinction between private and 
public will replace both realms with the ―amorphous and unbounded creature,‖ she resorts to 
nothing less than old fashioned fable telling. Zerilli concedes that Arendt actually advances the 
conversation in feminism because she does not treat gender as the primary category for thinking 
the human body. In the end though, Arendt aggravates old wounds by providing an account of the 
subjects‘ ―terror of embodiment and loss of symbolic mastery.‖65 She concludes that Arendt‘s 
prohibition actually confirms, secures and attenuates the symbolic order that ―barely conceals the 
sexually indefinable Chora which the very notion of two sexes, each in its proper place.‖66 
Moore‘s reading is the most nuanced of the three.67 She allows that Honig and Zerilli 
could be right and that the distinction between earthly immanence and human freedom is too rigid, 
contrived, and barely succeeds to disguise the ambiguity that lies at the heart of earthly 
immanence and human freedom. However, she concludes that their readings overlook a crucial, 
determining feature of Arendt‘s conceptual imaginary: her concept of natality. ―Natality‖ accepts 
the ambiguity inherent in earthly immanence and human freedom by relying on the double 
meaning implicit in ―birth.‖ Our first birth is characterized by everything we associate with the 
earth: blood, pain, sub-conscious struggle and revelation, affect, and yet our first birth also points 
towards our second birth and all that we associate with the possibility of meaning, and shared 
meaning. Our second birth is not limited to the here and now of necessity. Our second birth both 
consolidates and negates necessity.  
For Honig and Zerilli, the mere association of earth with women is over –determined. 
Moore decides to break from this group and aligns herself with Arendt‘s efforts to put bracket the 
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association of earth with women to focus instead on ―birth‖ as a metaphor which bridges two 
worlds and two modes of being. It is with some irony that, in doing so, Moore, like Arendt, opens 
the possibility for returning to concepts such as maternity, motherhood, and even infancy and 
natality, with a fresh outlook. As Moore correctly understands, Arendt‘s central thesis grounds 
itself on the distinction of earthly immanence and human freedom because, by returning to the 
thought of ―birth,‖ we are better able to see the larger framework in which earthly immanence 
intertwines with human freedom, and by extension, beginnings.  
 
Honig and the Post-Modern  
In ―Toward an Agonistic Feminism: Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Identity,‖ Honig 
claims that Arendt‘s repetitive distinction between earthly immanence and human freedom 
compounds the already ossified ideological configuration which positions women in the grips of 
the earthly, private domain of necessity and secures men‘s possible candidacy for human, 
political freedom.
68
 Honig charges that Arendt‘s opposition of the political and the private 
maintains the existent equation of the feminine realm of earthly immanence and the masculine 
realm of human freedom. As such, Honig contends that Arendt‘s distinction augments the 
prejudice that mothers as best suited for labouring, nursing, and tending to the very young and the 
very old, and ill suited for participating as equals amongst equals in the domain of human 
freedom. When Arendt utilizes the opposition of earthly immanence and human freedom to 
structure her treatise on The Human Condition and describes the sphere of human freedom 
without explicit mention of her feminist adherence, this only consolidates Honig‘s suspicion. 
When Arendt renders the distinction between earthly immanence and human freedom an ―apriori 
determination,‖ she seems to give the final evidence that her paradigm promotes political sexual 
                                                     
68
 ―Toward and Agonistic Feminism: Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Identity,‖ 48 
 
 67 
inequality.
69
 When Arendt explicitly excludes the desperate and disenfranchised from protesting 
their living conditions by identifying on this same basis, Arendt is confirmed as, amongst other 
things, an anti-feminist. Finally, when Arendt recommends that we bear a certain ―gratitude for 
what is and cannot be otherwise,‖ she merely salts the wound.  
For Honig, Arendt‘s ―notorious rigid public/private distinction‖ is part and privy to the 
prohibiting of the politicization of issues of social justice and gender.
70
 Honig parallels Arendt‘s 
distinction alongside Aristotle‘s in which he insists that women and slaves are more affected by 
the earth, more effective laborers, and, on this same basis, ineffective political participants. The 
overall effect seems to be to protect the sui generis character of her politics and the purity of her 
public realm by prohibiting the politicization of issues of social justice and gender. Ultimately, 
Honig dismisses Arendt‘s determination as a rhetorical device and denies its value as an insight 
into The Human Condition. She concludes by suggesting that Arendt deserves our attention not as 
a theorist of gender, nor as a woman, but as ―a theorist of an agonistic and performative politics 
which resists any apriori determination that is beyond augmentation and amendment,‖ for what 
she ―does include in her vision of politics, and also because (not in spite) of what she excludes 
from it.‖71 From this basis, Honig prescribes a reading of Arendt‘s work that grounds itself in the 
agonistic and performative impulse while resisting any determination of the public-private 
distinction that is ―beyond augmentation and amendment.‖72  
In place of the determination between earthly immanence and human freedom, Honig 
prescribes a metaphor which distinguishes between kinds of spaces. Honig begins this process by 
defenestrating the terms of the exclusion of the ―labouring body‖ from the public domain while 
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extracting what she perceives to be the essence of ―the agonistic and performative impulse.73‖ She 
defends her move by claiming that no distinction, not even Arendt‘s sacred distinction between 
the public and private, is ―beyond augmentation and amendment.‖74Honig determines her project 
successful for contesting, ―per formatively and agonistically,‖ Arendt‘s exclusion of the body 
from the realm of politics.
75
 
Honig re-fashions Arendt‘s concepts of earthly immanence and the body into a metaphor 
for the ―master signifier of necessity, irresistibility, immutability, and the determination of pure 
process.‖76 Honig determines that Arendt‘s conception of the body prevents politicizing the body, 
and thus prevents the same possibilities which might secure the possibility of human freedom. 
This is of special concern if, as Honig claims, the same people likely to suffer from the 
confiscation of the fruits of their labours are also those people likely to be silenced when they 
voice dissent about their unique experience of physical oppression, then any further silencing of 
their dissent compounds their oppression. When Honig determines that Arendt‘s notion of the 
body subverts political freedom, Honig also determines only one other option: Arendt‘s vision of 
ideal of human freedom must allow us to contest exploitation and oppression on the basis of 
representations of the body.  
Honig deems that, only by agonistically contesting the ―body,‖ can we ―episodically 
produce new identities in which newness becomes the beginning of a new story, started-though 
unwittingly-by acting women and men to be enacted further, to be augmented and spurred on by 
their posterity.‖77 Honig warns that too much reliance on this metaphysical dualism of earthly 
immanence and human freedom robs people of very future they need to experience the 
exhilaration of creating anew. Arendt counters that, anyone, no matter how down trodden, who 
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drags the needs of their body onto the stage of human freedom foul the same airs which might 
have allowed them a taste of freedom. Arendt writes,  
The most powerful necessity of which we are aware in self-introspection is the 
life process which permeates our bodies and keeps them in a constant state of a 
change whose movements are automatic, independent of our own activities, and 
irresistible i.e., of an over-whelming urgency. The less we are doing ourselves, 
the less active we are, the more forcefully will this biological process assert itself, 
impose its inherent necessity upon us, and overawe us with the fateful 
automatism of sheer happening that underlies all human history.
78
  
 
For Arendt, our choice is limited to negating or affirming earthly immanence; this 
includes our sexed, earthly immanence. The substance of our choice determines our possible 
freedom or slavery but, in either case, we must make the choice from within the bounds of earthly 
immanence. In terms of our sexed earthly immanence, we will have to live with, negotiate, and 
transcend the determinations and possibilities opened to us by virtue of, in the most general terms, 
either being the being who becomes pregnant, or not. We can repudiate this earthly existence it 
two ways: we can deny its grip on ourselves, and thus render our freedom an evanescent ideal, or 
we can drag its grip on us into the realm of freedom, and usurp the space speech and action with 
grunts and moans common to the animals, and charts and graphs common to the bureaucratic 
behaviourist. 
Arendt maintains that the choice is made from within the context of our embodied 
existence. Our bodies, like the body of the earth itself, move in same endless cyclical repetition of 
generation and corruption which is life. We are born into a world in which we can become human 
or inhuman by embracing the limitlessness of the earth which has no regard for our beginning or 
end. Labouring the earth is a burden, not only for the oppressed, but for anyone, but it is the only 
means for knowing the fecundity which can provide us with the willingness to risk loving 
freedom more than our own individual wants and needs. Arendt considers this to be neither an 
elitist nor a radical egalitarian position; she considers it to be the fact of our human condition. For 
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Arendt, any conflation of the earthly and identity is bound to set us in a trap which prevents 
genuine political thought and action. According to Arendt, when the earth is dragged out of its 
proper domain and forced into the realm of the ―political,‖ when the fact of becoming possibly 
pregnant or not becomes the basis of political action, women (and men and so on and so forth), 
actually fail to see the inherent double meaning inherent in our earth-bound, immanence. My 
biological existence can be tabulated and calculated, but it cannot be distinguished from any 
others.  
Arendt is actually partially sympathetic to Honig‘s post-modern critique. Like the 
postmodernist, Arendt is suspicious of models of the self that presupposes a self conscious ego 
who translates into words the reality of the ―I.‖ However, Honig‘s vision of ―who-ness‖ as the 
narrative actions sediment into a story and myth observed by others would be unpalatable to 
Arendt. While she agrees that ―texts‖ cannot maintain the mere illusion of coherence and unity, 
Honig‘s notion of arbitrary conventions of community is unable to explain why we are not merely 
fragmented, discontinuous, indistinct infants. Honig‘s attack on classical semiology is founded on 
the assumption that the uniqueness of self is nothing but the ideological construction of 
patriarchal autobiographical constructions. It leaves her with little leverage against appeals to 
ethical or political standards; she is even less able to conceive of humans or infants as some 
―thing‖ fashioned by others. In Honig‘s rendering of the infant, nothing is sacred about the infant. 
He is animal flesh and his fate is determined by others. Honig ends up claiming that infants (and 
possibly others) are no more than an inhuman- human construction.  
Arendt anticipates modernity‘s post modern moment when neither the earth nor humans 
could manage to explain why our humanity is inalienable. From within her critique of modernity, 
Arendt claims that, by virtue of having been born, what is neither given to us by others nor 
fashioned in our own likeness, is immutable, impervious, and inalienable. Our human freedom is 
ours by virtue of having been born. The ‗who‘ which appears to others remains hidden from the 
person himself, not as the consequence of culmination of words and movements, but as speech 
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and action which reveals his wholeness. His wholeness is what prevents the possibility of his 
being determined by others. He is given form by others, but his same self, by virtue of his birth, is 
the promise that he will transform his form; he is unpredictably human; his birth is his first 
testimony of this human freedom.  
Arendt speaks to Honig‘s concerns about sexual inequality. Her argument is simple. In 
fact, it is when it is made overly complex that it appears problematic, but Arendt works hard to 
maintain a simple, working distinction. Her argument is that both men and women‘s fate is sealed 
in their earth bound existence. Their fate is a sexed fate. They are born as men or women. Men 
and women must labour the earth from which they were born. Men and women, by virtue of their 
sex, must differently labour the earth. This is true of the hermaphrodite whom Arendt does not 
mention, but would be implied in a work so familiar with Classical mythology and philosophy. 
The hermaphrodite, the mother, and the man‘s possible tragedy or sovereignty rest equally on 
what ―is and cannot be otherwise‖-their bodies and the earth they inhabit.  
The preoccupation with the distinction between earthly immanence and human freedom, 
which for Arendt precludes identifying on the basis of sexed, biological determinations, is more 
Honig‘s preoccupation than Arendt‘s. For Arendt, the distinction between earthly immanence and 
human freedom is of interest, not in relation to sexual inequality, but for its intimacy between the 
earth and freedom. Arendt cannot conceive of a world in which freedom is possible without first 
addressing the issue of our earthly immanence. From Arendt‘s point of view, to identify women 
who mother as ―mothers‖ in the realm of the political is to doubly rob her of the opportunity to 
insert herself, and, more, to tear an opening for her infant‘s eventual insertion into the realm of 
human freedom. Thus, just as Aristotle suggests, it is only by tending to the necessities of life that 
we can contemplate the activities of thinking, speaking and acting which constitute political 
freedom. Like Honig, Zerilli remains unconvinced; Arendt‘s distinction between earthly 
immanence and human freedom remains problematic. 
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 Zerilli and the Psychoanalytic Critique  
In ―The Arendtian Body,‖ Zerilli claims that Arendt disguises the high stakes of the 
distinction in a casually prohibitive vernacular. She quotes Arendt‘s claims that to ―pretend to be 
something I‘m not, that would be kind of insane‖ because ―there is such a thing as a basic 
gratitude for everything that is as it is; for what has been given and was not, could not, be made; 
for things that are physei and not nomo.‖79  Zerilli suggest that these rhetorical features are 
prominent and assume 1) that a female subject‘s dis-identification with women is a hysterical, 
psychic trauma and 2) that stable subjectivity requires absolute clarity about sex and gender. On 
this same basis, Zerilli likens the Arendtian body to the Freud‘s ―taboo‖: the uncanny, dangerous, 
forbidden, and sacred that operates ―in a compulsive fashion that rejects conscious motives.‖80By 
protecting the seemingly impenetrable border between earthly immanence and human freedom in 
terms that she claims are beyond dispute or argument,‖ Zerilli determines that Arendt makes a 
futile attempt to protect the distinction. When Arendt appeals to Genesis: ―we know only male 
and female created he them,‖ Zerilli claims that Arendt barely conceals her dogmatic tendencies. 
Why, asks Zerilli, forbid something that is impossible? In the Arendtian staging of terror, Zerilli 
says we witness Arendt‘s frantic attempt to secure the body in its place, and the violence, 
injustice, and futility of that effort.
81
 Zerilli recommends that Arendt‘s sympathizers steer clear of 
the cultural association of the cyclical life process and the feminine body. If Zerilli is right, any 
association that does not expressly criticise the exclusion of women and slaves form the free 
space of the polis expresses nostalgia. It is, at best, ‗curious‘ that Arendt ―never makes this 
central feature of the Human Condition an integral part of her political analysis.‖82  
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There is some irony in charging Arendt with threatening and prohibiting modes of 
thinking. Zerilli‘s discursive tone exceeds the conventional standards of reasoning and debate. 
Her critique rests entirely on the assumption that –when we prohibit thoughts and actions-then 
our own thoughts and actions must themselves be erroneous; however, nothing about the manner 
in which we communicate an idea prevents it from being true or right, despite how unpleasant or 
pleasant it may sound to our ear. By failing to do more than illuminate some of the rhetorical 
devices upon which Arendt relies, Zerilli obfuscates the more important question which is: is the 
distinction between earthly immanence and human freedom practically and theoretically sound 
and prudent? 
Arendt warns that we should not drag what ―is and cannot be otherwise‖ into the realm of 
the political. She claims that by identifying with what has already been determined by ―earthly 
immanence,‖ we limit, if not halt, the possibility of being unpredictable. Arendt predicts that 
when humans drag one world into the other and the boundary between the two worlds is not 
maintained, the likely outcome is a humanity driven into action by wants and needs rather than a 
desire for genuine freedom. She suggests that it is only by letting go of the socio-cultural 
establishment of identity determined by biology that humans can hope to become a political 
thinking and acting being, i.e., free.
83
 Zerilli continues to disagree, but, like Honig, deems there to 
be an essential undertone in Arendt‘s writing worth salvaging. Zerilli is willing to accept the 
Arendtian body if it is neutered; once the embodied earthly immanence is rendered neutral and 
neutered, Zerilli concedes that Arendt has a gift for making salient the sheer terror associated with 
the body.  
Zerilli contends that because Arendt does not focus solely on the maternal body‘s 
relationship to the cyclic life process, and thus most often treats the body as essentially genderless, 
Arendt brings both women and men‘s bodies into question by reminding us that they too are 
entangled in the process beyond subjectivity. Thus, it is Arendt‘s more frequent tendency toward 
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―gender blindness‖ (and not her infrequent gender stereotyping) allows her to transcend the 
tendency to ―symbolize the labouring and generative body in clear, unchanging, and all too 
familiar gendered terms.‖84Despite some casual remarks made here and there, Zerilli determines 
that Arendt does not treat gender as the primary category for thinking the human body but does 
more by providing an account of the subjects‘ ―terror of embodiment and loss of symbolic 
mastery.‖ 85 Zerilli concludes that Arendt ―confirms and contests, secures and attenuates the 
symbolic order that barely conceals the sexually indefinable Chora which the very notion of two 
sexes, each in its proper place.‖ 86  In Zerilli‘s eagerness to make neutral and neutered the 
Arendtian body, she overlooks a central feature of the Arendtian body: the event of birth. 
For Arendt, we are sexed earthly beings capable of human freedom because we are born. 
Arendt‘s distinction between earthly immanence and human freedom is inseparable from her 
dynamic of first and second birth. Zerilli makes no mention of the import of birth. As is the 
tendency, when Arendt‘s critics overlook the crucial import of her concept of ―natality‖ which 
relies entirely on the double meaning of birth, her work seems dogmatic and two dimensional. In 
such cases, there is nothing to do but salvage what appears like a more politically radical meaning 
in notions like the ―body‖ or ―contestation.‖ When ―natality‖ is prioritized as the central, 
informative concept that it is, these efforts are unnecessary and, most likely, the concerns and 
harsh criticisms unwarranted. Moore‘s greatest contribution to the evolving conversation of 
Arendt‘s contribution to philosophy is the manner in which she brings ―natality‖ back into the 
spotlight. 
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Moore: Remembering Birth  
More careful readers of The Human Condition appreciate that the distinction between 
earthly immanence and human freedom is possibly rigid or possibly fluid depending on the stance 
of its central actor and spectator: the human. As Bowen Moore suggests in Hannah Arendt’s 
Philosophy of Natality, the human maintains a rigid distinction when he severs himself from the 
earth and a fluid distinction by maintaining his connection to the earth.
87
 The human affirms 
himself as the being who is his beginning by labouring the earth. Humans affirm their first birth 
as labour in their second birth as speech and action because both are determined by the 
unpredictability of its outcome, the irreversibility of the process, and the anonymity of its authors.  
Arendt names sovereignty as the relishing in the risk of embracing the earth‘s force and 
the anonymity of human action. The human actor affirms himself as ―infantile‖ by using words to 
express wants and needs and movements to achieve determinate ends. The human actor affirms 
himself as ―natal‖ when he refutes his mere biological existence by speaking and acting unlike 
any other human present, past or future. Moore quotes Arendt‘s mantra in which, with word and 
deed, humans 
… insert ourselves into the human world, and this insertion is like a second birth, 
in which we confirm and take upon ourselves the naked fact of our original 
physical appearance. This insertion is not forced upon us by necessity, like labour, 
and it is not prompted by utility, like work. It may be stimulated by the presence 
of others whose company we may wish to join, but it is never conditioned by 
them; its impulse springs from the beginning which came into the world when we 
were born and to which we respond by beginning something new on our own 
initiative‖88  
 
Arendt‘s central thesis which grounds itself in the distinction of earthly immanence and 
human freedom claims that, to understand ourselves as beings who are both immanent to the earth 
and potentially free, insists that there can be no original identification of an adult with his earthly 
origin. Only by returning to the thought of birth can we fully appreciate that our beginnings, the 
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complex intertwining of earth, mother, and labour is what allows us to be those beginnings 
without determination or termination. Carnal birth is the revelation of political freedom because 
political freedom, like earthly immanence, cannot be determined in advance.  
By accentuating the essential role of the concept of birth to Arendt‘s philosophy, Moore 
demonstrates that the distinction between earthly immanence and human freedom is possibly 
―rigid,‖ in the sense that Honig describes, or possibly ―fluid,‖ in the sense that Arendt describes, 
depending on the figure who inhabits this conceptual landscape. But while for Honig and Zerilli 
the mere association of mother earth and mother was over determined, for Moore the task is less 
about undoing the association of mother earth and mother, and more about the revelation which is 
birth. For Arendt, it is only by returning to the thought of birth that we can do more than engage 
in superficial debates about concepts of women, earth and the political reality of sexism.  
 
“The Blood is in the Soil”; Birth and the Political 
Arendt speaks of fascism which fixes identity in origin: the site of birth determines its 
infant‘s destiny.  As a counterpoint to the fascist appropriation of the metaphor of birth, Arendt 
reminds us of the double- meanings of the Latin root ―nasci,‖ to be born, and the Greek origin, 
―physis,‖ to grow out of, to appear by itself.‖89 Birth is ―natural‖ for Arendt in the sense that it is, 
on one level, one of our most intimate mediations with the cycle of generation and corruption 
which is life, and on another, the arrival of a being we cannot know beforehand. We await the 
arrival of an infant differently than we await the rain, or the sun, because we are waiting for what 
cannot be predicted. Like the infant, for Arendt, ―mothers‖ are natural in the sense that mothering 
requires tending to her infant‘s appetites just as much as it requires welcoming his unpredictable 
nature. Arendt does not claim that mothers have an instinct which steer and determine her method 
of mothering; instead, like Aristotle, Arendt suggests that her embrace is ―virtuous‖ because it 
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could be otherwise; the fact that it is a uniquely embodied choice heightens the stakes, but not the 
odds. Birth promises nothing save everything and anything.  
Arendt‘s insistence on mother‘s earthly immanence is still suspicious to many feminists. 
Feminist critics such as Kittay fears that blindness de-politicizing sexual inequality in a world 
structured by an inequality of ―chronological unfairness,‖ is more apt to consolidate than it is to 
dissolve this same inequality.
90
 Arendt does not relent: she insists that any human who confuses 
the product of their labour as their own fails to recognize that the earth is more than he can know, 
have or be. Arendt refuses women who identify as ―mothers‖ entrance into the space of the 
political because she is convinced that women who do so are unable to accept their earthly 
immanence as a higher principle, and who, in the very same breath, fail to accept that they can 
only gain an ―enlarged understanding‖ by postulating a subjectivity which appreciates the 
equalizing force of the earth. 
 
Against Arendt’s Wishes: Making Maternity Political 
Kittay begins her book Love’s Labour by remembering that, as a child, her mother would 
wait for the family to begin eating then justify her own eating by claiming ―I too am some 
mother‘s child.‖ The claim puzzles Kittay both as a child and as an adult. Kittay‘s ―childish‖ 
desire that food should be eaten is Kittay‘s adult goal. Kittay‘s mother‘s phrase ―I too am some 
mother‘s child‖ propels the project of accomplishing the goal that all those who need to eat-adults, 
dependents, and those who care for dependents. Kittay‘s emphasis is on the needs of ―mother‖ or 
dependent workers. The risk is not only that dependency workers receive not enough support and 
thus abandon their work and their charge, but that dependency workers receive not enough 
support and become dependent on their status as dependency workers inspiring an ambivalence in 
the charge themselves. In both cases it seems reasonable to claim that support diminishes 
                                                     
90
 Love’s Labour, ―Introduction‖ 1-5 
 78 
ambivalence. Ambivalence, stipulates Kittay, is what only the mother experiences in seeing those 
she is nourishing thrive while she herself must postpone satiating her hunger. 
Kittay argues against the norm in which justice is 1) symmetrical, 2) non-historical and 3) 
contractual. She claims that concepts of justice which presuppose a symmetrical, non-historical 
and contractual relation and ignore that all of us are in some relation of dependence and 
inequality throughout the course of our life; added to this is the fact that many of the decisions 
that govern our lives are not in fact ―contractual‖-especially when we are dependent..91 She 
counters by claiming that 1) we are all of us in relations of dependence (inequality) throughout 
the course of our life, 2) that we are always historically situated, and 3) that many of the decisions 
that govern our lives are not in fact contractual-especially when we are dependent. Rather than try 
to erase or diminish these differences, she claims we need to construct of model of justice that 
takes these facts of life seriously. This includes a universal subjectivity which affirms, rather than 
negates, the terms of our universal dependence on a ―m/other.‖   
For Arendt, a model of justice that began on the premise that we are all some mother‘s 
child, a model which emerged from our inequality and abstract obligation, makes the modern 
error of collapsing the political with the biological. For Arendt, a judgment‘s claim to validity 
extends only to those persons whose perspectives were taken into account in a process of 
―enlarging‖ one‘s mentality. According to Arendt, the judging agent ―always reflects upon others 
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and their taste, taking their possible judgments into account.‖92 Enlarged mentality requires the 
person judging to put herself in the situation of another so as to take into account the thoughts of 
others.‖93 We are able to put ourselves in the situation of another because we are the beings who 
once appeared without a name, a past or determined future.  
Arendt conceives of our second birth as the negation of the determined familial, 
identifiable relation and the affirmation of the indeterminate, web like connection as relation to 
others and the earth. Action and thought directed toward an indeterminate future cannot be 
contained. The urge to contain humans in the community of biological necessity engulfs it in a 
collective identity in which it would be impossible to appropriate an enlarged standing. By 
dragging our bodily needs into the realm of human action renders our words and deeds the 
indistinguishable cry of the infantile. We can only protect what is most precious, human freedom, 
by protecting this realm. Once we do so, the possibility of preventing someone from their entitled 
necessities or rightful obligations would not be impossible: but it would be contestable. Without 
the possibility of contesting every injustice anew, every injustice is possible 
It is for this same reason that Arendt can explain why the infant is not merely reducible to 
a product of labour or work; it is, perhaps, for this same reason that only Arendt can explain why 
mothers and their infants are capable of action. Whether a mother regards her infant as another 
self or the ―product‖ of her labour, the mother who calls her child her own regards him as a 
―what‖ rather than a ―who.‖ In doing so, a mother not only denies his ―who-ness,‖ so too does she 
negate her ―who-ness.‖ Any pretence of ownership renders herself and her infant a ―what‖ rather 
than a ―who.‖ Conversely, the mother who responds to the needs and wants of her infant because 
he is exposed to the world prepares him for his possible insertion into the world of human 
freedom. For better and for worse, the orphan‘s destiny is not set in biology. The total 
vulnerability of the infant to the world is, in Arendt‘s framework, demands that all persons 
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respond to his needs, not only his mother because he is a human, and not because he is an infant 
who does or should belong to some mother. By virtue of having been born, he, not we, announces 
his human freedom. 
 
Confronting the Radical  
Adrianna Cavarero, a native of Italy and member of the communist opposition movement, 
and Arendt a Jewish woman fleeing for her life and intellectual autonomy to New York, share a 
personal, familiar experience of the well-known etymological derivation ―the blood is in the soil.‖ 
Their single determination is to undo the tie which links a conceptual imaginary between the 
bond of blood and earth which draws the singular into its bloodstream and engulfs it in a 
collective identity as soon as, or even before, it is born. Both have a personal, familiar desire to 
wrestle birth from the clutches of fascism. By using birth rather than death to set the scene, 
Arendt confronts totalitarian propaganda, modern sagas and post modern narratives: she affirms 
unity, uniqueness, and totality without determining the content of this wholeness; she affirms the 
tenuous nature of the connection of community without affirming humans as the sum of their 
thoughts and actions. Cavarero follows suit. 
As Kristeva so brilliantly remarks, Arendt‘s rendering of the scene of birth will-in an 
unprecedented and unpredictable fashion-open up the anarchistic and conservative figure of the 
human who is unique, unified, and total (contrary to postmodernism).
94
 Against the ―melancholic 
tribe‖ (from Plato to Kant to Heidegger) and against the anonymity of the crowd, and the 
multitude of anonymous individuals melts, Arendt makes 
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an appeal for a political life in which the originality of each individual is 
guaranteed through (the creation of) a ‗web of human relationships‘ consisting of 
memory and narrative destined for others. This realization of the who of the 
individual in the web of attachments that unite particular individuals is a 
distinctive feature of Arendtian political thought, at one and the same time 
intensely libertarian and eminently social and therefore to which, paradoxically, 
both the most eccentric anarchists and the most conservative spirits can subscribe. 
It is the conviction, as ontological as it is existential, that what is unique in each 
individual remains hidden to ‗the person himself‘ and does not ‗appear so clearly 
and unmistakably [as it does] to others‘‖95  
 
Arendt‘s eccentric anarchism-her politics without party-and her conservative spirit-her 
insistence of the collective writing of life history-is what allows her to stipulate a notion of 
community in opposition to the ―national community‖ framework adopted by fascism. Only 
Arendt‘s anarchistic conservatism allows the setting of birth to be the ―appearing-with proves to 
be necessary to the existent precisely in its uniqueness or in its distinction‖ rather than a site for 
securing identity in origin.  
Arendt writes against totalitarianism, but also post-modern feminism. In Arendt‘s vision 
of the political, our earthly origins negate the possibility of determining identity, either by family, 
location or text. Arendt‘s socially interdependent beings can strip themselves of any particular 
relation through speech and action. Our willingness to risk this exposure is nourished by a willing 
submission to the earth‘s mighty cycles in which life is essentially indistinguishable from death. 
In the case of feminist postmodernism, it is generally suspicious of any claim to a unitary and 
substantial model of a self that finds coherent affirmation in his self narration because it 
presupposes a self conscious ego who translates into words the reality of the ―I‖ which precedes 
and is independent of the text. It is likewise suspicious of claims about the mother‘s earthly, 
determined connection to her infant. The anti-metaphysical horizon of post structuralism denies 
the ―self any status whatsoever outside language‖ and postulates a text which provides some 
semblance of coherence and unity.  
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Post-modernist discourses of maternity are generally suspicious of norms and values 
which prescribe selfless action on behalf of mothers to their children, especially when such 
sacrifice is directly against their social, political or economic best interests. And yet, to limit 
ourselves to suspicion would be a reactive limitation to representing the mother-infant relation as 
anything but ideological. It limits us to imagining everyone is an orphan and/or a bastard with 
little but a contractual right to be cared for in something besides an institutional framework, or 
some facsimile. In stark contrast, Arendt is able to imagine a mother- infant relation that affirms 
the web-like connection, the earthly connection, and --most important--the possibility of this 
same infant‘s mother herself appearing as a ―who‖ and not just as a ―what.‖ Arendt imagines the 
violence done to the underlying revelation of birth, sex difference, difference, ambiguity, which 
drives, rather than prevents, narrative identity, political thought and action, creativity. Arendt 
imagines that the generation of life enables, rather than prevents, the creation of ideas. The 
question remains: does Arendt, like her nemesis Plato, configure a notion of human freedom 
which requires a repudiation of maternity? 
Cavarero‘s work bridges Arendt‘s preoccupation with the Ancients, modern fascism and 
metaphors of birth. Like Arendt, she deconstructs western metaphysics to deconstruct fascism, 
not because metaphysics is inherently fascist, but because she believes that the germ of fascism‘s 
possibility and its possible undoing are manifest in metaphysic‘s exegesis of origin and identity. 
For example, both Arendt and Cavarero tend to be labeled ―feminist‖ but, like Arendt, Cavarero 
does not self-identify as a feminist. For both thinkers, the term ―feminist‖ is over-determined to 
become a restrictive political platform based on an identity rooted in the body. Such ‗markers‘ 
cause Cavarero to worry and be wary of the ability of fascism to insert itself into anti-fascism 
discourses and practices. In this sense, her analysis is politically relevant to feminists and non-
feminists alike. 
Cavarero uses ―birth‖ to counter-pose fascism to anti-fascism. Fascism begins with the 
premise that we are born into an identity rooted in the place where earthly immanence meets the 
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human domain of speech and action; fascism collapses the determinate with what should be 
indeterminate. Deleuze names this picture of thought the ―arboreal‖ because, rather than 
acknowledge the unpredictable inherent in the earthy, everything is understood and interpreted as 
if it branched out from one unified and uniform trunk: every branching out is classified by where 
it came from, instead of where it is going to. From within the arborescence of fascism, Cavarero 
unearths the rhizomatic inherent in birth: instead of interpreting birth as an event which 
determines identity, Cavarero assures us that, with every birth comes the promise of the 
unpredictable. Nothing about an infant‘s mother, or socio-historical-political context, tells us 
―who‖ this infant will become. Birth is rhizomatic: it scrambles, confuses, and disguises ‗origin.‘  
The tragedy of the philosopher is that has for too-long been occupied by someone who 
has too long been unaware of the need to solicit the story which can only be solicited from others. 
The hero‘s tragic fate is not his latent love of his mother nor is it his latent desire to kill his father; 
rather, the hero‘s tragic fate is his latent, unrealized desire to know his story. Without this desire, 
he fails to go forth and seek others; had he wanted, had he known, he would have asked, and, had 
he asked, he would not live in a world without others. The philosopher is not only lonely, he is 
angry; he seems to know that his desire is waning and that, without it, he cannot know what it is 
to live with others, and to know from whom he came. Perhaps it is his loneliness that causes him 
to regard the revelation which is others with suspicion and distrust. His lonely anger culminates in 
violence, the same violence that Klein terms the ―stupidity of psychosis.‖ The philosopher turns 
his head to see behind him, but, instead of seeing, he is left blind: a mono-mega empty origin of 
form without contour, a cavern black and empty, threatens to engulf him and repudiate this he 
must. Cavarero observes this scene of a man who, in his ignorance and distrust of the revelation 
of his origin, turns into a monster. The midwives too observe as their unborn stumbles in the 
underwater-cave, not knowing which way is up or down, with some pity, but all along, with a 
sense of inevitability. As Arendt warned, Cavarero concedes: our first birth is the possibility of 
our second birth.   
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In her recounting of the theatres of appearance and spaces of disappearance where she 
warns of the perils of misappropriating labour, obfuscating of work, or ducking action, Cavarero 
is sometimes too much the spectator and not enough the subject of her own contributions. Her 
narrative voice resonates with the meta-tone of a thinker who sees from the top down, 
depersonalizing the story of the triumph of the ―what‖ over the ―who.‖ In the rare instances in 
Relating Narratives in which Cavarero steps down from on high, she quickly extracts herself 
from the analysis; even in her chapter on biography in which she speaks of women‘s frequent 
desire to read stories of individuals rather than totalizing narratives, Cavarero opts to be the 
narrator rather than the actor.   
 
Our Life is a Stage 
If Cavarero has a tendency towards an anxious repetition, it is for demonstrating the 
impossibility of shedding the ambiguity inherent in birth. She repeats many times that, we desire 
to know our story, not because of a general sense of lack, but by witnessing the birth of another. 
96
 By witnessing the birth of another, she claims that we understand by analogy that we, like the 
infant, are exposed to an earthly immanence mitigated only by a theatre of performers and 
spectators who shelter us from the dark night of nothingness. For Cavarero, our exposure is our 
existence in the double sense which cannot be separated: our exposure as earthly beings is also 
our existence as possibly human. From birth, we are all showing who she or he is to others. As 
Cavarero stipulates, our sheer ―there-ness‖ relates to the context in which we appear; the primacy 
of appearance constitutes the fundamental corporeal aspect of identity.
97
  Birth has an 
―ontological‖ as well as phenomenological bearing. Birth is the root of origin, but this origin‘s 
―roots‖ are irreparably rhizomatic. In the entanglement which is the correlation of being seen and 
seeing, speaking and listening, asking and giving, community which is the manifestation of what 
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Cavarero‘s names ―the cosmic feast of reciprocity.‖ We are, she writes, ―the naked reality of our 
originary physical appearance.‖98 This is the double (and multiple) meaning of what it is to be 
‗born.‘  
When we are born, we are named. As Cavarero echoes from Benjamin, our name is not 
an ―onomastic originary‖ which confers our uniqueness; instead, ―the names that parents give a 
child do not correspond-in a metaphysical rather than etymological sense-to any knowledge, for 
they name newborn children.‖99 He can not be known to himself, except through others who 
narrate the beginning for which he was not present. Our first experience is a memory which is 
prohibited to us. This prohibition is the gap in memory which spurs us to solicit our whole story 
from others. The fact of our being and having a name and a story is, of course, a story within a 
story-and one which Cavarero increasingly distances her self from.  
Cavarero is insistent: as the text unfolds, we are repeatedly reminded of the underlying 
unpredictable quality of every memory, every certainty. We are told that we know who we are, 
and who we are in others, only as a state recognized ―too late.‖ We are always after the fact, and 
then not even. Who we are and where we came from stubbornly refuses to secure the 
indeterminable and unpredictable anonymity of origin. Again, this ambiguous uncertainty does 
not apply only to our identity, or the story of identity, but even the most mundane of facts. Facts, 
however amicably or combatively or sophistically narrated, still carry a narrative string that will 
furl. In each instance, we are reminded of the impossibility of asking for a more solid, fixed 
ground upon which to think and believe with the arrival of the infant. As the ambiguity and inter-
dependence of our identity becomes increasingly apparent, Cavarero‘s own narrative becomes 
increasingly un-self reflective and all the more constative.  
Like an all too familiar puppet-master, we are told  a story of an infant who turns to their 
audience to know who they are, and the cycle of identity, community, and knowing commences 
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one more time. The revelation of birth reveals that those to whom we turn to know ourselves also 
only know who they are through others. It is by witnessing the birth of another that I appreciate 
the tenuous nature of my own memory, and thus, by analogy, I know that the memory of those 
who were present to my own birth comes to them in the same fragile, convincing illusion. The 
fact of birth makes the pretence of knowing one‘s self dogmatic.  
Cavarero accentuates the ―eperon‖ of birth: it promises all that metaphysics had wanted it 
to: an illumination of origin and identity, but dashes any hope of fixing or securing this 
illumination. Like the experience of waking from a dream, we can almost touch and feel the 
experience, but in reaching for it, we are prescient to its illusive quality. Birth is ephemeral, but 
constitutive. In summary, reviving the double meaning of birth makes salient the manner in which 
our life is affectively real, earthly and grounded, but only because of the nearly evanescent 
narrative communities which establish, and de-establish, our memory, our identity, and our 
belonging which we, by virtue of being born, require to know who we are and who we are 
required, by virtue of having been born, to disrupt. Our life is a stage. But am I, as Plato once 
suggested, born into a world of other-mothers who cannot tell me from any other? And what of 
that mother who philosophy distrusted for so long-where does she make her appearance? 
 
 
Enter Oedipus  
 
When Oedipus the philosopher stands before the riddle of the Sphinx, he attempts to 
answer her question ‗who are you?‘ by answering with a general response. On this same basis, 
Cavarero determines a correspondence between Oedipal and Platonic discourse. In the case of 
Oedipus, the ―riddle flows from the cruelty of a god, from malevolence towards men.‖100 Either 
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Oedipus or the Sphinx must die; either he will be devoured by a monster, or she will be cast into 
the abyss. The one who reveals the secret is saved, but risks living with the monstrous knowledge. 
In the case of the philosopher, he attempts to avoid the riddle and shift the problem on the 
―definition.‖ But, claims Cavarero, the curse lies not in the riddle but in having to answer the 
riddle. 
When the philosopher tries to be free of the sphinx by answering, ―I am Man,‖ he does 
her work for her. The philosophers extinguishes his self: his answer is at once ―masculine and 
neuter,‖ a hybrid created by thought; invisible and intangible, yet ―declaring itself to be the only 
thing ―sayable‖ in true discourse. The philosophical (and modern tragedy) relies on its ―noetic‖ 
status, and leaves behind no life story. The philosophers‘ response, claims Cavarero, is the ―very 
form of philosophy.‖101  Philosophy determines the correct approach in advance and in each 
instance and, as a result, its epistemic form does not change: the definition is answered by the 
universal. Not only does this philosopher perish, so too does his trace. The philosophers‘ response 
―man‖ applies to everyone and to no one and thus ―disincarnates‖ itself from the living 
singularity of each one. When Oedipus the philosopher answers the question, the outcome is 
similarly tragic. 
The monster‘s cruel game is to show Oedipus facing the Sphinx in the act of solving the 
riddle: he does not speak but points towards himself. At the time he tries to know himself, he 
recognizes himself in the definition of man. It is a deadly interaction between universal man and 
concrete uniqueness. In the sentence ―I Man,‖ the ―I‖ dies and yet, at least in the case of Oedipus, 
the story is known by all except Oedipus himself. His ignorance of his birth leads him to the fatal 
crossroads of murdering a stranger and parricide, and a legitimate marriage and an act of incest. 
The mask of the duplicity is the mask of his birth. His tragic ending is the beginning of his 
revelation that he requires others to know who he is. Like Oedipus, our story is incomplete and 
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generates a need for others. It is a story which both discovers and creates the relation of self with 
the world in which it can appear with others, knowing itself only in that appearance or display. 
Ultimately, we cannot distinguish the ―I‖ who narrates from the self who is narrated.  
 
Jocasta: Mother Avatar  
Cavarero shares Oedipus‘s anxiety when it comes to answering the question. She is 
insistent, persistent, and relentless in her archaeological uncovering of his story, his pain, his 
destiny, but, if we were to turn the tables and place our narrator Cavarero before the Sphinx the 
enigma would be: ―who is your mother?‖ She well understands his story, its depths and traps, its 
ironies and its desires, and, by the end of Relating Narratives, while we know all too well why 
Oedipus confuses his mother, Jocasta for his wife, but we know almost nothing of Cavarero, the 
mother, her mother, ―mother.‖ Her answers lead us to conclude that she, like all of us, must 
recollect birth. Oedipus could answer the question: ―what is a mother?‖ quite easily. He, like the 
philosopher, would describe the universal qualities shared by mothers: they conceive, gestate, and 
often nurse and rear their young. At the end of his life, he might have added that we cannot know 
her except through others; but, neither she nor he can tell us who our ‗mother‘ is.  But, as 
Cavarero so often remarks, because he failed to know her except as a universal definition, in this 
case not of ―man‖ but of ―mother,‖ he is secured a tragic fate. And yet, what does Cavarero reveal 
of her own anxiety when she speaks of Oedipus‘s anxiety?  
Her anxiety borders somewhat on poetry. The seasons of her existence, this existence and 
not another, where has it come from? 
102
Cavarero leaves it here, like that, and like others, our 
―mother‖ is offered to us in the form of universals. Is this simply because, for Cavarero, ‗mother‘ 
is the universal we cannot know? Is mother, for her, what coincides with what it is to want to 
know, the metaphor for what is potential rather than actual, and not simply a conscious act of 
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remembering?  Is mother ‗not’? It certainly seems to be the case-that, ultimately, ‗mother‘ is 
made an empty universal, an ever elusive ―cause‖ which we know through its effect, the birth of 
her infant. Ultimately, Cavarero‘s account tells us who mothers are by telling about her infant; if 
indeed Cavarero‘s habit is the point of view of the adult recollecting his birth, is she not 
committing the same error which she accused Oedipus and Plato of making? 
 
The Gift of Life?  
Recall in Chapter 1 that Protevi defended Aristotle‘s notion of the maternal on the basis 
that the notion implied an ethic of the gift of life. Cavarero‘s rendering of the mother‘s role in the 
appearance of the infant is strikingly similar. She deduces that the infant necessitates a reflection 
on names such as Donato and Benedetta because ―whoever is born and abandoned by the mother 
is still an existent offered by her as a gift [donata/dono] to the world and blessed [benedetta] by 
it.‖103 Like Arendt, she suggests that we are all orphans because we have all been abandoned by 
some mother. This is true in the sense that, ―the perceptible truth of each existence‖ is ―made 
more acute by the immediate loss of one's proper origin.‖ The mother is the ―who‖ from which 
the 'from' is already missing. Mother is already absent in the giving of her gift. And thus, for the 
same reason that we are infants, we also have a ―name.‖ Naming is always given, a gift (le don). 
The gift of life necessitates a gift-in-return. But is mother really only a nodular point in the 
economy of the gift? 
Mothers know themselves, by analogy, to be she who was once an infant, but mothers 
also know that she is present for birth differently than others. Not all mothers, but many mothers, 
witness the birth of their infants differently than does a stranger and not simply as a mother, but 
as his/her mother. She awaits his story with a readiness to do more than narrate his unpredictable 
evolving in community; she most often awaits his arrival with the intention of tending to his 
needs, his wants, as well as his dreams and his nightmares and everything in between. Many 
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mothers receive their baby waiting for the story to begin-differently. Her story is double: she is 
not a spectator in the sense that others are spectators. She is and is not the body to which he will 
search, explore, and create in the vessel of the symbol. Not all mothers, but most mothers, are 
sentient to this evolution and relate to him differently for this reason. In chapters 4 and 5, Klein 
and Kristeva will develop the relevance of this difference. But, for now, we can note that 
Cavarero does not, will not, and perhaps cannot imagine birth from the point of view of anyone 
but he who recollects birth. Kant more than most seem to understood that this seeming impasse is 
philosophical.  
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CHAPTER III  
KANT ON ORDINARY, IRRATIONAL WOMEN AND THE SUBLIMITY OF IRIS 
 
Abstract: Kant overthrows the reigning idealisms and empiricisms and crowns the human subject 
sovereign. He makes clear that this new kingship is a mixed blessing: forging one‘s way through 
temptation and moral dilemma without the comfort of an external authority is taxing and 
sometimes vertiginous, but there is no alternative. The ―creative centre of the knowable world‖ 
must make himself against the material world according to his pure will. With an absent-minded 
massage on the scars left where the chains of material determinism once burdened him, the genius 
strives on-not by imitating, nor by obeying pre-established rules, but by giving the law to nature. 
With brilliant stealth, Kant makes nature dependent on man. Highly prescient to the risks 
associated with this bold move, Kant lays down the law of reason with absolute force; everything 
will be referred back to her omnipotent majesty for approval. There is only one problem. While 
the master of the enlightenment permits an unprecedented patronage in ethics, politics, 
philosophy and the arts, he does not permit this patronage to women.  
 
One Antinomy Leads to Another 
 When Kant unleashes the force of the antinomy, neither dogmatic theology nor 
empiricist determinism absorbs the shock. With unparalleled force, Kant strips the subject down 
to a distilled machinery of senses which supply data to an imagination which synthesizes with 
rules supplied by the understanding. An analysis of the aftermath reveals a lone-subject hovering 
on the edge of a vertiginous precipice, his stature framed by the sublime heights of the celestial 
spheres. This newly denuded subject is raw and exposed but uniquely capable of shedding the 
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earth‘s suffocating embrace and those supercilious imperatives from above. Kant is the reticent 
artificer of the ―creative center of the knowable world.‖104 
For those left to tend to the afterbirth, a putrid whiff averts their attention from the 
newborn creation and tinges their tender hearts with a mournful melancholy. In an absent -
minded salute to Plato, Kant withdraws from the sodden terrain of the nativity with barely an 
acknowledgment to those whose destiny it is to generate life. The evidence is indisputable: Kant‘s 
pedagogic energies are reserved for subjects who are born but never bear. As he writes in the 
Anthropology,  
Nature was concerned about the preservation of the embryo and implanted fear 
into the woman‘s character, a fear of physical injury and a timidity towards 
similar dangers. On the basis of this weakness, the woman legitimately asks for 
masculine protection.
105
 
 
Kant acknowledges that some women are the exception to the rule, but adds that they 
―may as well have a beard.‖106 These sentiments are echoed in his Observations on the Beautiful 
and the Sublime in which he determines women‘s intuitions to be governed by sense rather than 
reason.  
Kant not only assumes that nature prevents women from creating genuine ideas, he 
suggests that nature‘s influence over women is so profound that it is able to infect men through 
women. Nature, claims Kant, can with ―gaping throat, drink the whole kingdom of moral beings 
like a drop of water.‖1 Thus, in Kant‘s ontology, the moral man is tempted by nature, but can 
resist her lure. When reason dictates that he ought to succumb to temptation, when for example he 
must will the continuation of the species, he is to succumb begrudgingly. Some of Kant‘s readers 
deduce that for Kant, willingly succumbing to sexual temptation with no intent of procreating is 
more morally wrong than suicide; suicide has the remaining dignity of being a solitary drowning 
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rather than a willful self-obliteration in a ―petit mort.‖107 Regardless of how far we push this 
interpretation, it is clear that Kant renders nature the unreliable, self serving dictator of prejudice, 
emotion, and passion and women her servant. Nature is rendered the dual temptress and warden 
who beckons man to return to what he, by virtue of being a rational animal, must return to. Kant 
is adamant that it can and should be no other way.  
Moral man is only moral when and if he refuses temptation. Moral man is both an 
imperfectly biological and an imperfectly rational being. He is both subject and not subject to the 
laws of reason and nature. On this same precipice lies the foundation of his freedom. Moral man 
is capable of knowing that he is not determined by nature but compelled by an imperative. The 
imperative conflicts with the purely determinate laws of nature which are meant to govern over 
nature and compel him to live as if his actions were in accord with what has laws and formal 
unity, nature, but not of determinate nature itself. To be free, he must conceive of the possibility 
of being free from external determinates. In the stormy seas of immanent animality, man can hold 
onto the realm of the universal. Once he takes hold of the universal, or more accurately, once he 
allows it to take hold of him, he can channel every current of the stormy seas of his animality to 
propel himself into the open spaces of morality and autonomy and creativity. In Kant‘s eyes, 
women are too natural to be like nature.  
 
Man Made Nature 
Kant claims that the cognizing, moral man knows it is impossible to know if he originates 
in the all powerfulness of his reason or if he emanates from some other unknown; however, the 
good man knows that he cannot know. Otherwise said, the moral man knows the (sublime) limits 
of cognition. The man knows that the ―infinity of possibilities that entice and beckon the 
transcendental imagination,‖ cannot be known by finite, imperfectly rational man. Those who 
know that they cannot know revere her invulnerable majesty, bow to her voice and understand her 
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commandments; conversely, those who claim to have known what cannot be known, are, 
according to Kant, ―liars and boasters.‖108 For Kant, the moral man appreciates that ―reality is 
something hard, something which resists reason and value, something which is recalcitrant to 
form.‖ 109  Men appreciate that form must be imposed on the world of matter because the 
understanding is the source of all knowing.  
Despite her majesty‘s sovereignty, Kant insists that she is dependent on the subject. Kant 
is not suggesting that man can overcome nature, rather, he is claiming that man, and not nature, 
transforms nature into something that has shape, meaning, consequence. Nature itself has no 
value. Anticipating our likely anxiety of the unbearable weightlessness of such a revelation, Kant 
reassures us that this man-made reality is just as heavy, real, and potentially wounding as ever. 
He adds that, while it might appear that this ―phenomenal ―world‖ risks crumbling in the grips of 
contingency, it remains, nevertheless the only world we know and sometimes all too real. Those 
of us who know this world to be one of distinction and clarity have, as Korsgaard describes, 
―won‖ this experience. For this reason, she describes Kant‘s contribution to epistemology as 
modernism realized.  
Korsgaard explains that, in Kant‘s world view, reality is something hard, resists reason 
and value, and is recalcitrant to form. The Kantian subject feels at a distance from nature because 
nature is what the subject knows himself by knowing he is not nature; similarly, modern man 
constructs a phenomenal world and knows himself by knowing he is not this world. (The more 
familiar way of explaining this is to say that, for Kant, the subject knows with senses supplying 
the data we synthesize (intuitions) under rules (categories) supplied by the understanding 
(reason)). Kant anticipates the likely outcome to be that we can never know if God or some other 
omnipotent entity constitutes the ―creative center of the knowable world,‖ but there will never 
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any longer be any disputing our role in this creative endeavor. In fact, for Kant the history of 
philosophy could be read as a case history of the subject‘s struggle to accept that he, and not 
Nature or God, is the ―creative centre of the knowable world.‖ Korsgaard describes this 
awareness as a ―materialism‖ that no longer puzzles over why the world, ―being good, is yet not 
good.‖110  
 
The Antinomy  
Kant‘s account of man emerging as an autonomous subjectivity comes at a unique 
juncture in the history of philosophy; in fact, Kant‘s genius comes in the manner he approaches 
this same juncture. Rather than accepting what had long seemed like a straightforward conflict 
between reason and sensibility, Kant offers that this is in fact an insight into cognition as such. 
Kant terms the irreconcilable conflict between reason and sensibility the ―antinomy.‖ In the first 
stages, humans attempted to shed themselves of the shackles of the earth by taking refuge in the 
celestial sphere of rationalism; they are soon trapped in a boundless infinity when they are forced 
to claim that all knowledge is intuited in innate ideas which correlate with essential forms. Kant 
stipulates that ―rationalism‖ was forced to prescribe acting and thinking in accordance with the 
same ideas whose unshakeable, omniscient, omnipresent legitimate existence it must presuppose; 
no empirical experience could confirm the existence of what must remain, ultimately, essentially, 
formal.  
Kant identifies a turning point, when, in an attempt to return to the solid ground of earthly 
certainty, philosophy went full circle only to get stuck in the dead end of empiricism which must 
base any and every inference on past, empirical experiences. It limits its scope to predicting 
cognitive possibilities and moral certainties based on past experiences of the empirical. In a final 
attempt to escape, the empiricist takes refuge in a rationalist domain it long shunned. Ultimately, 
it must make any inferences on the basis of a ―cause‖ that can never be made ―empirical.‖ More 
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problematic still, the empiricist must postulate that everything has a ―cause,‖ including what 
cannot have a cause, namely freedom. In simple, rationalism must postulate that everything has 
an origin but extend indefinitely and empiricism must postulate that everything has a termination 
but be broken into infinitely divisible parts.  
Kant resolves the antinomy by not resolving it. In other words, Kant concludes that the 
laws and unity of the world must be supplied, not by God (rationalism) or Nature (empiricism), 
but by the understanding. The understanding knows itself in constructing a phenomenal world 
and knows itself in knowing its self to not be this same phenomenal world. To state otherwise, 
cognition will never be made evident in an unmediated and wholly-founded expression or 
experience. Cognition, by definition, always lacks. In more technical terms, Kant postulates that 
the world we know must be supplied by senses that are synthesized (intuitions) under rules 
(categories) supplied by the understanding (reason); this same phenomenal world must be the 
production of the temporal sequence which brings objects into an ordered whole and makes them 
knowable.
111
 In simple, the phenomenal world is the world. By pushing the antinomy to its limits, 
Kant does not resolve it; instead, he generates a sustained revelation on cognition‘s desire for the 
ultimate, unconditioned termination and extension.  
While for other philosophers, the choice between rationalism and empiricism appeared 
like the only choice, for Kant, the antinomy delivers an imperative to accept that, not only is no 
final reconciliation possible, but that cognition is born from the matrix of this non-reconciliation. 
The fact that there is no hope of reconciliation is our signal to part company with an external 
authority and an invitation to begin a new sojourn as an autonomous subject. The impossibility of 
reconciling the tension between the demand for earthly intimacy and the demand to be at a 
distance from ―nature‖ generates the creativity proper to the human subject. The tension between 
nature‘s pull and culture‘s push is the tension proper to being a rational animal. To grasp the 
phenomenon of this tension is not only to understand the beginning of the moral feeling; it is to 
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understand the very process of being a creative subject. In a sense, our burden and our blessing is 
that we must come to terms with our desire for it to be otherwise. When we accept that there is no 
grand signified such as Nature or God ―out there‖ who will determine our thoughts and actions, 
we accept our freedom; this freedom is our cognition.  
As Horowitz captures in Sustaining Loss, the ―blandishments‖ of nature threaten to return 
in culture, but the illusion must threaten. Nature can only threaten to return because it is the 
return of a lost world we never knew. In fact, Nature cannot return simply because it never was, it 
cannot return because it never could have been. The cognizing, moral, autonomous subject is the 
process which is identical to the attempt to reconcile the tension which cannot be reconciled. This 
tension is the production of subjectivity and the ―artefact‖ its product. Our yearning for a loss 
which cannot be recovered is a loss which lures us toward beauty. Horowitz describes beauty as  
nature‘s obscene yet unapproachable afterlife. Beauty is the loss of a world that 
cannot be recovered. The cognizing, moral autonomous subject mourns this lost 
nature, but the illusion still has a claim on him. He knows that neither Nature nor 
God will return to give him the nourishing solidity or secure certainty that would 
oblate the burdensome freedom which is his and his alone. The need to create is 
the inevitable burden of freedom proper to subjectivity.
 112
  
 
The experience of yearning for something that cannot be is a yearning that is proper to 
being human. The experience of wanting and needing to create is similarly proper to being human 
The question becomes, does this need to create, generated from a yearning for a return to a lost 
time of nature, relate back to Kant‘s other antinomy, that which places our moral man at the 
devotional ground of our ideal of Isis and at the homestead of our disdained real woman? A 
number of Kant‘s feminist critics answer ―yes.‖  
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Introducing the Feminist Critique: Apologies, Inconsistencies, and Antiquities 
Kant accomplishes a radical overhaul of determinism. His rendering of the autonomous 
subject, and all that this entails, is unparalleled. And yet, while he answers the toughest questions 
with the most rigorous of methods, he allows his prejudice towards women to run deep and 
undisturbed. Despite his obvious familiarity with the works of Plato and despite his commitment 
to the dictates of reason and equality before the law, Kant pays little attention to fact or argument. 
He assumes that 1) either a woman does not mother, and so is not a real woman, or she mothers 
and so embodies the following natural properties 2) she lures moral men into sin 3) she 
transmogrifies, cognitively, in response to the developing needs of her foetus and 4) she allows 
nature to inform her thoughts and actions relevant to the mothering of her infant from childhood 
to adulthood. In short, women who do not mother are not women and women who mother are 
irrational. In Kant‘s efforts to salvage an autonomous subject from the antinomy of reason and 
empiricism, he produces an antinomy of his own: the antinomy of sublime Isis and irrational 
woman. Kant requires that his masculine subject repudiate the feminine in ordinary women, but 
revere her majesty in the form of the mothers of all mothers. These contradictions are the subject 
of much feminist scholarship. 
In the following sections, I engage feminist critiques of Kant‘s representations of women. 
The first type I term ―apologetic.‖ The apologetic response acknowledges Kant‘s sexist remarks 
about ordinary women, but dismisses them as relative to the customs and cultures in which he 
was imbedded. The second type I term ―inconsistencies.‖ The inconsistencies response 
acknowledges his sexist colloquialisms but prefers to undertake an archeological dig of his 
ontology; after careful inspection, they deduce that there is no solid ground for claiming that his 
ontology is sexist, and, on this same basis, Kant has no good reason for his prejudice against 
women. The last response I term ―universalism.‖ It attempts to find an explanation for Kant‘s 
apparent sexism by identifying a deeper insecurity about the integrity of his ontology. I conclude 
by arguing that Kant had no alternative than to conceive of the subject by also conceiving of the 
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repudiation of the maternal. As I will argue in the following chapter on Klein, Kant was not 
wrong to repudiate the maternal; rather, his error was to attempt to conceal this repudiation. 
Enlightenment, it will turn out, has everything to do with repudiating the ‗generation of life.‘ 
As Robin May Schott argues, contemporary readers of Kant need to determine to what 
extent historical context is relevant to his representations of women. Placing his philosophy in 
historical context encourages readers to identify his sexism as indicative of the prevailing 
attitudes of his day; placing his philosophy in historical context might also determine just how 
much these same attitudes sully his enlightenment philosophy. On this same line of reasoning, 
Brown and Sedgwick‘s claim that we are obligated to forgive Kant‘s sexist remarks; they 
encourage us to focus instead on his positive contributions to the equality movement which stem, 
in no contingent manner, from his enlightenment philosophy.  Brown and Sedgwick urge us to 
accept that Kant‘s denial of citizenship and equality to women is simply part and privy of an 
antiquated anthropology. They argue that the principle of charity dictates that we assume that, had 
Kant‘s prejudices against women been proven to be the product of determinate, social historical 
forces, he would have had to recognize that women were being wrongfully denied the opportunity 
to exercise their rational faculties. Clearly women can generate life and create genuine ideas. 
They conclude by recommending that we, his readers, dismiss his sexist comments as glib 
remarks indicative of the then prevailing, but now untenable, anthropological Enlightenment 
ideology. Once it is determined that his glib remarks are accidents of the tongue originating in 
common prejudice, they deduce that while he might have been ideologically misled or 
empirically mistaken, his moral groundwork remains safely intact.
113
 
Neither Brown nor Sedgwick concede that Kant‘s hyper-vigilant distrust of common 
sense prejudice should have steered him away from the lofty certainties which only reason can 
afford. Given the import Kant places on thinking and acting in an autonomous manner, it seems 
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unfair to grant him amnesty on this same basis. Instead, it must be deduced that Kant‘s words are 
his own. Whatever he might argue and believe, he does so for a reason; whenever he argues and 
believes without reason, he does so in error. (They also fail to mention that Kant did in fact have 
knowledge of an alternative to gender inequality; no doubt he knew the works of Plato intimately; 
no doubt was familiar with Aristotle‘s disputes with Plato on the topic of gender equality). 
Instead, it is reasonable to assume that anything Kant thought fit to publish, he thought fit to 
claim; this applies equally to his views on women. Neither his mundane experiences nor his 
anthropological musings are to blame for causing him to believe that those who generate life, 
women, cannot create genuine ideas.  
Kant nearly always explains his reasons for any thought or action; however, this is not the 
case when it comes to his sexist views about women. Given that his sexist views cannot be 
reduced to mere common sense prejudice, we must search for another explanation. A number of 
his critics have focused on the parallels between his concepts of women and Nature. Their 
reasoning is as follows: if Kant determines that nature is a force of life and surmises that women 
are determined by this same force, then he must be assuming that women‘s weakness, physical 
and cognitive, can be explained by her intimacy with nature; however, Kant resolutely denies that 
physical experiences can determine human thought or action. Kant‘s argument for the subject‘s 
autonomous relationship to nature is explicit, and even adamant on the point that the subject can 
rise above or sink below his affective context, but neither pain nor pleasure can determine any 
specific consequences in the subject. If pain or pleasure had a determining force, then freedom 
would be Mother Earth‘s cruel charade, an apparition, and a hoax. If we assumed that pain and 
pleasure could determine our thoughts and actions, we would have to concede that, on one 
extreme, victims of torture, and on the other extreme, invites to a sinfully pleasurable orgy would 
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be less capable of being rational. Kant‘s insistent point is that all rational beings are capable of 
being rational despite temptation or inclination.
114
  
Kant‘s argument for the sovereignty of reason is substantiated in a rare series of examples 
in which Kant refers to a man who is tempted by his passions to commit adultery and another 
who is tempted to end his miserable life. Both men are consumed by their passions of pain and 
pleasure but both men, by virtue of their humanity, are able to let reason rule sovereign over 
inclination. In Kant‘s unreserved opinion, their triumph is concurrent with their becoming 
singular, precious instances of rationally moral men. If we assumed that Kant was suggesting 
even a weak correlation between pain, pleasure, and rational autonomy we would have to assume 
that the rational man‘s ability to be moral was interconnected in some way to his ability to feel. 
Kant makes certain to distinguish moral feeling as the negative of feeling.
115
 On this same line of 
reasoning, Kant refutes a possible correlation between morality and positive feeling by reminding 
us of the benevolent who loses his feelings of sympathy and ceases to do what is right and 
good;
116
 according to Kant, this man is no longer a moral man, not because he ceases to do the 
work of benevolence, but because he allows his loss of feeling to determine his thoughts and 
actions. Only once this same benevolent is motivated to do what is right and good --despite his 
lack of sympathy-- will Kant allow us to call him a true moral agent; the man who is moral 
despite the circumstances is an instance of obedience to unconditioned moral reason. If pain and 
pleasure determined us to be moral or immoral beings then mothers would be equally, and 
sometimes more likely of being enduring examples of moral subjects. Kant sees no reason to 
dismiss such an absurdity. Why then would the physical experience of gestation, labour, and 
nursing render a woman incapable of creating genuine ideas? 
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There should be no reason for claiming that there is a quantitatively significant difference 
between the pain experienced during gestation, labour and nursing and the pain and pleasure 
experienced during the preparation, fighting, or recovering from battle. Kant has no reservations 
about expressing his reverence for the battle-worn general who, from his stage of mud and blood, 
inwardly glows with a near sublime light.
117
  And yet, the received opinion in much of the 
feminist literature is that, given the long association of the body with the feminine, there is good 
reason to dig more deeply. Kant has yet to give us a good reason for excluding women on the 
basis that she becomes pregnant or gives birth. A more likely for Kant‘s distrust and demotion of 
the body and its full gamete of wants, desires, and capacities is a feature of the ―body‖ Battersby 
terms its ability to ―speak back.‖ 
Battersby argues that Kant‘s ambivalence toward paradigmatic shifts in science were 
deeply connected to his discomfort with women‘s bodies and their person; she suggests that Kant 
tends toward a sexist philosophy, not because he does not like or respect women per say, but 
because women remind him of his philosophical impotence to conceive of matter as anything 
except inanimate and wanting for unity. This would explain why Kant insists, even after the 
scientific paradigmatic shift in our understanding of change across species, to conceive of a 
subject in relation to matter as ―mort‖ rather than ―morphing.‖118 Following this line of reasoning, 
Kant‘s prejudice against (pregnant) women is interpreted as evidence of his deeper discomfort 
with the possibility that matter might generate itself. If Nature generates itself, then Kant‘s 
concept of cognition, morality and freedom is unstable and untenable. If the subject understands 
by imposing formal unity on the world of matter and this same matter ―speaks back,‖ Kant‘s 
subject‘s autonomy is put into question. 119  Battersby‘s reading might help explain Kant‘s 
discomfort with theories of evolution, but it does not explain Kant‘s prejudice against women; 
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rather, it explains his prejudice towards generating bodies. Battersby‘s reading depends on the 
reader assuming a causal connection between Kant‘s metaphysics of matter and his prejudice 
against women. Until the causal connection is established, it cannot be proven. If the issue for 
Kant were merely that matter generates itself, then Kant, presumably, would show some 
discomfort with to anyone with a body, man or woman. Kant‘s possible discomfort with the 
possibility that man‘s body evolves does not translate into a prejudice against men.  
Boundas argues that the tension in Kant‘s philosophy is indicative of neither a 
misinformed sexism nor an antiquated scientific world view; instead, he argues that it results 
from Kant‘s well intentioned attempt to articulate a theory of rationality that would establish a 
consensual harmony among mental faculties for the sake of a harmonious republic of ends. In 
doing so, Kant stumbles across sexual difference and, given the trouble it threatens to cause, 
squashes it with the intention of protecting the autonomous subject. Boundas suggests that the 
tension that lurks in Kant‘s philosophy is much less about a prejudice towards women or men and 
much more about the inevitable limitations of a philosophy that struggles to affirm a radical 
universalism. Boundas identifies a tension that culminates along the fault line that divides it into 
two subtexts, one of which culminates in ideas without adequate intuitions to fill them (ideas of 
speculative reason), and the other of which ends with an intuition lacking an adequate idea or 
concept (the aesthetic instance of the sublime). Given Kant‘s ambition to offer a system of 
universal reason, Boundas suggests that the tension remains intolerable. Boundas describes the 
tension as ―traumatic‖ and as an ―unclaimable‖ fecundity sired by the thought of universality.120  
Ultimately, Boundas postulates that Kant‘s prejudice against ordinary women and 
reverence for the ideal woman is indicative of a tension proper to his struggle to wrestle -not with 
sexual difference- but with difference as such. On this reading, the assumption is that our greatest 
insight into Kant‘s philosophy comes not by ruminating over minor sexist remarks made here and 
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there, or by deconstructing his antiquated scientific world view; instead, our greatest insights into 
Kant‘s work are thought to come by pushing his philosophy to its internal limits. The argument is 
sound, but ultimately misguided when it dismisses the important role that sex difference plays in 
Kant‘s philosophy. Kant is highly preoccupied with the relationship between the ―creative centre 
of the knowable world‖ and his other; for example, in Kant‘s letter to Schiller. In this same letter, 
Kant is insistent on the import of a deep reverence for ―Isis‖ and the formation of the autonomous 
subject. For Kant, the attitude of reverence for the mother of all mothers is crucial import to 
understanding autonomous, creative subjectivity; it remains possible that the attitude of 
ambivalent distrust of ordinary women is just as important, and possibly relevant to the reverence 
for her apparent ‗other‘.121  
 
Universalism Revisited: Why Ambivalence Matters  
The arguments for apology, inconsistency, antiquity, and universalism fail to reach below 
the surface-tension proper to Kant‘s ambivalence towards ―generation.‖ The genius of reaching 
below the surface comes in allowing, rather than preventing, the tremors of the ―traumatic 
tension‖ to register long enough to glimpse a possible interconnectedness between Kant‘s 
ontology and his glib remarks about ordinary women. Such a reading does not necessitate a 
digression into an analysis of its author or its subject; instead, such a reading invites us to 
maintain a seriously playful openness to the possibility that Kant‘s glib remarks are not merely 
accidents of the tongue (which he thought fit to publish), but, are rather an expression of a deeper 
discomfort with which he was wrestling. A wide-ranging group of theorists informed by the 
school of psychoanalysis suggests that this discomfort is nearly universal and proper to be proper 
to being human and warn against any desire to squash and silence such a tension. If fact, they will 
suggest that enlightenment is just as much about sound judgment, coherent cognition, and artistic 
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creativity as it is ambivalence and anxiety. For the likes of Klein and Kristeva, Kant‘s willing 
recounting of his experience of ambivalence towards the generation of life, and those who seem 
to embody its essence, is very much in keeping with the enlightenment Kant helped initiate.   
To understand why Kant is unable to regard women as the ―creative centre of the 
knowable world,‖ we can entertain that Kant‘s genius registers as readily in what he does say as 
much as what he does not say. Working to ―solve‖ the problem of difference in Kant‘ s work is to 
make it harder to engage the themes of difference, gender and origin as they intertwine with both 
Kant‘s glib remarks and his metaphysics.122 Perhaps I and others are too invested in this impasse 
because it is our tangible claim to a possible connection between Kant‘s casually sexist remarks 
and his metaphysics. But, without this assumption, I am unable to understand why Kant‘s ―free 
and moral man‖ reveres and fears the sublime Iris while being incapable of relating to ordinary 
women.  
 
Genus, Genius: Feminists’ Ambivalence   
Kant‘s calculated assault on dogmatic theology and empiricist determinism open the 
doors for the unprecedented latitude for creative genius but, the prohibition against likening the 
creative process to anything but a symbolic appropriation of the generation of life runs deep.For 
Kant, women ought to and do generate life rather than create something which is ―like‖ life-
although, apparently, every life, all life, is only ever ―like‖ life. Kant is meticulous in his 
application of the metaphor. Moral agents, geniuses, and the autonomous rational agent are only 
ever like women; real women gestate, birth or mother and midwife but are themselves never 
actually women. For example, in Kant‘s rendering of the artistic coupling of a master and his 
genius-tutor, a proximity to the generation of life is grazed but never grasped. The artist and his 
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mentor are anything-anything-but the mother birthing life. They must come as close as possible to 
being in direct communion with nature, without ever touching her, knowing her, being her. Her 
sublimity tears the edges of the beautiful. 
This rendering of women as simulating nature is generally ill-received by contemporary 
feminists. Moira Gatens argues that ―the dichotomies that dominate philosophical thinking are not 
sexually neutral but are deeply implicated in the politics of sexual difference. It is this realization 
that constitutes the ‗quantum leap‘ in feminist theorizing.‖123 Alison Ainley agrees. She claims 
that feminist philosophy rests on the belief that  
the construction of philosophical images is of particular interest from the feminist 
perspective when it affects the way that the body is ―imagined‖ into theoretical 
disciplines and reproduced in specific ways, which also has consequences for the 
way that moral systems are constructed and subsequently impinge upon the 
subjects to whom they are addressed.
124
  
 
Klinger adds that, in the context of aesthetic philosophy, the way in which the ideas of 
the beautiful and the sublime are conceived and how they are contrasted with each other is 
analogous to the polarizations of ―form and matter, mind and body, reason and emotion, public 
and private, having and being, activity and passivity, transcendence and immanence. The 
common denominator of these and other binary opposition lies in the dualism of culture and 
nature which in ―traditional Western thought imply the dualism of gender.‖125Klinger argues that, 
in Kant‘s writing, ―nature and otherness are often linked explicitly and implicitly with symbolic 
representations of the feminine and maternal, but not always as simply passive. [They appear as] 
idealized material form, at once intimate and indeterminate, brimming with purposive life yet 
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plastic enough to put up resistance to the subject‘s own ends.126 In short, they render real women 
a screen for man‘s imagining.  
Irigaray contends that, in Kantian aesthetics, the impression is that the ―creative centre of 
the knowable world,‖ creates him-self against woman as m/other. The Kantian subject creates 
him-self through her, and at the cost of her coming into existence. In this reading, ―fear and awe 
of an all powerful nature forbid man to touch his/the mother and reward his courage in resisting 
her attractions by granting him the right to judge himself independent.‖127 It is in this same 
picture that the specter of Nature is constantly threatening to come to life inside the subject. This 
nature is in the subject as ―both mother, as ground and principle of creation; and matter, as 
sensible.‖ She is what sustains him, but what he must refuse to sustain himself. For Ainley, this 
signals the symbolic figure of the mother as the unknowable origin and thus determines the 
repudiation of the mother as a precondition for the moral.
128
  
It is true, Kant‘s rendering of the master and disciple relationship of creativity mimics the 
pregnant, labouring, and nursing mother, but –interestingly- does not describe the master and 
disciple productive relationship in terms of sterility or deferral. Instead, as Horowitz so 
perspicuously reads, Kant renders this relationship in terms of a master who has occupied the 
place of genius himself, but moves away to make room for the next generation. He does not teach 
by instructing, or even by showing the rule of art, but by himself producing the rule of art which 
is in turn negated by the nascent genius. The repudiation is not one sided, but instead nearly 
rhizomatic in its unfolding. It seems fair then to suggest that for Kant, creativity is not merely a 
relationship of repudiation-if this is repudiation at all. And neither is Kant‘s model of 
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mentor/mentee a simply model of production of a product down the ―midwife-mother-child‖ 
assembly line; instead, it is clear that his notion of mastery is reciprocal and unpredictable; Kant‘s 
notion of the unpredictability in creativity parallels Arendt‘s notion of natality as the ‗being who 
is its beginning.‘ Kant moves closer to a comfort with the origin of creation, but is ultimately 
troubled by creativity as indeed we all are in some way 
 
The Birthing of New Identities 
As Kant describes, a master‘s art cannot be couched in formula and serve as a percept.129 
There is no copying or aping. Each genius must labour his own mournful loss of nature. With 
every creation, each new artistic genius buries the last. The ravaging of nature renders the artistic 
mentor a fatherly midwife to a most adjuratory, heterological, amerceable creator. The inability of 
the master to teach makes the scene of artistic instruction into a theatre of the master‘s nakedness 
before his own mastery: Only if our stipulation of ―repudiation‖ could allow for a nuanced sense 
in which the ―repudiated‖ speaks back, could this be called ―repudiation.‖ Instead, Kant‘s master 
cannot properly master his own mastery. As Horowitz describes, the embarrassing powerlessness 
of the master is, however, simply another name for the master‘s genius.  
Horowitz suggests that Kant‘s notion of the genius‘s mastery makes clear that it cannot 
be grasped in a formula and that it is a cognitively groundless achievement. It is the master‘s 
ability to hover here that makes him at once both worthy of siring the next generation and 
impotent to do so. Looking forward to the generation of students, the master is a father actively 
pursuing his posterity, but looking backward to his attainment of the warrant of mastery, he is a 
akin to a midwife passively birthing the work of nature in the subject. As Horowitz describes, 
where paternity used to be, there is, traumatically, unclaimable fecundity instead. Artistic 
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education is the scene of the unmasking of the mastery of genius.
130
 The master reveals what lies 
at the heart of creativity: the symbol. 
Kant‘s notion of the symbol as the non-reconciliation of nature and culture is also a 
rendering of the creative undertaking of the symbol; rather than determine the non-reconciliation 
as lack, the non-reconciliation of nature and culture is rendered the creative production of the 
symbolic. The production of the symbolic is the creative, artistic production without 
determination or finitude. Its own inadequacy to reconcile nature and culture generates itself.
131
 
The creating human subject creates and recreates by virtue of being a subject who cannot 
reconcile the tension between nature and culture. On Kant‘s terms, the subject who attempted to 
reconcile by resigning herself to rule-following, either the rule of nature or the rule of reason, 
could not properly be said to be a subject. Her labour is the labour of remaking the world of 
mechanism as a world that need not be the realm of inhuman necessity. The inadequacy we 
experience as we undertake this effort is the sometimes vertiginous experience of freedom. The 
experience of freedom is the experience of an illusion of nature unbound by cultural conscriptions. 
There is no genius that is not giving the rule to art; and, nor is there any genius in the destruction 
or aimless or senseless production. It is only in the grips of the tension of the non- reconciliation 
that the subject touches the surface of freedom: the symbol.
132
 
The experience of the beautiful and sublime differ significantly; perhaps it is in the 
experience of the sublime that our more persistent feminist-misgivings might be warranted. Kant 
describes the experience of the sublime by describing the man who knows it is impossible to 
know if he originates in the all powerfulness of his reason or if he emanates from some other 
unknown, but a good man knows that he cannot know. Otherwise said, the moral man knows the 
(sublime) limits of cognition. For his feminist readers, this sublime limit of cognition is far less 
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―unknown‖ than Kant suggests. In Ainley‘s interpretation, the sublimity of Isis, or woman‘s 
generating body, reminds men of the objective validity and the sanctity of the moral law but it 
reminds him in its consuming threat. Ainley speculates that the fear is that he was once a 
woman.
133
 The thought that he was once his mother‘s body is too much for Kant‘s cognizing, 
autonomous moral subject. What for Kant is the ―infinity of possibilities that entice and beckon 
the transcendental imagination,‖ is, for others, simply his mother. Although far from simple, on 
this first register she is not nearly as distant and unknowable as Kant seems to need her to be. 
Kant‘s rendering of cognition, morality and freedom is bound up with representation of what is in 
opposition to the maternal, birthing, lactating body.  
If Kant‘s metaphysics develops from the point of view of an individual identity that 
cannot give birth, his hopes of universality do seem to be in vain. In this case, the issue is less that 
there is something disagreeable with a philosophy like Kant‘s that seems to mimic the 
philosophical practice of opposing nature and culture, and women and men and conflating women 
with nature and men with culture. Instead, the issue is that Kant‘s philosophy must posit the 
repudiation of maternity as the origin of autonomy. Perhaps more serious for a philosopher, a 
model of cognition that wants to claim universal validity, but cannot account for the fact that a 
person could ―normally, at least potentially, become two,‖ ie., become pregnant, is non-
representative.
134
 Kant‘s hopes for universality are contradictory and thus, perhaps, impotent to 
sire the next generation, in more ways than one.  
Battersby suggests that Kant‘s ‗person‘ is based on ―ideals of autonomy and closure‖ and 
―remain inimical to any form of embodiment‖ while the transcendental subject ―exists only in 
relation to bodies.‖135In either instance, Kant‘s model of spatiality is inadequate to deal with a self 
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that contains a self within it. His rendering of spatiality-bodies that supply the data to the 
imagination is a body of inert matter. His self confronts itself against a changeless, infinite 
substance which it also requires to know itself. Without such objects of thought the ―I‖ would not 
be able to distinguish itself from ―not I.‖ Without ―positing bodies in space as permanent 
reference points against which change would be measured,‖ the persistence of the self through 
time could not be secured.
136
 If in fact the problem is that Kant‘s rendering of the relation of mind 
to matter is conceived of as a relationship to something dead and incapable of birthing or 
―morphing‖ into new identities, then Kant‘s concept of person and the account of the 
transcendental subject are sexed, but neither concepts are able to contain birth within the horizons 
of nature that is formed ―top down‖ by the transcendental imagination.137 
Battersby and Boundas claim that Kant sets the standards for the same limitation because 
of the demands made by his Copernican revolution. But Kant is hardly unaware of the problem. 
In a letter to Schiller, Kant relates the experience of looking out over a sublime landscape of 
sexual difference. He claims that his imagination cannot fathom it. 
138
He dismisses the possibility 
that primal matter is also self-forming matter and begins to entertain that nature may be more like 
crystals than solids but, he writes, 
mother earth (like a large animal, as it were) emerge from her state of chaos, and 
maker her lap  promptly give birth initially to creatures of a less purposive form, 
with these then giving birth to others that become better adapted to their place of 
origin due to their relations to one another until in the end this womb itself, 
reified, ossified, and fancied itself to bearing definite species that would no 
longer degenerate, so that the diversity remained as it had turned out when the 
fertile formative force ceased to operate (3
rd
 critique, teleological). 
 
Kant struggles with this tension until the end of his career.  In 1796, ―On a Newly Arisen 
Superior Tone in Philosophy‖ he makes some strides by distancing himself from the Neo-
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Platonists priority of ease, passivity, inspiration, and moves towards an Aristotelian notion of 
struggle and labour. Battersby describes that, during the Romantic period this notion of labour is 
favored and metaphors from the plant and insect kingdom abound. In this same rendering, the 
genius passively-though not effortlessly- labours nature and great men struggle to drive harder 
because of unconscious forces within him and work is the outcome. And yet, unlike many of his 
Romantic counterparts, Kant abstains from adopting the ―previously despised‖ metaphors of 
being impregnated and giving birth.
139
 His description of production is one of wrestling against 
rather than intertwining with Mother Nature. Kant emphasizes the genius as the source of the law 
and law-giver. As Korsgaard suggests, Kant makes nature dependent on man. The subject reveres 
Natures‘ might, but he does not emulate her; instead, he negates her: he is not her, but forms her, 
to become himself. This, now, is repudiation. 
Kant continues to ponder, and even agonize, over Isis-and sexual difference. In response 
to the same series of Kant‘s letters, Schiller, a year after Kant wrote the Critique of Judgment, 
relates of the wisdom passed to Moses by the Egyptians: Only those who had Joa-Jehova (the one) 
could enter the temple of Serapis: they were called beholders and were said to discover the truth 
which was the passage from darkness to light, and could see this truth in sensuous images.
140
For 
Schiller, nature and its creator collapse into one. They are first Isis, female, and then Joa, male. In 
a poem entitled ―The Veiled Image of Isis‖, Schiller describes a man who refuses the warnings 
and heads in. Kant reserves the capacity to intuit the unknowable-but not unthinkable-to the 
nominal. Schiller does not deny males the capacity to see what it behind the veil-only that there 
are no men brave enough to see and survive; such men either never manage or never desires to do 
so. For Schiller, this would be to return to what we cannot return to - when nature was itself or 
God was meaning. Instead, there is a traumatic, unclaimable fecundity: creativity.  
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Kaufman reads Kant‘s notion of the subject and his reverence for Isis as a fear of 
castration. She suggests that the prohibition against lifting the veil of Isis, ‗of pretending to know 
what he cannot know‘, is really a prohibition against lifting the veil which reveals the lack of the 
penis. She claims that it is typical of misogyny and warped sexuality and the Enlightenment 
attitude towards real women. While real women are no longer allowed to be actively-desiring 
sexual beings, their once insatiable appetite for sex is contained within hard limits, while she lays 
weak, seductively and morbidly charming. She suggests that for Kant, unlike Burke and 
Wollstonecraft for whom the sublime is analogous to the father, the sublime is analogous to the 
mother.
141
As Kaufman determines, for Kant, she, not he, is the undisclosed and undiscoverable 
―infinity of possibilities that entice and beckon the transcendental imagination that fashions 
Nature as an inexhaustible whole.‖  
In the end, Kant dismisses it all as blasphemous and goes about putting things back in 
their proper place. He posits change as the transferal of energy from one closed, homogenous 
object to another. While his nature is fated to give birth to races and species incapable of change, 
he claims this is better than taking seriously an idea which would prevent us from knowing the 
proper origin or the destination of alteration. His ultimate worry is that man and animal would 
recognize one another in a dark unconscious. So long as he can maintain that Nature is ordered 
and unified, then reason continues to be capable of making its own rules. But if nature does not 
behave, then a body that births itself is a problem. For some thinkers, Kant‘s admission of this 
limitation is a failure. For others still, his failure and his blindness is, as it is for all of us, the 
beginning of our deeper insights into subjectivity. Enter, Melanie Klein. 
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CHAPTER IV 
  KLEIN ON THE ETHICS OF STUPIDITY, MATRICIDE AND GENIUS 
 
Abstract: In a genius all her own, Klein contradicts Socrates‘ assertion that those who ―generate 
life cannot create ideas.‖ Rather than claim that generation of life is opposed to the creation of 
ideas, she presents the following paradoxical premises: 1) ―mother‖ is the matter out of which 
every memory is made but impervious to the grasp of consciousness 2) the memory of mother is 
the cause of ambiguity, anxiety, and ambivalence and the matter out of which enlightenment is 
garnered and 3) adults garner enlightenment by engaging in the erratic detours of child’s play. 
Despite wide-spread opposition to her paradoxical premises, she persists. Her hope is true and 
simple: to discover the antidote to fascism. She wagers nearly everything on the hunch that the 
answer is to be found in the children she mothers, teaches and analyzes; in them, she believes she 
is able to bear witness to the origins of the patterns of hatred and destruction typical of fascism; in 
these same children and their possible flourishing, she believes she guards the secret to 
unravelling the fascistic-patterns of hatred, destruction, and above all, stupidity. By observing 
children at play, Klein, an ironic counterpart to Socrates the midwife, renews our hopes in the 
possibility of a being born in the vehicle of the symbolic, the ―genuine idea.‖ Perhaps we should 
not be surprised that the reward for our willingness to accompany her on her erratic journey of a 
lifetime of analyzing melancholia and criminality resembles the philosopher‘s reward for the life 
devoted to wisdom: neither wealth, accomplishment, nor even happiness await us; instead, at the 
end of the sojourn which is the passage from generation to creation, our hope is humble but true: 
nothing more and nothing less than creative, receptive calm at the juncture where creation once 
more returns to generation: death.  
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Mothers in the Middle: Matricide and Fascism/Creativity 
In her undertaking of a psycho-analysis of fascism, Klein is sceptical of Freud‘s account 
which explains destructive-ignorance in terms of repression and pleasure; instead, she asks 
―under what conditions are destructive thoughts and behaviours akin to symbolization?‖ For 
Klein, the conditions are quite precise: the death drive, our desire to have and consume and 
destroy, is not only the primary agent of our distress, it is also the mechanism by which we come 
to symbolize. Thus, while her analytic preoccupation with child‘s play may seem sheltered from 
the realities of political fascism, for her, child‘s play is the pure matrix of symbol-formation. Her 
obsession with the genus of symbolization in children presents some of the most thoughtful 
challenges to the dominant intellectualist discourses of her day.  
Klein‘s years of analysis lead her to conclude that the imprint of our nascent beginnings 
is anything but indeterminate; instead, she likens our early years to a high-stakes card game 
rigged by mother herself. ―Mother‖ refers to both mother the ‗person‘ and mother the evanescent, 
but nevertheless absolutely real, symbolic of desire and love on one side, and repulsion and 
hatred on the other. Mothers embody our ambivalent feelings about wanting and not having and 
loving that which we want and cannot have. Because ―mother‖ is --quite literally-- the possibility 
of our corporeal existence and the possibility of evolving into something beyond mere corporeal 
existence, mothers can seem omnipotent; but this is hardly the case. Instead, while it is true that 
Klein sees no alternative than to describe our mothers as omnipresent, she does not assume that 
they must also be omnipotent. In fact, as Kristeva many times suggests, much the opposite is true.  
Klein observes a strong correlation between cultures which portray women as all-
powerful and cultures who are misogynist and gynophobic. In reality, in most times and places, 
then as now, the recipients of oppression and violence are more likely to rely on passive 
resistance, in whatever form, for survival of spirit and person. Only the hunted are forced to act 
like prey; women who mother are no exception. Klein‘s genius was to link the discourses and 
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practices of violence against women in her families and communities with the larger cloud of 
fascism looming over Europe. We contemporaries are its ambivalent progeny.  
Klein does not dispute that matricide is integral to the development of our subjectivity; 
rather, her somewhat usual premise is that matricide can be done well or it can be done badly. 
Our bloody, messy mud of wanting and not having, loving and wanting to destroy, all take place 
on the body of our ―mothers.‖ The music of her voice and the gestures which typify her embrace 
tempt us, but they must also threaten us; without some measure of fear, the child is miscarried. 
While the child struggles with the guilt of imagining crimes far worse than those perpetrated by 
the military commander, he must nevertheless imagine overcoming her omnipotence. Every child 
must eventually leave his mother; without this effort imagined, he is much more likely to enact 
real violence against real people on the stage of war or criminality. If he is able to imagine 
without enacting the exit from his first birth, his second birth will unfold in the playful, creative, 
and of course sometimes tormented, experience of love.  Like Socrates, Klein nuances the 
repudiation. Socrates‘ error was not to assume that some create ideas and some do not, it was to 
assume that those who generate life cannot create ideas. As Klein observes, boys and girls 
identify with she who generates life; instead, the difference is in how girls must imagine 
identifying with the being she must also separate from; Klein, more than most, bears witness to 
the insanity of this separation. Socrates error was to assume that the generation of life is opposed 
to the creation of ideas. Klein‘s experience as a mother and analyst tells her that, the mere 
opposition of creation to generation is not enough; without something more than just simple 
repudiation, never will a genuine idea be born.    
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Detonating Fascism, Accreting Sexuality: The Birth of Psychoanalysis 
With a wary wisdom, Klein accepts that our only hope of liberation is by venturing down 
the royal road marked ―mental illness.‖ 142  Rather than relegate madness to the realm of 
pathology, she insists that it must be thought, written, spoken, in essence, created. The child who 
does not know how to create (his mental illness) is our baby fascist in arms. On this same line of 
reasoning, her contemporary, Husserl, urges us to accept our mixed feelings about the crisis 
which is fascism. Like Klein, he predicts that we are better to actively grieve and celebrate its 
paradoxes, because, by accepting the ambiguities inherent in this historical juncture, we are better 
able to come to terms with its evil and its possibilities; the crisis gives precedent for an 
unprecedented evil, but it also gives permission for a science which, without the usual censorship 
of propriety and recompense, was able to make tracks in previously unexplored terrains of human 
frailty, error, and irrationality.
 143
  
As Kristeva explains in her book Melanie Klein, the sojourn of the modern subject and its 
Cartesian cogito had to be unsealed. In order for a paradigm shift to occur, there had to be a crisis 
in the hierarchy of the Church and the authority of Enlightenment culture. In order to accept that 
sex is neither a vice nor a sin, but a truth in the ―essence of man,‖ there had to be a crisis in the 
foundations of Europe itself. 
144
The alternative seemed certain: to stay, and not know, and cause 
culture to suffocate in its own ruins leading to its own unparalleled social-psychological malaise, 
despair, and isolation.
145
 For thinkers such as Klein, the imperative to explore the unknown 
seemed just as certain: the promise of an unprecedented, unpredictable future deserving of the 
name ―second birth.‖  
When Freud engages the shame surrounding sexuality, far from discovering an 
irreducible chaos as many had predicted, the unconscious is discovered to have a logic all its own. 
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By responding to it, rather than for it, Freud pioneers the psychoanalytic era. The crisis in 
authority and legitimacy becomes instrumental to accepting that sexuality is an object of study 
rather than an object of guilt.  Klein is highly sympathetic to Freud‘s quest and his faith in his 
findings. She agrees that sexuality confuses and confounds the boundaries between the dualisms 
that have so long kept man a stranger to himself. As Freud stipulates, sexuality is an  
energy as well as meaning and biology and as a form of communication with the 
Other, which does not transform the essence of man into something biological, 
which it has been accused of doing, but immediately incorporates animality into 
culture. We are able to symbolize and sublimate because we are endowed with a 
sexuality that inevitably fosters something that metaphysics considered to be a 
dualism: body and mind, drive and language. 
146
 
 
Not only does Freud refuse to accept these dyads as duelling opponents, he renders the 
dynamic termed ―sexuality ― something that holds us in check: our competing desires of love and 
hate are the crossroads of the ―genetic and the subjective,‖ ―weightiness and grace,‖ ―generation 
and creation.‖147  In the end, despite every intention of showing loyalty to Freud, Klein‘s analytic 
experiences cause her to disagree with him in a fundamental way.  
While Freud contends that the unconscious is structured by desire and repression (as it 
might well seem in the adult), Klein focused on the newborn‘s pain, his splitting process, and his 
early capacity for sublimation.
148
 In Klein, the other is always already there; the newborn‘s drives 
are always already directed toward the object of the breast of the mother. The breast is his first 
object and the template for every other object, but the breast is not itself a breast, it is the template 
for the object. ―The breast‖ is  the site upon which we introject and project and the site of making 
inside and outside, loving and hating, wanting and having, and wanting to destroy and wanting 
not to want. Thus, if Klein is correct, the infant well knows the highs and lows of the dramas of 
the bond between the object and the ego. Kristeva likens this drama to a horror and a Bosch 
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painting. Deleuze likens to a ―theatre of terror.‖ 149   Klein likens the drama to a process to 
enlightenment reminiscent of the 19thC politic-historical enlightenment of genius and creativity 
on one side, and historical and political violence on the other.  Klein emphasizes that the entire 
drama is a ‗play‘ and ‗playful.‘  
For Klein, play is serious. She suggests that almost all of the process of development of a 
child occur through play. When Little Richard plays games with Churchill and England and 
Hitler and Germany, she intimates that while his game is, on the one hand, about history, it is also 
a game of his story; the child‘s place, his identity, and his destiny, censorship, are, if Klein‘s 
hypothesis is right, about sex. Once it is clear to the child that Klein has no intention of censoring 
his game, his game can go where he really wants it to. His questions are less likely to be about the 
omnipotent authority and more likely to be about ―sex‖ because sex is the child‘s understanding 
of metaphysics --with the important addition that ―metaphysics‖ is no longer metaphysics.  
 
Klein: All Women are Sex Symbols 
With her unparalleled tolerance for the anaerobic depths of nightmare creations and 
daytime symptoms, Klein moors her anchor in infancy and permanently alters the map of 
psychoanalysis. With her signature vulgar manner, she charts the infant‘s transition from its 
mother‘s bloody, pushing and heaving lap to the site of the perpetual and relentless struggle to 
create. Her conclusion is certain: sex is metaphysics. Klein nuances Freud‘s sense of ―sexuality‖ 
by translating any absences of sharp distinction into a dynamic symbolic/asymbolic only to 
transform both back into an amalgamated notion of the ‗symbol.‘  The child is the symbol‘s site 
of production. Klein claims that symbolism is not only the foundation of all phantasy and 
sublimation but, more than that, it is the basis of the subject‘s relation to the outside world and to 
reality in general. When a child is unable to symbolize, it is unable to think; on this basis, Klein 
equates psychosis with the inability to think and the inability to think with censorship of 
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knowledge about sex. The manner in which we symbolize, or fail to symbolize, is our fate, as 
persons, but also as a people.  
The tenuous balance between intelligence and ignorance, love and hate, and destruction 
and creativity, lies, for Klein, in the lap of mother; however, this is not to say that mothers 
determine anything, and neither is it to assume mothers would be able to determine such a fate in 
which they could not even steer the course of their own lives from within the cultural context of 
misogyny. Instead, as some have accused, of raising the import of the role of the mother over the 
role of the father, and thus instantiating a cult of heteronormativity, Klein is the first to determine 
that our ability to think has everything to do with matricide. The tragic irony, all too real to Klein, 
is that women are the real victims of the symbolic gone wrong. The memory out of which every 
memory is made, ―mother,‖ is also frequently the victim, real and symbolic, of the repudiation of 
this same memory. She is omnipresent and omnipotent in a culture that is sexually prejudiced, 
oppressive, and highly exploitative. Women navigate their young children through a process of 
thinking and loving and separating, only to place them in a culture that harbours a hatred for the 
maternal.  
Klein traces the origin of madness back to the patterns back to an early imbalanced 
giving, showing, and telling of the story of the first kill. She warns that too much and too little 
knowledge of sex is pathological; censoring or not censoring enough our desire to know our 
carnal origin impairs our ability to know ―reality.‖ Klein predicts that the more a parent can keep 
pace with his child‘s quest for knowledge about sex-in all of its esoteric and mundane 
dimensions- the more likely the child is to develop a constitutional balance that will allow him to 
be an autonomous adult. The less capable a parent is of contending with his own sexual 
insecurities, the less capable he is of responding with clarity, coherence and candour, the more 
likely their child is to develop a psychosis; at some point, the child‘s knowledge does not dare 
rebel and never attempts to draw its own inferences. His sense of reality has to wage with the 
innate tendency to repress. His awakening sense of origin, identity, and destiny are his awakening, 
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in a rude sense, to what his parents do together which he is generally not permitted to see or 
participate. To flatten this awareness into brutish terms is to miscarry him; by attempting to 
understand sex, he is attempting to understand what can never be fully understood: it must be 
grasped in the midway of a symbol.  
The child who is educated by open-minded, tolerant parents will find that his memory has 
an affective, dissonant resonance in his adult, conscious life. According to Klein, ―remembering‖ 
requires converting, displacing and creating of mother‘s body in the vehicle of the symbolic. His 
origin and his infancy are unknowable except as an evanescent analogy whose content he must 
deduce from witnessing other events of sex or birth or by himself experiencing sex or birth. His 
―memory‖ of his origin and infancy comes to him like shadowy afterthought in his gestures, turns 
of speech and effective disposition. His memory is delivered to him in the vehicle of a narrative 
spun by others (whose own self knowledge is similarly evanescent). At the same time that he 
realizes that he needs others, he also realises that he was born into a world that necessarily 
excluded him, and excludes him, and it is this same world that he wants for himself. He is born 
―other.‖ In almost every instance, this balance is regulated first and foremost by ―mother.‖ 
Mother‘s bear us a first time, but she also bears us a second time. If she gets it wrong, only the 
analyst, his other mother, can save him.
150
 
In Klein‘s narrative account, the newly born infant suffers from the beginning. He is at an 
impenetrable distance from what he wants most: to survive, to eat, to sleep, to rest in peace. From 
the beginning, he cannot have what he wants, but he must want to want in order to live and, 
eventually, to live past his earth-bound existence. The newborn‘s conflicted desires to have and to 
not-have promise to deliver him from his first birth to his second birth. Without this conflict, he 
risks perishing. In this sense, mother is omnipotent: we must want and not want her. In order to 
fully separate from her, he must also forget what we had to do to her to become who he is. His 
latent guilt guarantees that he never fully forgets. There seems to be no other way: in Klein‘s 
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account, mother‘s body is not something we can simply repudiate, overcome, and forget. We are 
required to separate form the same body which refuses to accept the iron law of inside and 
outside, and this includes her ability to enter into our memory long after the fight seems to be 
over. Thus, our feelings are, by definition, ambivalent. The maternal is a discourse that calls a 
crisis in identity, especially for any one who insists upon nothing but a stable, unified, and unique 
identity for themselves or from others. 
 
The Time that Never Existed 
The experience of time manifest in Freud‘s hysteric, globusm, is contested and nuanced 
by Klein. If Klein is right, this time never existed. Time is always punctuated by the ―other,‖ the 
breast that receives us immediately following birth. However, the first time is nevertheless a time 
from which we cannot be extricated without consequence. If, at an early age we are prevented 
from easing into the experience of the breast-time to a highly articulated time of past, present and 
future, most of us end up experiencing the world as hostile to our desires. Because our experience 
of time is also our understanding of causation, if a child is forced into knowing too much or too 
little too soon or too late, he experiences a world that seems not only hostile, but foreign; this 
child does not know where he is, what time it is, or who he is. To those already inhabiting a world 
punctuated by clocks and calendars, it will appear as if this child is stupid and anxious. He does 
not know the season, the time of day, or where he is. His demands and wants seem repetitive, 
compulsive even. In short, timing is everything.  
It should come as no surprise that Klein is accused of going too far, and too deep. She 
appears to charge the most nascent and infantile of humans with the gravest of crimes.
151
 Klein 
has a rebuttal on hand: those who deny otherwise, ―immediately whip up his cultural tendencies 
against his ingenuousness‖ and ―spin veils of secrecy around matters sexual‖ create the 
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―foundation of [their] own destruction.‖152 Those who use culture and deception to prohibit and 
prevent the natural development of infancy into adulthood are, in Klein‘s estimation, largely 
responsible for fascism. For her fascism is the intolerance to creativity. Klein wants most for her 
children to escape the omnipotent hold of mothers, and those others who threaten to prevent their 
creative exit. A child at ease with his sexuality is a child likely most likely to be autonomous--
literally, self-naming and self-creating; a child prevented from enlightened tutelage is easy prey 
for those with an appetite for nascent, developing egos.  
It must be noted that Klein is not proposing answers, solutions, or resolutions to this 
conflict. Instead, for Klein, there is, in some tragic way, no alternative to our experience of 
ambivalence and anxiety.  Putting a more positive spin on this inevitability, she reminds us that 
our madness, our sadness, and our bad habits are all, in some sense, good material for creativity. 
The child can make it to the other side once he can achieve a symbolic grasp of his desires for 
return. The competing desires force children to repress into operation by dissociation: it forces 
him to symbolize. The irony, perhaps only for the human reflecting on being human, is that his 
ability to love is also his ability to accept his hate. He must grieve the victim of his own murder. 
He must accept that reality is governed by these profoundly irrationally truths. Thinking will 
require the work of accepting and understanding this profound unthinking. If he gets lost in the 
world of seeming consistencies, love is opposed to hate, I am guilty and hateful towards the 
person I must kill, and, last that reality is rational, than, he will never accept be at home in all that 
―is not black and white,‖ thinking. Without this ability, his journey to the end of night, his 
mortality, will be most insufferable. In this sense, ―reality‖ begins, not with an age, but, triggered 
by the loss of a real, loved object. 
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The Truth: Desire Entails Grief 
To accompany a loved one to their death is to stand on the brink of one world 
overlooking another. The experience causes most of us to stop in time, unable to speak or think as 
we once did. The affective experience of grief is unique to the person who has lost their love, but 
in every case, the loss forces transformation. The bereaved is altered by the loss of a loved one 
because, in losing his beloved, he is no longer who he was, and he has had little, if any say in the 
matter. At once, his inter-dependency and his alone-ness in the world are made more salient to 
him. The ‗facts‘ of loss force him to confront –or to work hard to repress-that he cannot do more 
than accompany his loved one in their death, and they him. He must move into the world for, 
what may feel like the first time, on his  own; for many, this new world of ‗grief‘ it is a world 
punctuated by feelings of an over-active dream life, waking-dream life, confusion, a feeling of 
being broken and tired, intense feelings ranging from anger, sadness, and loneliness-and, perhaps, 
above all, a disorientated temporarily.   
Loneliness in turn sparks, in many of us, a yearning for togetherness and reminds us of 
our vulnerability to this same other who he cannot have or be with. Despite its overall depressive 
temporality, grief causes the mind to move into overdrive making it seem as if the mind has a life 
of its own. If Freud is correct, this is typical of grief. The mind‘s dreamtime infuses waking time 
with intrusive thoughts, flashes of memory and insights, and a restless searching and cataloguing, 
because it is processing a radically transformed reality. The mind has a mind of its own and it will 
do anything try to turn the corner and arrive in yesterday, if only to allow us to move more slowly 
into our new reality. This experience is, as Freud names it in Mourning and Melancholia, the 
work of ―testing of reality.‖ The mind‘s searching is steered towards reproducing the intangible 
substitute for the other, the ghost, presence, and significance in order to hypercathect the same 
object. Once this process reaches its dénouement (which is not a termination, but a merciful 
normalizing of our struggle with denial, anger, and resignation) detachment is accomplished and 
the verdict of reality is absolute. Klein‘s stroke of genius is to parallel the experience of mourning 
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a beloved to the processes of the infantile mind. If Klein is right, every experience of grief is 
really an experience of our first and most affective experience of grief, our loss of mother‘s breast. 
Klein‘s observations lead her to believe that every child goes through states of mind 
comparable to the grieving adult, or, more accurately, the grieving adult re-experiences patterns 
reminiscent of his earliest experience of loss (in most cases, of the breast). The breast is love, 
goodness, and security, but also, we might conjecture, breast-feeding is our early struggle with 
desire, hate, and fear. Weaning triggers a fear of losing other loved ones and objects at the same 
time it triggers a sense of guilt. Why does loss trigger guilt? For the infant, he can only surmise 
that his desire caused the loss of the loved object: she went away because I loved her. These 
mixed feelings trigger, from the very first months of an infant‘s life, sadistic impulses. The 
nascent infant wants nothing more than to devour his mother‘s breast having it by any means 
which sadism can suggest.  
Klein likewise claims that, from the beginning, the mechanisms of introjection and 
projection are at work. Because the child‘s aggression is projected onto the same breast which it 
also desires, these imagos, phantastically distorted into the real object upon which they are based, 
become installed in what is experienced as outside in the world and inside the ego. It introjects 
the good and the bad, for which the breast is the prototype. Even very young children pass 
through anxiety situations and defend themselves against them.
153
 The depressive position of the 
infant mind, a melancholia statu nascendi, is the result of coming to terms with the loss of 
mother‘s breast and all that it comes to mean for the infant. As they come closer and closer, the 
ego has recourse to splitting the objects into loved and hated objects.  
The experience of ambivalence allows the child to gain more trust and belief and carry 
out increasing phantasies of restoration of the loved object. At the same time, the paranoid 
anxieties and defences set in. It is at this stage that the internal and external, loved and hated, real 
and imaginary object is unified. During this stage, the child grows increasingly near to reality. 
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This continues until love and trust in the object is established. Ambivalence, a safeguard against 
one‘s hatred towards the terrifying object, is diminished. The child who cannot sufficiently trust 
his constructive feelings (deeply tied to his feelings of ambivalence rather than hatred), tents to 
resort to manic omnipotence: another mode of the denial of reality.  
Denial tends to cause obsessive compulsive thoughts and actions (a vain attempt to re-
start the program and get it right), or, denial and desires for omnipotence. This method of defence 
against the dread of persecution is what Klein terms ―scotomization,‖ or the denial of psychic 
reality. The denial of psychic reality results in the limitation of the process of introjection and 
projection, and, by extension, a denial of external reality. During this time, any object which he 
attacked during his introjection and projection by splitting, hitting, ingesting and dejecting, in his 
work of symbolizing, are potential agents of retribution against him and his desires. Brothers, 
sisters, mothers, and fathers are no exception. In Klein‘s experience, this depressive place is the 
source of the Oedipal situation and umbrellas to our relation to people in general. It is through 
this process that the child develops an inner world.  
Corresponding to his actual experiences of external reality, but altered by his phantasies 
and impulses, the child develops a world. A child‘s fear of witches, magicians, and evil beasts is 
something of the same anxiety, but one that has already undergone modification. All these stages 
vary in degree, but move toward the inevitable process of denying and accepting his inevitable 
exile from mother‘s embrace. The to and fro of denial and acceptance are themselves born form 
the need to transition an infant from his dependence on mother while also avoiding deterioration 
or disintegration.  
In Klein‘s view, the sufferings of later life are for the most part repetitions of these early 
ones. Every child in the first years of life goes through an immeasurable degree of suffering, all 
of which, in some manner, stem from the deeply unconscious knowledge that children grow in 
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the mother‘s womb154 On this same basis, she pleads with us to permit the child to play in a 
completely uncensored manner, free of ethical and moral criticism. The connection between our 
childhood phantasies and our adult flourishing cannot be understated. She reminds us of how 
even the very young child fights his unsocial tendencies. This struggle is his struggle to love and 
be loved. Klein does not believe in the existence of a child in whom it is impossible to obtain this 
transference, or in whom the capacity for love cannot be brought out. As in the case of Klein‘s 
‗little criminal‘ who was apparently devoid of any capacity for love, he proved everyone wrong. 
The mother died in terrible circumstances from cancer, and while the daughter did not go near her, 
and it was he who looked after her as she lay dying while the family left her alone. When they 
returned to search for the boy, he could not be found: he had locked himself in the room with 
her.
155
 
 
The Ethics of the Opening and Closing of Doors 
While Klein is accused of being unethical, she nevertheless stipulates a rigorous ethic all 
her own. Much of Klein‘s ethics deals directly with boundaries: the opening and closing of doors. 
As she frequently iterates, to open a door too soon and without the prompting of the child, is to 
expose him to more than he can accept as reality; to refuse to open a door into something he 
desires to know in a manner appropriate this his age is to prevent him his creative, autonomy and 
flourishing in love. For this reason, the analyst, the mother, anyone really, in dealing with 
children must, warns Klein, be hyper-vigilant in their safe guarding and timing of the opening and 
closing of doors. She warns that those adults willing to join the child in play, to stay alongside, at-
one-with, both the child and the adult undergo a revelation hard to bear, but one likely to deliver 
one into a second birth. Those who tell too much or too little at the right of the wrong time 
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determine the child to be a stupid, violent, incapable being, or an intelligent, creative autonomous 
adult.  
The door we open and close for the child is the door to the ―parental bedroom.‖ The 
meaning of ―parental bedroom‖ lies behind closed curtains, but allusions to ―the bedroom‖ 
abound. Her readers ―see‖ the bedroom as if watching someone through a mirror who is 
themselves watching the original scene -as in the case of a little girl named Grete who thrashes 
about in therapy after an event triggers the screen memory of her parents in coitus.
156
 In Klein‘s 
essay on the ―Infantile Anxiety Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and in the Creative 
Impulse‖ the bedroom is the inside of the mother‘s body and the internal workings of our 
unthinkable beginnings. But while Klein prohibits the child from the scene of the parental 
bedroom, its symbolic counterpart is a place she frequents (with an obsessive repetition Deleuze 
names compulsive) with her child patients.  
The difference between the ―real bedroom‖ and ―the symbolic bedroom‖ which is said to 
establish ―reality‖ in children is paramount to Klein‘s analysis and her ethic. Klein insists that 
analysis should not take place in the home. Mothers should do their work of mothering in the 
―home,‖ (in the broad sense of community and house), and analysts in a designated therapeutic 
space with basic objects, like a sink with running water, and toys with few but essential details.
157
 
Keeping the doors open and closed, and properly marked, at the right time, in the right place, and 
in the right way, will in every way determine our success. Klein determines that the space of the 
home is too intimate to what he must know without knowing. The mother‘s non-analytic stance 
protects the child from what he must know without knowing, while the analyst‘s non-censoring 
stance enables him to imagine what he must in accept in order to break free from the symbol of 
his mother in order to love his real, actual, present mother and her person.  
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It is, Klein says, ―clearly impossible for the mother to play to role of an object of desire 
while playing the role of the subject presumed to know the unconscious.‖158And yet, according to 
Klein, something of ―mother‖ must be kept alive in analysis; the analyst cannot do without 
―mother.‖ To make the journey she must assume a tandem maternal disposition and analytic 
therapeutic mode. To achieve the necessary transference, she has to be the analyst of her creation 
and bear a semblance to her creation‘s (partial) object of desire, ‗mother.‘ She has to maintain the 
symbolic at its most indiscernible threshold: the threshold between generation and creation. It is 
difficult and yet somehow fleetingly simple; it is a risky, but necessary accomplishment. 
 
Mother Reborn 
The tenuous balance between mothering and analysis disturbs her for her entire 
professional career; like someone foreign to northern summer climes, she scratches away at it 
with an absent- minded, anxious and relentless persistence. It irritates her that, in order to deliver 
a child from its first birth to its second, she must embody the object of desire which she must also 
help him to symbolize. She appreciates that this unique kind of transference sometimes feels too 
close to the quick and not symbolic enough to be good and ethical. In her personal life, the high 
cost of tumbling to the wrong side was self evident. Her daughter Melinda hated mother, 
privately and publicly, in a way that, perhaps especially for a mother who had already lost a child, 
must have been devastating. Klein continues to do her work in the shadow of her lost son and 
angry daughter.
159
 In the Kleinien vertigo of analysis, the dialectical-dualism of generation and 
creation unravels in a crisis all its own.  
For many reading Klein, it appears as if this crisis takes place with children, but Klein‘s 
analysis of children, with herself as mother symbol, is about much more than children. Klein‘s 
refusal to accept the imperative of respectful distance means that she dives into that place where 
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both analyst and child are born and born once more from within the space of psychical, sexual 
return to origin. It is only by making this journey that Klein helps unpack that tangled mess which 
is the subjectivity of the subject who is both a generator and a creator. Klein allows a being who, 
throughout the life process including motherhood, is not only the object of her infant‘s evolving 
wants and needs, but a being who creates ideas, a being for whom the process of idea creation is 
meaningful, a being who is present to birth, and a being who ultimately has a unique and 
weighted sense of the significance of her birthing. A mother carries a buried knowledge that her 
infant‘s possible autonomy that will require that he kill ‗her‘ so he can recreate her endlessly and 
be born again and again. For her daughter, she will have to ‗kill‘ a ‗her‘ who she also is. A 
mother is a mother and not a mother.  
Klein attempts to do what no analyst had done before. By pushing her own 
psychoanalytic ethic to its limits she approaches a threshold between the tenuous limit of the 
theorist, the midwife, and the mother. It is Kristeva‘s estimation that, by so doing, Klein manages 
to name the unnameable trauma of the ‗Other‘ and to name it with the child‘s words. It is Klein 
who reveals the need for projection at the source of the interpretation; by allowing the child in the 
analyst to be reborn, she created the possibility for the child in each of us to re-emerge. Klein‘s 
tragic, sometimes reckless sojourn introduces a new conception of the temporality of analysis as 
rebirth.
160
 I add that Klein does more than this: she is also unique for being the germinal force 
behind a mode of theorizing subjectivity which will, in an unprecedented form, allow for 
theorizing a subjectivity who births and who is born: mother! Klein theorizes the being who 
generates life and the being who creates ideas-it is not always clear that even her most attentive, 
faithful readers and followers do the same. 
Klein theorizes the woman (creator) who is also a mother (generator). Klein is capable of 
so doing because she theorizes the experience of birth, not from the point of view of an adult 
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recollecting his origins, but from the ordeal of analysis and motherhood. Despite the 
philosopher‘s prohibition against confusing the metaphor of birth for a more carnal ‗metaphor,‘ 
Klein obsesses over the significance of the non-carnal dimensions of carnal birth. Klein theorizes 
the space where ―mothers‖ are the first earth, but never the indifferent cyclical motions of the 
effective we name ―Mother Earth.‖ Mothers, in contrast to mother earth, determine whether her 
infant‘s transition is triumphant and creative or disabling and deadening. With a most insistent 
repetition, Klein names mother the midwife of her own infant. By extension, she names mothers 
the midwives of thinkers generally, for who does not have a mother? 
Klein does not allow mothers to take refuge in the guise of instinct or cultural 
prescriptions. Klein‘s radical ethics renders mothers the agents of our creation and our destruction. 
For Klein, those speaking beings whose bodies are our first earth determine whether our 
transition from first to second birth is triumphant and creative or disabling and damaging. For 
Klein, we come to life or perish in the hands of our mothers: if mothers are generous, loving, and 
tolerant, they most often manage to ease an infant‘s transition from their first birth into their 
second birth which is their transition into the articulated, temporal, linguistic, reflexive and 
dimension of creative being. From the very beginning, mother creates the life she generates. She 
is the infant‘s first engagement with history and culture. Her body is how we come to experience 
desire, and all that this entails. Her moods and gestures will determine whether or not we are at 
home in the space of all that is not ―black and white,‖ namely the contradictions, ambiguity, 
anxiety and ambivalence that enable the space of reflective thinking. Klein‘s moral stance 
prevents mothers from taking refuge in culture or instinct, while preventing us from imprisoning 
women in determinist natures or cultural prejudices. As contentious as it might be, Klein puts the 
breast back in mother‘s hand.  
Klein‘s account of a mother‘s nursing and weaning can sound quite a lot like Aristotle‘s 
account of a mother‘s love. She, like Aristotle, describes a most virtuous mother. Klein insists 
that, when mothers calculate and deliver her milk like a commodity to a consumer, she renders 
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mothering a restricted economy of duty. Both Klein and Aristotle feel that, while the newborn 
may not understand very much, he understands this difference quite well. Instead, a well loved 
child learns to role with the inevitable poverty and traumas which peppers every life because he 
knows that while mother had both a ‗good‘ and a ―bad‖ breast, she remained his mother. With 
this experience, the child is not only prepared for a world that is alternately bountiful and 
impoverished, the child is prepared to love other women who are variously generous and reticent. 
The mother who never refuses her breast and the mother who always refuses her breast moulds 
her infant‘s psychosis. As Nussbaum agrees, tolerance for the child‘s appetites allows him to be 
likewise tolerant of his own appetites which are guaranteed to go unsatisfied.
161
 Tolerance of his 
wants, without servility to every want, allows a child to develop into an adult who can form social 
relations. The child who is at ease with his desires is an adult at ease with himself. The more he 
has had to contain and repress, the more his being contains itself, splits into pieces, plagues and 
limits him. In the end, Klein determines these mothers to be partially responsible for fascism.  
Fascism is many things, but at core it is the hatred of ―all that is not black and white.‖ 
Mothers teach us how to see colour; she is our first lesson in all that is not ―black and white,‖ the 
seemingly opposed worlds of inside and outside, reason and unreason, self and other.  Not only 
does Klein introduce an ethic and agency back into maternity, she imagines a ―carnality‖ which is 
inherently problematic for Plato and his progeny. Plato‘s ontological, epistemological, and ethical 
faulty-structural integrity rests on his belief in two worlds: one in which he is the autonomous 
artisan and the other, that realm in which his immanent animality is master, he must fight to hold 
at bay. Klein‘s rendering of the mother plays against every manifestation of Plato‘s myth of the 
cave in which the mother is an interior of darkness, shadow, and sensibility. Klein‘s account of 
enlightenment contains no such sharp boundaries, and nor does it describe our suffering in quite 
the same way. In Klein‘s account, the mother is the original space of enlightenment as an 
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articulate, intellectual and profoundly sentient being whose sound judgment, or lack of it, 
determines her child‘s destiny. Nursing and weaning is mother‘s midwifery.  
  
The Body under Siege is not a Body without Organs  
Deleuze shares many obsessions with Klein, not least of which is her obsession with 
philosophy and psycho-analytic concepts of sexuality, infancy and children, and Plato‘s 
metaphysics. In fact, Deleuze thinks that most thinkers really have no alternative than to obsess 
over these concepts. As we can recall, the crisis in 20thC European culture paved the way for 
unprecedented forms of evil which, in retrospect, can appear to have created a need for a new 
science which would explore the previously unexplored. Without the censorship of 
Enlightenment morality or the dogma of the Church, this science obsessed in the promise of 
uniting, healing, and unveiling the truth of things. The science of sex and metaphysics is what 
Deleuze terms a science of ―intensities.‖ In this sense, Deleuze is an ally to Klein‘s exit from the 
cave of Plato‘s rendering of generation and creation, and, ultimately, both are hyper-vigilant to 
the mines that lie at the road-side of this exit, he is almost angry about her conclusions about the 
infant, and, by extension, of the genus of love, genius, and creativity. But, ultimately, he reserves 
some of his harshest criticism for her work. Unlike some of her other critics, he is not squeamish 
about her object of study, nor even her methodology. Instead, he is nearly upset by the fact that 
while she ventured so close to the truth of things, ultimately she ruins it all by returning with a 
more saturated, repetitive, compulsion to interpret, interpret, interpret. At the very core of what 
could have been the unleashing of what is true and possible, and the remedy for fascism, she 
inserts the germ of fascism itself: lack. 
He describes Klein‘s ―theatre of terror‖ of the nursing infant as one in which he is the 
―stage, actor and drama at once.‖ 162 He studies her rendering and determines it to be a cliché of 
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the ―Passion of the nursing infant.‖163 Deleuze, not one to shy away from the obscene, finds 
Klein‘s rendering of the mother‘s body split into a ―good and bad object, emptied, slashed to 
pieces, broken into crumbs and alimentary morsels‖ not only horrifying, but unconvincing. He 
wonders why the good and bad breast are introjected in the same manner. He sees no reason to be 
so certain that the good object does not conceal a bad object, why one bit is always the persecutor 
of the other, and every piece bad to its core.  Deleuze‘s alternative theatre makes the back 
stage front. For Deleuze, if the choice is a theatre of lack, or a theatre of desire, the choice seems 
obvious. In Klein‘s theatre of lack, there is little to look forward to save an understanding of the 
depressive position. She promises a good object which stands on high, but which cannot descend 
without changing its nature. If height, which disguises itself as depth, manifests both cruelty and 
love and protection, it is because all these manifest from its higher unity which, again, cannot be 
realized. The good object is by nature a lost object. It only shows itself as already lost. Its eminent 
unity it that it gives its love as what it gave before. It turns its face away, from on high, and offers 
its gifts as gifts already once offered.  
Deleuze wonders, why, instead of bodies in pieces, can we not experience, and thus 
imagine, a ―mother‖ who is not ―mother‖ but a body without organs? In one case, we experience 
the constant feeling of never quite attaining, but always wanting. This same experience of want 
causes us to fear satiation. In the other case, we experience a constant feeling of neither needing 
or wanting, but always experiencing nevertheless. He likens this desire to a desire of the 
indefinite rather than a desire of the incomplete. Deleuze suggests the alternative: either the child 
does not leave the foldings of his or her future spinal cord, over which her parents fornicate (a 
reverse suicide), or she creates a fluid, glorious, and flamboyant body without organs and without 
parents. 
Deleuze is also strongly critical of Klein‘s evolution of language which assumes the 
child‘s first approach to language to consist in grasping a model of the familial voice which 
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conveys tradition. Language affects the child as a bearer of a name and demands his insertion 
even before he begins to understand. Even when one does not know what the voice denotes, it is 
at once the object, the law of the loss, and the loss itself. It forbids without us knowing what it 
forbids. If we made the analogy from sex to metaphysics obvious, Deleuze suggests that Klein is 
really offering an analysis reminiscent of depressive Platonism: the Good is reached only as the 
object of a reminiscence, uncovered as essentially veiled, the One gives only what it does not 
have, since it is superior to what it gives, withdrawn into its height; and, as Plato said of the Idea, 
―it flees or it perishes‖ -the idea withdraws as the ego advances. Why, asks Deleuze, was a whole 
theatre installed where there were fields, workshops, factories, units of production?
164
  
A battle emerges between Klein and Deleuze over custody of the child. Both want the 
child to take them to the place where sexuality will illuminate the truth of things. Klein takes her 
child down the royal road only to return to mommy-daddy; Deleuze is convinced that mommy-
daddy is but a stop on the road of big mountains, desert skies, animal-becomings and strangers. 
Klein waits with the child at the depths of the maternal body, but it is, says Deleuze, yet to 
discover the depth of her own body. The hiatus between one world and the other is best captured 
by Carroll with Alice in a pool of tears. 
165
 The lesson of the child to the adult claims Deleuze is 
the logic of sense. Its lesson is especially prescient to psychoanalysis, which he claims, must learn 
that before it can find truth in generative matter or engendered form, it must learn to map. 
Psychoanalysis, he says, cannot content itself with the designation of cases, the manifestation of 
histories, or the signification of complexes. Instead, it must be geographical before being 
historical. 
166
  Its truth of sexuality, desire, is not mythical, but a ―machine, a synthesis of 
machines, a machinic arrangement of desiring machines.‖167   
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When Deleuze observes children at play, he does not believe that a parental unit lurks 
behind every narration of every arrangement of toys. Instead, he thinks that the child is simply 
attempting to make sense of the world they are merging into. Rather than beings obsessed with 
the mommy-daddy configuration, he sees machines at play with machines. If we remember little 
Hans who tinkers with his machines in Anti-Oedipus, Alice in the Logic of Sense, the artist child 
in A Thousand Plateaus, or the carnal metaphor of the child in Proust and Signs, there is no 
poverty of child tropes in his work. In every instance, he uses the child to show that the child 
shows us nothing. Deleuze is not claiming machines reproduce themselves, but neither do they 
only reproduce themselves through the intermediary of man.  
Does any one say that red clover has no reproductive system because the bumble 
bee (and the bumble bee only) must aid and abet it before it can reproduce? No 
one. The bumble bee is  part of the reproductive system of the clover. Each one 
of ourselves has sprung from minute nimalcules whose entity was entirely 
distinct from our own. These creatures are part of our eproductive system.
168
 
 
The subject is an effect. There is no difference between living and machine, vitalism and 
mechanism, but two states of machine, two states of living. For this same reason, he determines 
psychoanalytic account of the unconscious of representation a bankruptcy. Deleuze has a fresh 
way of understanding this process, one that steadfastly refuses to interpret. This applies to art, 
which, again, he likens to ‗children.‘ 
Deleuze likens children to art, which, he claims attain a celestial state that no longer 
retains anything of the personal or rational. Art, he claims, say what children say. Art is in turn 
defined as an impersonal process in which the work is composed somewhat like a cairn, with 
stones carried in by different voyages and beings in becoming (rather than ghosts) [devenants 
plutôt que revenants] that may or may not depend on a single author. The production of art is the 
process of production. Children remind Deleuze of machines because they are essentially 
machinic: they are at home with the process of production.  
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The Truth in Child’s Play 
Deleuze claims that children never stop talking about what they are doing or trying to do 
because a child‘s narration is ―mapping.‖ By talking, children explore milieus that become 
flattened and polarized for the adult inhabiting a metaphysical straight-jacket. In fact, as Deleuze 
notes, Freud and Klein understand how important maps are for children. There is no ignoring how 
often children are making maps; however, the mistake is to assume that something lies beneath 
the map which has significance beyond the mapping of intensities at hand. For example, the child 
is unable to imagine ―parents‖ that function independently of an impersonal body. If Deleuze is 
right, a child‘s map refers to a milieu that is made up, not of parts (Freud), or fragmented parts 
(Klein), but of qualities, substances, powers and events. They imagine these parts and fragmented 
parts as constituted by fields and trajectories, but are unable to imagine the space in- between. 
Parents are themselves a milieu that children pass through.  
Deleuze is not suggesting that parents play a small part in the development of the child; 
rather, he is claiming that parents occupy the position in this milieu of opening and closing of 
doors, guardians of thresholds, connectors and disconnectors of zones. The parents occupy a 
position in a world that is not derived from them, even with the infant, the parents are defined in 
relation to all else that is defined in relation. He writes, 
there is never a moment when children are not already plunged into an actual 
milieu in which they are moving about, and in which the parents as persons 
simply play the roles of openers or closers of doors, guardians of thresholds, 
connectors or disconnectors of zones.
169
 
 
Deleuze claims the libido‘s business to haunt history and geography, to organize 
formations of worlds and constellations of universes. On this plane, he suggests that, rather than 
think of fascism as a politic, a history, or geography, or even as a psychology (Klein), we try to 
understand it, not by studying the persons and events of history any more than we do by 
analyzing the child at play. No one tells us more than the other about itself. Deleuze admits that 
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Klein recognizes the network of mapping with a precocious acuity, but turns the map making on 
its side, rendering it as flat and yellowed as the old ―photos of father-mother.‖  
Deleuze has no issue with the symbol, rather, it is that no one yet has been able to 
imagine the symbol without also having to imagine two worlds, father-mother. He offers the 
cartographer as our alternative. The psychoanalytic ventures into the depths of the unconscious to 
understand the import of ―madness‖ to living, thinking and acting, but falls back into the very 
metaphysic it implies: it is a memorial, commemorative, or monumental conceptions that pertains 
only to subject and object. It knows no other way that to see the ―pre-linguistic‖ child as 
inhabiting a depth from which the adult has risen and repressed. Maps, on the contrary, find 
themselves inserted in one another, horizon upon horizon. The unconscious is no longer 
something that deals with persons and objects, but with trajectories and becomings, a ―subject in 
process.‖  
Deleuze anticipates a line of thought that Kristeva will borrow, but from Klein. For 
Deleuze, when Freud and Klein misunderstand the animals and people that populate children‘s 
stories for sex, such as when Hans‘s horse fallen on the street to a love-making scene of his 
parents, Deleuze interrupts by suggesting that Hans‘s memory of the horse is really an attempt to 
understand animal forces, the big widdler, the heavy hauling, blinkers, biting, falling, being 
whipped. His horse narration is a map of forces and a science of intensities. This list of affects is 
itself an intensive map, a map that folds into other maps and profoundly alters the other map. The 
image is not only a trajectory, it too is a becoming. Children, and their maps, are in process.  
He feels that, to arbitrarily draw a line between one and the other would be a map of its 
own kind, and one all too familiar to the philosopher and his critics. Thus, for Deleuze, the 
seemingly unfinished thought of the child is not something the analyst needs to fill in, but a gap 
that the analyst and others should listen to carefully. It is a full and complete ―indefinite.‖ While 
for the analyst, the ―child is being beaten,‖ must imply by someone, by some father or other, for 
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Deleuze, this lacks nothing: it is a determination of becoming. This indefinite project of mapping 
is creation, or art.  
Rather than understand art as a personal process and a collective ideal of commemoration, 
a desire for a return to a lost time that can never return, Deleuze likens art to a voyage, not of law- 
breaking, or even law-making, but of foraging and venturing. He uses the work of Perrin as an 
example. Perrin clears out erratic blocks from the greenery that integrates them into the 
undergrowth and delivers them to the memory of the glacier that carried them there. Deleuze 
suggests that the artist does so, not in order to assign an origin to them, but to make their 
displacement something visible.15 One circles around a sculpture, the viewing axes that belong to 
it make us grasp the body, sometimes along its entire length, sometimes in an astonishing 
foreshortening, sometimes in two or more diverging directions: its position in the surrounding 
space is strictly dependent on these internal trajectories. It is here that Deleuze invokes Dionysus 
as the god of places of passage and things of forgetting. Creativity is figured as a creative 
forgetting of what cannot be fully remembered, memorialized, nor forgotten. I cannot help but 
think that Klein would approve. Would she agree that this process is, as Deleuze once termed it, 
―becoming woman?‖ 
 
Becoming Woman, Becoming Alice, Becoming  
Feminist engagements with Deleuze are most preoccupied with his concept of ―becom-
ing-woman.‖2 ―Becoming-woman‖ embodies the instability and multiplicity socially and 
historically associated with women, especially a certain view of oppressed women in a patriarchal 
political, socio-economic culture. This is especially true if we consider the place affords to 
becoming, and, by extension, the strong link he makes between becoming and ―becoming-
woman.‖ He claims it is a necessary plateau in the act of ―becoming.‖ ―Becoming-woman‖ is a 
necessary plateau, a lift this movement into uncertainty, the affect yet to be seen. Acknowledging 
that ―becoming-woman‖ is indeed sexist, Massumi explains that because the feminine and 
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women have traditionally embodied the instability repressed in patriarchal culture and the rigid 
components of masculine identity formation, Deleuze privileges ―becoming-woman‖ as a better 
place from which to begin an innovative departure: ―The feminine gender stereotype involves 
greater indeterminacy (‗fickle‘) and movement (‗flighty‘) and has been burdened by the 
patriarchal tradition with a disproportionate load of paradox (virgin/whore, mother/lover).‖170 The 
task, for Deleuze, but also for Klein, is to find a way out of the dualist metaphysics that 
implicates and infects, not only the ontology of the subject, but sexual difference. 
Since women do not have an immediate or necessary access to ―becoming-woman,‖ 
many feminists contend that ―becoming-woman‖ is another manifestation of a complicated but 
familiar process of excluding women from representation while simultaneously formulating their 
exclusion as an image of representation‘s undoing. Luce Irigaray and Alice Jardine argue that for 
all the innovation in Deleuzean thought, ―becoming-woman‖ is a repetition of Western 
philosophy‘s simultaneous construction and disavowal of the feminine: the same girl in a 
conceptually different dress. One might paraphrase both Irigaray‘s and Jardine‘s arguments with 
the following question: does ―becoming-woman‖ risk repeating women‘s historical invisibility in 
the name of literary and philosophical experiment, evacuating the category of woman, and 
celebrating her disappearance?  
Ultimately, Deleuze‘s notion of becoming-woman bears a strong affinity for Klein‘s 
complicating of the mother/analyst divide, and, in turn, determinist, essentialist notions of the 
generation of life and mothers. Rosi Braidotti agrees. She claims that Deleuze‘s emphasis on the 
―activity of thinking differently,‖ combined with his emphasis on ―de-essentializ[ing] the body, 
sexuality, and sexual identity‖ can expand feminism‘s ―construction of new desiring subjects.‖171 
Becoming woman is a form of becoming such as in writing, one becomes-woman, becomes 
animal or vegetable, becomes molecule to the point of becoming-imperceptible.‖  
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Similarly, while for Klein, the creative process of being a mother and accompanying any 
child in their act of play, imagining, and symbolizing, or what Deleuze terms ―mapping‖ and 
―narrating,‖ suggests something of an ethical imperative at the heart of creativity. In ―becoming-
imperceptible,‖ the ego‘s relation to language unhinges, making it open and permeable to 
collective utterances; the territory of identity dissolves into ―we.‖ Virginia Woolf is one of two or 
three women writers cited in Deleuze‘s work bridges the distance between writing and becoming-
woman: ―When Virginia Woolf was questioned about a specifically women‘s writing, she was 
appalled at the idea of writing ‗as a woman.‘ Rather, writing should produce a becoming-woman 
as atoms of womanhood capable of crossing and impregnating an entire social field‖ 172 Deleuze 
refers to Woolf‘s attention to the places and states where the borders between persons blur to non-
existence. He notes that in, for example, Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf uses ―women‖ to imagine a 
facilitating passageway. He concludes that ―the self is only a threshold, a door, a becoming 
between two multiplicities‖ 173 ―Woman‖ is rendered a passage way, not unlike Klein imagines 
women in her work on the bedroom, the door, and the child. As Deleuze suggests, ―becoming 
woman‖ is a form of ―art‖: anyone-as Klein would agree-can do it:  children, artists, women, men, 
all move into the space of thinking, depersonalized, reflective, governed by a playful receptivity 
to the boundary, and lack of boundary, between generation and creation. 
 
Becoming the Subject in Process    
If, as Klein and her colleagues suggest, our early life forms a template for which our adult 
behaviour flows, then the manner in which our mother weans us from her earthly embrace 
determines the manner in which develop our flourish. She maintains that children who are at ease 
with the ambiguity, ambivalence, and anxiety which is the experience of being an infant born of a 
―mother,‖ are children who learn to think. Thinking, as Husserl describes, is that space in which 
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all is not ―black and white.‖ For some thinkers, Klein goes to far in suggesting that mother‘s are 1) 
really the template which lies behind every thought and 2) that her thoughts and actions play such 
a determinate role in our development. If we accept that ―mother‖ is not necessarily a term which 
must refer to ―mother‖ proper, but instead, the full body which the infant knows first (by virtue of 
being born, in most cases, to a woman and then suckled by this same woman), it is acceptable to 
use the term ―mother‖ simply to refer to the earthly immanence which we are born into, but 
which must separate and distinguish ourselves from.  
Deleuze is less worried about the success of our separation, and more concerned with 
imagining a process by which we distinguish rather than separation per se. In both cases, there is 
a fecund opportunity: if every adult is really some version of his earlier self, with the vessel of the 
symbol and the navigator our analyst, learn to swim rather than sink in the murky spaces of the 
patterns of anxiety, ambiguity, and ambivalence. Klein goes even further, and it is here (despite 
herself and her decidedly non-intellectual mode) that she is most relevant to the philosopher. 
What we discover when we begin to swim in the dark underworld is more than an incestuous lust 
and murderous guilt and the role censorship plays in fascism and the inability to think or love. To 
best understand the genus of genius, violent destruction and its opposite creative thinking, she 
insists that we analyze its closest witness, the pre-linguistic child. In this child, lies the key to our 
second birth.  
Both Deleuze and Klein use the ―child‖ as a metaphor for a voyage of return to the 
formation of our identity, ontology, and, ultimately an ethic of creativity. Informed to no small 
extent by the crisis of the European sciences, and the birth of psycho-analysis, sexuality becomes 
a crucial concept for understanding the relationship of our affective, animal nature, and our selves 
as creative beings capable of a second birth. It is most interesting that, both thinkers tend to do 
this from the point of view of the child, or the adult recollecting his experience of the child. While 
Klein will return a strong sense of agency to the mother, and even complicate the boundaries 
between mother and analyst, she still tends towards the point of view and interests of the child. 
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Ultimately, while both make great strides on their journey out of Plato‘s cave and its determinist, 
essentialist notions of mothers as those who ―generate life,‖ but do not create ideas, they do not 
go so far as to give a sustained, explicit reflection on the subject-position of mother: the being 
who generates life and creates ideas. Until this is accomplished, any illusion of having exited the 
cave and the repudiation of sexual difference as the pre-condition for thinking philosophically is 
pure pretence. Thus, while Arendt, Klein, and others show a genius in thinking –obstinately and 
against the grain-of the moral majority and dominant discourse, it is Kristeva whose genius is 
most scintillating and revolutionary. Kristeva‘s notion of a subject in process, which is not limited 
to thinking woman‘s identity, finally moves into this long-neglected territory: the being who 
generates and creates, ―mother.‖ 
 The Anna Freudians criticized her for not paying attention to the real family and mother 
or the burgeoning external reality, limiting herself instead to the world of sadistic fantasies, or at 
best essentially negative ones. This view is not really accurate, for the child‘s psychic dynamic 
depends, as Klein believed, on the mother‘s inner world-which the child deems to be an external 
object! Klein proclaimed that we are all paranoid –schizophrenics. Even worse, she believed all 
forms of authority, parental authority in particular, generate inhibition and anxiety: we recall 
Fritz‘s atheist mother and believing father, who eventually allowed him to think for himself. 
Klein does not endorse any power, phallic, or mother phallic. She did not endorse a rival power. 
She did not believe in a father or a mother. On the contrary, she attempted to figure out how to 
get rid of this final henchman of power, this infantile pivot for tyranny.  
The mother of an internal object is the double of the real mother. The doubling which 
engulfs the baby enables the world to avoid both judgment and verification through sense 
perception. The real mother is but the colored screen that is produced by our fantasy and 
projective identification. To learn to judge reality in a way that is not based on terror, we can 
certainly depend on the satisfying care of our mothers, who as luck would have it, are capable of 
doing so, but we are invited to depend on analysis so we might have a chance to work through our 
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fantasies of omnipotence, which in the end, is maternal omnipotence. Her single effort was to 
demystify power. By archeology, the remnants that lurk in us, we have a chance to deconstruct, 
through the help of some mothers distant enough and gratifying enough, to transference and 
interpretation. This all begins with ―play.‖ It‘s this same creativity that will bring me to my final 
chapter and my last attempt to fully unpack that Platonic prejudice that those who ―generate life 
cannot create ideas.‖ 
 
Playing with Children: Genius! 
Kristeva seeks to understand why, as far as she can discern, the 21
st
 century has produced 
women geniuses, including Klein. First, Kristeva determines two unlikely trajectories in Klein‘s 
context which raise the stakes of her offering a novel understanding of psychoanalysis, a 
discourse which she considers to have been one of the most influential of the 20
th
C. Given the 
trajectory of Klein‘s work, it is no accident that her work stands apart from her contemporaries 
because she, unlike any of her mentors, is a mother. Furthermore, Klein undertakes mothering 
and analysis in the throws of fascist Europe. By moving alongside her charge‘s games, Klein 
experiences the war on an entirely different level than her contemporaries. The people in her 
midst destroy and create, dream and fear in epochs and worlds, which, for the children (and, as 
Kristeva intimates, like many of her soon-to-be contemporaries in London psychoanalytic circles), 
are slipped into without reference or reverence for the limits of strict reality. Thus, Klein‘s 
relatively unschooled foray into the world of psychoanalysis, her much-noted bad habit of 
thinking out loud, and her playful assembling of the concepts and ideas of thinking psyche change 
everything, not only for psychoanalysis, but for the entire Christian-Platonic metaphysics which 
has so long formed the basis of Western, canonical thinking.  
She alters the field of metaphysics by doing so as a mother/mother-analyst. Remember 
Socrates‘ first premise regarding the creation of ideas: neither the philosopher nor the midwife of 
a philosophy is a mother. He, the philosopher and philosophical midwife, is like a mother or like a 
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midwife, but, unlike both, he creates ideas rather than birth infants. Klein‘s radical claim is that 
all ideas are rooted in this first birth: they are more than just ―like‖ an infant and the mother who 
births this infant and birth itself, the connection between the idea of one and the idea of the other 
is osmotic. She bases her claim on her observations of children in which the defences, repressions 
and conversions between their memory of ―generation‖ and the work of ―creation‖ are less reified. 
In Kristeva‘s estimation, Klein‘s findings render her a genius. Until the French revolution, 
few thinkers reflected on child‘s play. During the revolution, child play comes into focus. 
Kristeva mentions Montage‘s Essays in which he writes, ―As indeed it must be noted that 
children‘s games are not games, and must be judged in children like the most serious actions‖.174 
Kant‘s fascination with Rousseau‘s Emile was so gripping that he disrupted his schedule and 
inserted pointed assertions about pedagogy and the development of the capacity to judge and 
think in the Groundwork. But it was not until the turn of the Century that child‘s play became a 
field of study, and thinkers such as Piaget and Kohlberg made their mark. What distinguishes 
Klein‘s analysis of play from her Enlightenment and psychological counterparts is that she is not 
interested in those instances when child‘s play approximates our adult standards of accuracy and 
correctness, such as when Plato teaches the fundamentals of geometry to a slave-boy, Klein is 
interested in the playfulness of play. 
No matter how unconventional her methods, Kristeva insists that Klein‘s effort to 
understand child‘s play inside the semiotic of children permanently alters the terrain of thinking 
identity. Klein broadens the net of significance to include every gesture, verbal and non-verbal, 
every expression of anxiety and ease in voice and posture, and every movement and desire for 
movement from one room to another. By casting this net, Klein captures something of great 
importance, not only for children, but for the child in every adult. The work of identity formation 
draws from three dimensions because identity is fashioned from what is forever deep and wide: 
our first memory of mother‘s embrace.  
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Klein concludes that every child‘s early life is saturated by mourning, guilt, and longing. 
The work of identity is the operatic work of desire. Every child‘s early life is a story unique to the 
child. Their story is written before them, but only they can act in the script which others will 
narrate. The degree of success is not determined by the rules of geometric accuracy or the victory 
of one commander over another in a mock-war, but with their ease with the story that is their own. 
Once they have begun to understand, and thus, once they have begun to feel guilt and shame, the 
story has already begun. Their only choice is to be at ease, or not, with the generation of life 
which is theirs. Their ease determines their ability for ―creativity,‖ the genus of thinking and 
living well. Aristotle is Klein‘s ally here in nearly every manner. 
Klein‘s discovery of child‘s play begins, as Kristeva reminds us, with a simple intuition. 
At the start of analysis with a young girl, Rita, Klein realizes that the words and fixtures in the 
room are insufficient to allow the little girl to ―speak‖ fully of the anxieties that prevent her from 
moving freely, loving with ease, and playing openly. Klein, like any mother, exits quickly only to 
return with some toys into the room, thus pioneering child-analysis. When the child is too anxious 
in the room, the analyst changes rooms and the analysis continues uninterrupted. Moving in and 
out of these spaces, and between speech and toys, Klein realizes that nothing is what it appears to 
be on the surface. Rita‘s drawings are not merely drawings: the paper itself, the room changes, 
the pen, all are integral components to the child‘s desire to express herself and repress what she 
already understands to be socially unacceptable. Almost intuitively, Klein also understands what 
has become a first commandment of analysis: let the patient indicate when they are ready, and 
how they are ready to begin communicating. Klein explains:  
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I should like to explain briefly why these toys afford such valuable assistance in 
the  technique of play analysis. Their smallness, their number, and their great 
variety give the child the very wide range of representational play, while their 
very simplicity enables them to be put to the most varied uses. [ . . .] The child‘s 
various play thoughts and the affects associated with them (which can partly be 
guessed at from the subject-matter of its games, and which are partly plainly 
expressed), are presented side by side and within a small space, so that we get a 
good survey of the general connections and dynamics of the mental processes 
[ ... ] 
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Klein‘s radical methodology begins by studying children and taking her cue from 
children. As such, like any adult who gets down on the floor on all fours to play, she is brought 
into play.       
Despite her occasionally clumsy pioneering ways, no one can dispute the manner in 
which Klein reveals the absolute importance of play and its ability to reveal revelatory and nearly 
sacred dimensions of what we now term ―otherness‖ and ―difference‖-the underpinning of nearly 
every contemporary theory and discourse on ethics and identity in post-modernism. The 
suppression of play and the consequent human tendency for hatred and violence is reflected upon 
by Husserl, Proust, Bataille, Artaud, Blanchot, Foucault, Deleuze, Levinas, and Nancy, to name 
but a few. An ethics of playfulness operates like an imperative for a ―generation‖ of thinkers to 
follow. The distinction between children‘s play and adult play diminishes the impotence of play 
squarely refuted, and the import of play to identity formation in a post-capitalist context 
prioritized. It is in this same spirit that Derrida mis-en-joue the idea of play and permanently 
alters the playing field of philosophy. The violence of deconstruction-a game bent neither on 
doing harm nor destroying, begins with play. Unlike their contemporary social-scientists such as 
Piaget and Kohlberg, their interest is not in the patterns and development of play, but the never 
ending desire for play. Play is gradually understood to be, not some attendant, irrelevant past time, 
but the very process of dialoguing with reality. The spatial-temporalizing of objects and their 
                                                     
175
 Qtd. in Melanie Klein, 49 
 148 
functions is one and the same as the process of building and breaking, cleaning and dirtying, 
emptying and filling, entering and exiting. Play plays us, and we it. We are the basic units of play.  
When Klein plays alongside children and parallels, equates, and differs with the things at 
hand, she relies on her own intuition just as much as theirs. She hovers in this space, long 
threatening and seemingly irrelevant to real thinkers and philosophers, and gives it priority. Her 
discovery is that every game, in some sense, is the mis-en-jeu of our alpha and our omega. Our 
struggle to be and to accept our not-being is fought on the ―full earth‖ our mother‘s body. Thus, it 
is not the case the ―mother‖ has an essence. In fact, mother is she who has no essence-she is the 
being who both enables and threatens our very existence: the generation of life and the creation of 
ideas. Something of this spirit which underlies Kristeva‘s highly evolved notion of the ―subject-
in-process,‖-a subject who, in every way, is born and bears, who thinks-life, and is living-
thinking.  
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CHAPTER V 
KRISTEVA’S IMPERATIVE: GET IN TOUCH WITH YOUR FEMININE SIDE 
 
Abstract: Few thinkers more than Kristeva are as sensitized to the professional risks associated 
with postulating theories mistaken for sexualized-essentialism. In her home life, Julia is married 
to Philippe Sollers, the author of Women, a widely-circulated and highly ironic literary 
deconstruction of nearly every major discourse on sexualized-essentialism relevant to the French-
intellectual imagination; the book‘s stream of consciousness is exhaustive, literally and 
figuratively speaking (it measures nearly 600 pages). In her public life, Kristevian concepts have 
dominated the same two decades in which feminists and non-feminists obsessed over sex-
essentialism. Her concepts of ―Chora,‖ the symbolic and the semiotic, ambivalence and the abject, 
and the feminine and rebirth continue to trigger a heated tête-à-tête in France and beyond. Her 
most controversial and equally seminal contribution to these discourses is her insistence that the 
maternal body threatens, and should threaten, the patriarchal symbolic-order; in fact, her 
contributions to the most advanced discussions on semiology to her highly personal accounts of 
political activism, analysis, and co-parenting, all bear the same fascination with the manner in 
which the maternal body threatens the symbolic order. Kristeva‘s experiences and reflections 
have led her to believe that, when allow that the maternal body threatens the symbolic order, we 
allow ourselves to hear what is other. Kristeva makes no hard and fast distinction between this 
otherness and others; in fact, she considers the imperative to listen to others an ethic (and perhaps 
even an aesthetic) proper to the ―subject in process.‖ The subject in process is a subject who is at 
home with the unpredictability of otherness, and by extension, the other; it is here, like this, that 
he who creates ideas is, finally, permitted some intimacy with the generation of life.  
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An Ear for Listening to Motherhood, an Eye for Repudiating the Maternal  
Kristeva is aware of how the patriarch uses and misuses ―essence‖ and yet, after two 
decades of attacks from all fronts, she does not succumb to the pressure to reduce sexed-identity 
to the arbitrary and conventional parameters dictated by many of her adversaries. Kristeva spends 
more than a decade deconstructing the patriarchal propensity towards reducing women to essence 
and then splitting her into an impossible ideal (shadowed by a lamentable real). She spends more 
than two decades analyzing, treating and remedying this unhappy, impossible situation for 
women. In light of her academic and psychoanalytic work, Kristeva does not agree that the 
current situation of women is good reason to dismiss the possibility that women might have an 
―essence. She believes that women‘s apparent affinity with the organic and her strong counter-
transferal impulses are not merely habits springing from conventions indicative of a culture which 
despises women, but a possibly genuine affinity which springs from her embodied maternal 
identity. 
176
 She adds that these tendencies have a greater import and relevance to all of us, not 
only women, for the very simple reason that we are all born from women who mother. The 
maternal resonates in all of us thinking, living beings.  
From the beginning, Kristeva explains the repudiation of the maternal, not in terms of a 
propensity for maternal-victimization, but in terms of hyper-reactivity to the perceived threat of 
the maternal body. Kristeva identifies the ongoing political struggle over women‘s reproductive 
rights as testimony to the perceived stakes of controlling, regulating, and taming the perceived 
threat to the patriarchal symbolic. In order to understand why the maternal is perceived as a threat, 
Kristeva suggests that we analyze the high stakes the patriarch places on rational unity and the 
logic of non-contradiction. For the patriarchal symbolic order, the maternal body presents an 
apparent threat because it defies the standard logic of opposition of inside and outside, one and 
the other, thinking and feeling. Kristeva names the cause of the effect of the maternal body which 
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confounds distinctions and blurs boundaries ―semiotic otherness.‖ 177  At this early point in 
Kristeva‘s career, her more specific interest is with the methods used to cover over, displace and 
contain the perceived threat of semiotic otherness triggered by the maternal body.   
Kristeva claims that Catholic discourses attempt to control the semiotic otherness of the 
maternal by circulating a myth of the virgin.
178
 The myth of the virgin is a clear example of a 
feminine essence which ―splits‖ women in two. By stipulating that women are either 1) the virgin 
(whore) who knows her pleasure in the child who is not hers to have or 2) the whore (virgin) who 
knows pleasure outside the sanctions of paternal law and marriage, the myth stipulates two 
options which is really one option. The myth of the virgin relegates women to the status of virgins 
and their ―bastard‖ children to the status of legitimate entities by impregnating the ―virgin,‖ not 
with the seeds of carnal pleasure, but with the ―word‖ incarnate.179 In this manner, the filial 
passage is regulated by the patriarch while simultaneously appearing to satisfy the need for 
primary identification with the mother. The phenomenal experience of this ―mother‖ is described 
in, for example, Celine‘s account of her ambivalent love for her grandmother in which she 
appears as a gruesome woman with two faces; Kristeva wonders if ―the theme of the two faced 
mother perhaps the representation of the baleful power of women to bestow mortal life‖?   
The theme of the two-faced mother anticipates a larger theme in Kristeva‘s work: the 
crucial distinction between the woman who is split in two (the myth of the virgin-whore) and the 
woman who is more than one (because she adopts the maternal function). In the former case, the 
woman‘s destiny is to mother a child to whom she cannot be a mother; in the later case, woman is 
also a mother. Kristeva determines that, despite appearances to the contrary, Catholic discourses 
(as opposed to modern liberalism) prevent women from the experience of being a mother. While 
Catholic discourses and practises might appear to make maternity mandatory, Kristeva claims 
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that, in actuality, all efforts are made to prevent the child from really knowing and, by extension, 
loving the woman who is also their mother. The child born and bred on the myth of the virgin is a 
child who can neither hear nor comprehend that his mother‘s jouissance comes from elsewhere. 
The child born and bred on the myth of the virgin is a child who is unable to bear the 
unpredictability of the other. 
In the myth of the virgin, the child, rather than be excluded, excludes the mother‘s 
jouissance.
180
 The mother‘s jouissance is the mother‘s desire which refers to something which 
exceeds the existence of the child. The mother‘s jouissance is the mother‘s referent to her 
otherness. The child born and bred on the myth of the virgin is a child unable to integrate that its 
mother desires something else or someone else. Her existence beyond him remains for him a 
either a threat or an intolerable actuality. Any attempt she may make to speak in a manner that he 
can hear is likely to fall on deaf ears. The result is a child born who can never be re-born. He is a 
child unable to bridge from his earthly existence towards his human freedom: both are, in essence, 
unclaimable, unpredictable, unknowable.  
Kristeva‘s experience as a clinician causes her to dread the future of a people unable to 
integrate the desire and suffering of others; conversely, her experience as a clinician causes her to 
place great hope on the child who accepts his mother‘s desire for other people and things other 
than he the child. On this same trajectory, Kristeva suggests that by permitting ourselves to bear 
witness to the desire and suffering of our mothers and others, something in all of us can be born 
and reborn. The subtle irony implicit in Kristeva‘s prescription for listening to our mothers and 
others is that our mother‘s desire is affirmed by adopting a maternal stance; however, the irony is 
not also prohibition against men adopting the maternal stance; instead, the irony appears as an 
irony only for those who cannot imagine a masculine maternal function. Kristeva has no trouble 
imagining a masculine maternal stance; in fact, she intimates that there is little alternative. If we 
recall the thematic developed extensively by Klein, we can accept that women are only ever a 
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symbol for the maternal. Mothers are not really women, and in some sense, all of us are and 
ought to be mothers. This can be understood as a claim about the origin of our identity, and its 
continual evolution, and it can also be understood as a moral claim. If mothers are those who 
adopt an ear for listening to others, then there is a strong case for adopting her ethic. 
In this sense, each one of us is a subject-in-process who is always already negotiating the 
other within; like the maternal body, we are never completely the subjects of our own experience; 
and, like the maternal body, the experience of being the subject-in-process is not reserved for 
women, but available to anyone born and reborn, including the (masculine) autonomous unified 
subject. If we recall, as Kristeva does, Klein‘s observations of children at play, we recall that boys 
and girls re-enact this primary identification with the maternal body early in their lives and for a 
long time after.  As Oliver suggests, Kristeva uses the maternal body with its ―two-in-one, or 
other within, as a model for all subjective relations.‖181 
Kristeva emphasizes the importance of the maternal stance to the development of 
subjectivity; in doing so, she challenges a prejudice in both Catholicism and psychoanalysis.  
Catholicism and psychoanalysis tend to portray the maternal function as a site of comfort, unity, 
and wholeness while maintaining that the child enters the social by virtue of the paternal function. 
Kristeva wonders why a child would venture from the maternal function, something safe and 
nourishing, if his only motivation were fear? Her more common-sensible suggestion is that the 
maternal function delivers none of the pure comfort and security Freud and others suggest; 
instead, like Klein, Kristeva suggests that, from the beginning, a child‘s experience with its 
mother is complicated. Children evolve in the midst of a stage always already complicated by the 
competing desires of having and not having, and wanting and not wanting their mother. From this 
same matrix, the loved and loving child learns to relate to their mothers as articulate, social 
beings who desire and suffer. At times such as loss or crisis, the memory of the maternal function 
tends to register with salience, but, for the most part, it becomes a background rather than a 
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foreground for our relationship with an other. The child develops alongside and from within this 
evolving relationship between others as a subject in process inside the fold which is his 
mother/woman in process.  
Cavarero anticipates that, by adopting an ear for the real story of motherhood, we no 
longer need virgins or goddesses to fill her place because we hear a real story of motherhood 
which cannot be confused for any other‘s story. Kristeva agrees, but adds the caveat that the 
stakes of renouncing the myth of the virgin are complicated, especially for women. When women 
renounce the psychic stability which comes with ready made gods, she is liberated from the task 
of renouncing what she is in to become who she might be, but she also risks losing the maternal 
thing altogether. For a woman at the crossroads, it can appear as if the choice is a choice limited 
between psychic stability and madness. Kristeva acknowledges that there is something inherently 
insane about standing at such a crossroads, but insists that the prospects are not nearly as grim as 
they might seem.  
For the journey of the girl-child born into the discourses and practices implied by the 
myth of the virgin/whore, identifying as a woman is a masochistic identification. The ideology 
and practices which sustain the myth of the virgin require that girls renounce her desire and, by 
extension, her autonomy. Added to this, a girl‘s hope of seeing through the myth of the virgin is 
tenuous. In Kristeva‘s account, a girl‘s hope of seeing through the myth of the virgin is premised 
on her becoming a mother. Mothers can see through the myth because they know that their 
children are not gods. For the girl, her hope of seeing through the myth of the virgin is premised 
on a future contingent and remote and possibly undesirable or untenable to the girl. If the girl is 
lucky enough to be born to a mother who knows and is able to speak about her knowledge in a 
manner that allows her daughter to hear, then the girl-child is well positioned to understand that 
she is no god, and that suicide is not her only option. In listening to her mother‘s speech, she will 
learn about more than the truth of her status, she will be granted a relationship with the being who 
is a woman and a mother: she will be granted an opportunity to identify with a being she will 
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have to kill in order to become who she is, but at this point, she will already have a relationship 
with a woman who has had to do the same.  
Kristeva, like Arendt, suggests that while women can –in theory-refuse to accept her sex 
(however pragmatic, or politically radical, or authentic) this refusing is in some sense an 
acknowledgement: to refuse her sex altogether is tantamount to madness or suicide if, for 
example, she refuses to accept the possibility that she might become pregnant after sex. In other 
words, her choice can appear as a choice between kinds of suicide. Instead, Kristeva offers that 
the choice is not between two avenues, but a choice about how to proceed on the journey unified 
by one feature: the maternal function. As a being who is born a girl and might later become a 
woman who mothers, she must lose her mother to become a mother. When a woman becomes a 
mother, she must lose her child to rediscover her mother. The journey is cyclical. As Kristeva 
explains, a woman‘s choice is not to lose or not to lose her mother; rather, her choice is in how to 
grieve her loss with intelligent, loving, creativity. To refuse to grieve is, in most cases, to choose 
some version of destructive, violent stupidity. Her choice is, as Heidegger says of authentic 
Dasein, ―own most.‖  
Kristeva‘s vernacular could be mistaken for a conservative prescription requiring 
maternity, but it could also be described as an anarchical affirmation of the freedom of speech.  
When the speech of real mothers is allowed to resonate and problematize the myth of mothers, 
Kristeva believes that her daughter is born into a time and place in which the myth of the virgin 
no longer circulates and insinuates itself into her girlhood in quite the same manner. Masochism 
is not a predetermined destiny for girls, but imagining how it could be otherwise is yet to be 
determined. All that is known for certain is that a girl‘s narrative will unsettle anything which 
came before it: it is, as Arendt predicted, unpredictable. 
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The Two Faces of Matricide 
If the paternal-symbolic order is understood to be all that prescribes a logic of opposition, 
non-contradiction, and, in most cases, a hierarchy of value, and if the maternal function is 
understood to be what threatens this same logic, then ambivalence is the experience of the 
maternal function. Ambivalence is the experience of the in-between, of the contradiction, and of 
the scrambling of order. After many years of conducting analysis, Kristeva maintains that the 
experience of ambivalence plays an indisputable role in identity formation. Where others might 
predict that psychosis would onset with the dissolution of boundary and predictability, Kristeva 
claims a more reliable indicator with the inability to cope with the dissolution of boundary and 
predictability. She contends that, when repression dictates what can and what cannot be said by 
mothers or about mothers, then, typically, mothers are ―split‖ and made abject. If Kristeva is right, 
the psychosis is intimately connected with violence against women. A being unfamiliar, 
uncomfortable or hostile towards what appears to threaten order is almost always someone who 
has confused women for the mothers they appear to embody; this includes women themselves; 
self-inflicted violence such as anorexia and bulimia are mirrored in the private and public 
violence against women; misogyny‘s cousin is masochism; neither illness is a secret, and both 
spring from repression. Ours is a culture that has not learned to love women, and neither has it 
learned how to speak about its hatred. For the uninitiated, the complicit nod of the law enforcer or 
the indifference of the community is variably sickening and disheartening. For Klein and Kristeva, 
these attitudes are inevitable given the historical-cultural climate of matricide.  
For Klein who was writing in the twilight of crisis of early 20
th
 C Europe of fascism, 
man‘s complicity with misogyny was best understood by unlocking the censorship which 
surrounds his first encounter with ambivalence: loving the same woman he had to separate from. 
For Kristeva who is writing in a post-modern light all its own, misogyny is just as real and 
prevalent, but the responsibility has changed somewhat. There is a responsibility not only to 
memorialize the undertaking of the psyche and its discoveries for men and women, there is a 
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responsibility to do so in a manner that explicitly cultivates intelligent, loving creativity for men 
and women. For example, her later work delves into the relatively unexplored notion of the 
paternal function and its likeness to the maternal function.
182
  Kristeva‘s contributions in this area 
establish her as a political agent: while she is sharply critical of any attempt to determine an 
identity-based platform around which women or any other might rally, she offers one of the most 
perspicacious critiques of violence against the ―weaker sex.‖183 
As Reineke details in her book Sacrificed Lives, Kristeva explains violence against 
women by explaining what women represent to the aggressor: women represent that which one 
had to do violence to in order to separate. If separation was complicated or was initiated too soon, 
the child is more likely to suffer from psychosis. Kristeva, like Klein, likens psychosis with the 
inability to think. When a child matures into an adult, but separation is incomplete, violence is 
often directed at real bodies. Women‘s bodies are often the target of this kind of violence because, 
to the person who has not fully separated in the vehicle of the symbol, women‘s bodies appear as 
a semblance or identical to the body we had to do (imagined) violence to in order to separate. As 
adults trapped in infancy, we turn to women‘s bodies to ―rein scribe, reflect on, and commit to 
memory the subject-creating forces of negativity that first secured them in the world.‖184 Kristeva 
claims that just as a subject under siege may  
deploy defensive strategies modeled on the initial bounding practices of an 
emergent subjectivity, so also may a community under threat engage in boundary 
building ventures based on those that first brought it into existence as a social 
order.‖185  
 
The creative/destructive footprint of violence against women seems to bear this claim 
quite well. Despite differences across and internal to cultures all around the world, women are 
targeted in remarkably similar ways. Whether it is the angry medical practice detailed by Gena 
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Corea, or armies assaulting women on the battlefield or on the home front, or domestic violence 
in so called ―peace times,‖ in most cases, it is her face, her breasts, her womb, and her 
reproductive organs are mutilated, controlled, covered over. 
186
 Woman‘s body is attacked 
because woman‘s body is confused as a literal symbol for the first body from which we had to 
separate. Like individuals, nations, communities, religions, who conceive of ―negativity in terms 
of a hard-won, positioned awareness, placing it in service to representation‖ strike out against 
their ―mother.‖187 ―Mother‖ is made into a thing to be venerated in public, but despised in the 
domestic; she is made a thing to be excluded from political participation, but emblemized as a 
symbolic ideal. Mother is ―split.‖  
Kristeva clarifies that there is nothing inevitable about violence against women; initially, 
the child does not see its mother‘s sex as threatening; instead, the child‘s first salient experience 
is that of ambivalence. Ambivalence is the experience of the transition space between those hard 
and fast boundaries dictated by the paternal order. The child must inhabit these transition spaces 
in order to separate. There is nothing inherently psychotic about his experience of these spaces; 
instead, it is the manner in which he is able to come to terms with this ambivalence that 
determines his fate. During this transition, the mother is not yet object and the child is not yet 
subject. The child cannot tell if the abject is itself or its other. The mother‘s body is still too 
immediate and dwells in the child‘s super ego. Similarly, the mother cannot tell whether this 
other in her is her or not. Mother and child are subjects in process and embody narcissism in 
crisis. While the mother and child both need and fear the lack of separation, inverse castration, if 
under the guidance of the ‗mother‘ (the being who navigates the child from the maternal into the 
vehicle of the symbolic), the process maintains an optimum balance, the child becomes a creative, 
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intelligent and loving adult. If this navigation goes too much off course, then psychosis (the 
inability to create) is inevitable.  
Every child is a criminal, but no child is incapable of the transference of love; this applies 
just as easily to adults, but the consequences of adult psychosis are almost always 
incommensurate to those perpetrated by a child. As Reineke reminds us, this psychosis is not 
limited to individuals but can manifest itself in community and nations. In essence, the fate of 
nations is decided by mothers. (But we are all of us eventually mothers and this realization must 
come later). In this sense, mothers are responsible for matricide, but must also mother in the 
context of a culture where matricide is inherent and implied. This is not to say that mothers are 
responsible for creating a criminal class, rather, they are responsible for intervening in our 
inherent criminality. This intervention could be called love if love were understood to, not as an 
uncomplicated wholeness, but an open, receptivity to the violent struggle which we must engage 
in with in order to become creative. 
188
 The task for the midwife of the child‘s ‗soul‘ is to find 
avenues for allowing the ambiguity proper to the relation of mother and infant to resonate; 
whether through touch and speech, or later, in art proper, the mother/midwife navigates her child 
to his second birth. Without these efforts, we are all of us likely to feel frustrated, violent and 
stupid. Caught in the grips of his psychosis, he experiences real others as abject; when his 
countrymen experience the other as abject  . . . what is there left to say? 
 
The Abject  
The experience of the abject threatens to disturb identity, system, and order because it is 
that which does not respect borders. The abject is the affect of ambiguity. It is as Kristeva details, 
―a hatred that smiles,‖ ―a debtor that sells you up‖ ―a friend who stabs you,‖ but it is not a 
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quality.
189
 Abjection is above all ambiguity. It releases a hold, but does not cut off the subject 
from what threatens it. Abjection preserves what existed in the archaism of pre-oedipal mommy-
baby relationship in the immemorial violence with what a body becomes separated from another 
body in order to be. As Kristeva summarizes, the abject ―maintains that night in which the outline 
of the signified thing vanishes and where only the imponderable affect is carried out. It is founded 
on the abject separation of one body from another at birth. It is the laboured, but necessary, 
founding and prefiguring symbolic separation.‖190 The prototypical abject experience is birth. 
For Kristeva, when Socrates makes birth the absolute boundary between generation and 
creation it is equally inevitable and most ironic. The child identifies not with one or the other, but 
with the murky in between. The child vacillates between identifying with the waste violently 
expelled from the mother‘s body in order to avoid separation, but then hates the body because it 
cannot be free of it. The maternal body enrages because it carries us in its body and it enrages 
because it refuses our desire to return. For the male child, the abject is experienced as betrayal: 
how can he become a man when he was once a woman? How can he become a man and love a 
woman, the threatening hole represented by his mother?
191
 The male child must split his mother 
to become heterosexual man: he must render her abject and sublime. Making the mother abject 
allows him to separate from her and become autonomous to love another. If the mother remains 
abject, she never becomes an object of love which the masculine sexuality can take as an object 
of love. If she is only sublime, then the child will not separate from her. The boy child splits his 
mother, but what about the daughter?
192
 
For the daughter, separation will never be complete, and in most cases, force her to 
contend with masochism. If the daughter splits her mother, she splits herself. In hetero- discourse, 
she is required to abandon her mother for the love object which is her father. When the female 
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makes her mother abject to reject her, she abject and rejects herself. If Kristeva is right, women 
usually end up lugging this corpse rather than getting rid of it-an over preoccupation with house 
and home serves as one very potent example of the insanity of this situation. The question 
becomes, why is choosing creativity (over a spectrum of more taxing, and less pleasurable 
experiences) so often the preference? 
Matricide is only successful if the child can eroticise the loss by taking a substitute or by 
eroticising the other and finding substitutes. For this reason, Kristeva makes the unlikely 
suggestion that women do not marry their fathers, but their mothers, whether or not they marry 
men or women is not the point. (Klein and Kristeva more than once acknowledge the insanity of 
being a woman). Otherwise, women must commit matricide without also killing herself. Even 
then, it is only ever partial because she is the body she is killing. It is, says Kristeva, beyond 
remedy. She must find a way to eroticise without killing herself. Kristeva maintains that we must 
affirm women loving women. This is made all the difficult if we consider that most women find 
themselves, not only in a culture premised on matricide, they find themselves in a culture which 
prohibits the homo-erotic. Even with the many evolutions in law and mores, Kristeva contends 
that feminine sexuality is partly melancholy and depression fundamentally homosexual because 
of the prohibition against homo-eroticism. However, like the mother who knows her child is not a 
god, the daughter and the mother are both saved somewhat by ―mother.‖ Kristeva claims that,  
More persistent than philosophical doubt, gnaws, on account of its basic disbelief, 
at the symbolic‘s almightiness. It bypasses perverse negation, and constitutes the 
basis of the social bond in its generality, in the sense of resembling others and 
eventually the species 
 
Despite the omnipresence of the patriarchal symbolic and every attempt at censoring the 
truth of the maternal, mother‘s flesh threatens the almightiness of the symbolic and the 
anonymous autonomous entity glorified as the ―rational autonomous agent.‖ Mother gains access 
to what is off limits. She must wean, break up, and remain silent about it. She must ―pass up‖ her 
child over to the Symbolic. But, claims Kristeva, she knows better. Daughters and mothers are 
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born again at the confines of this juncture of matricide, masochism, and the prevailing 
sovereignty of the ―semiotic.‖ In this sense, it is true that Kristeva appears to mandate maternity, 
but we are now ready to hear that this maternity is not mandated to women, but to the subject in 
process. But even on this narrow, shallow spectrum of possibility, the daughter born to such a 
mother would have a much less traumatic development than the daughter born in the current 
regime of the cult of the virgin. Possibly, this daughter would not require a child of her own to 
understand and see through the myth of the virgin. In fact, to assume otherwise may be a myth of 
the virgin all its own. 
 
The Middle Voice 
Sons and daughters feature prominently in Kristeva‘s work. At the end of the day, it is 
they who show us the way ―back to mother.‖ They do so by doing what they do best: play. Like 
Klein‘s ethic of analysis which emphasizes intuition, flow, listening, and mindful-playfulness, 
Kristeva‘s adheres to an ethic of poetry and play. She, also the mother/analyst, enters into the 
dream-like space in which the connections between this world and a seeming other world are 
strong. Kristeva understands play to be subjected to primary processes (condensation and 
displacement) and the narrative account of play to be a verbal and non-verbal a semiotic. Like 
Klein, Kristeva predicts that this method of communicating promises a connection back to the 
beginning. The child‘s efforts to name his trauma, which none of us can name, he, by virtue of his 
diachronic proximity, can conjure most poignantly. Play opens and broadens the domain of the 
in-between and makes apparent that the distinction between one side and the other.  
Kristeva, like Nietzsche and Derrida, hold philosophy responsible for the repression of 
the middle voice. Kristeva adds that the challenge is to determine whether or not this middle 
voice is structured, and if so, how. Kristeva maintains that the repression silences more than just 
the unconscious.   
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Our philosophies of language, embodiments of the Idea, are nothing more than 
the thoughts of archivists, archeologists, and necrophilics. Fascinated by what 
remains of a process which is partly discursive, they substitute this fetish for 
what actually produced it [ …] and persist in seeking the truth of language by 
formalizing utterances that hang in midair, and the truth of the subject by 
listening to the narrative of a sleeping body-a body in repose, withdrawn from its 
socio-historical imbrications, removed from direct experience.
193
 
 
Kristeva‘s most scathing critique to western metaphysic‘s dualism is her finding that 
thinking is not possible without living. The solution is not a simple organicism in which the 
―body‖ is brought back to life; neither does the solution consist in collapsing one entity into the 
other; such solutions risk fostering a ―one dimensional‖ experience proper to the personage who 
haunts modernism. (This person is deconstructed by Marcuse whose modern subject is fraught 
with the lack in every dimension: loneliness, meaninglessness, despair).  On this same basis, 
Kristeva is critical of structuralism and even a certain reading of Freudian psychoanalysis. 
Kristeva maintains that, because these discourses eliminate the drives from the semiotic 
and imagine ―the unconscious as a depository of laws and thus a discourse,‖ the result is 
―structural operations dependent on the phenomenological reduction, just as they depend on what 
this reduction is able to make visible: symbolic functioning.‖ 194,195 In essence, their trajectory is 
circular. Instead, Kristeva seeks to give an account of language which allows the middle voice to 
animate the space in a playful architectonic called ―semanalysis.‖ 
Semanalysis ―tears the veil of representation to find the material signifying process.‖196 
Tearing the veil reveals what Kristeva terms the ―semiotic‖ heterogeneous elements of language. 
Tearing the veil does not reveal something more true and real than the veil, rather, it helps reify 
the relationship of two planes of signification: one, material rejection, and two, symbolic stability. 
―Tearing the veil‖ and allowing what lies behind the veil to come to the surface in dreams and 
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poetry permits us to understand how drives enter language. Tearing the veil shows us that the 
unconscious is not only structured like language, but structured like what is heterogeneous to 
language. Language is a process of differing and distinction. The result, as is detailed in 
Revolution in Poetic Language, is that the speaking subject is herself heterogeneous.
197
  Kristeva 
believes that by recovering what lies behind the veil of language, a revolution begins. When what 
was one appears as two can no longer be understood as a simple addition of one to the other, then 
the structure of language and the dualisms that have begin to crumble: nature, culture; self, other; 
inside, outside; political and personal, and so on. A mixing and circling at the roots of the unity 
that kept two worlds apart causes a revolution in one field and presupposes a revolution in the 
other. This oscillation produces a surface which Klein likens to silt, a barrier, and even the skim 
which forms on warm milk-the same ―in-between,‖ or surface area that causes the experience of 
aversion, an experience that is paramount to her work on violence and creativity.  
The subject who is born a second time in this matrix is Kristeva‘s ―subject-in-process.‖ 
The subject in process is the result of the heterogeneous process of the semiotic and the symbolic. 
The semiotic drive animates language in the sense that the semiotic produces and destroys 
language. The two require one another in what Kristeva likens to an oscillating dialectic. The 
bios of semiotic, the music of speech, and the socio of language interrupt each other, contain each 
other, and in essence, produce speech. Ultimately, the sounds that impregnate language trigger a 
memory so remote, and so distant, we only know how to recognize it by analogy: it points to a 
maternal music. Thus, while others are concerned over the repression of the middle voice, 
Kristeva is doubly concerned over the repression of the middle voice in the locus of sexual 
difference. It is here that she has the most to contribute, either as a foil or as a pioneer, to 
contemporary discussions of identity.  
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The Alpha Hermaphrodite 
Kristeva executes a rational deduction of Freud‘s own principles. In Freud‘s rendering of 
love, the identification that provides support for love seems to rest upon a strange object. Freud 
describes our first experience of love as an ―enigmatic apprehending of a pattern to be imitated 
that has not yet undergone a libidinal cathexis.‖198 (Kristeva wonders how Freud‘s rendering of 
love is any different from his rendering of madness) 
199
.The enigmatic, non-objectal identification 
of love which borders on madness is imagined by Freud as an oral assimilation, a being devoured. 
Kristeva asks the question: how could a primary experience of love-madness transition from its 
natal infancy into being? She sees no alternative except to offer that our first love could not 
develop without having been capable of transforming a thirst to devour into a deferred and 
displaced level of the psychic. One must take pleasure in chewing, swallowing, and nourishing 
one‘s self with words. In being able to receive his words, I become like him, but not him. Freud‘s 
account of first love, with its lack of object-cathexis, is unable to explain the origin of speech. 
Freud lands himself in a bit of a quagmire and Kristeva believes he understands his 
quandary quite well. For Freud, first love must be directed towards a first father. He makes it 
clear that this father is a father in individual prehistory. The father who precedes individual 
prehistory appears before the awareness of sexual difference and is thus really ―both parents.‖ 
The identification with this father before prehistory is, claims Freud, ―immediate,‖ ―direct,‖ and 
―previous to any concentration of any object whatsoever.‖ 200  It is, claims Freud, only with 
secondary identification that the mother and father appear and reinforce the first identification. 
Freud ends up with serious problem: he describes love as both an all consuming, object-less 
desire and like language. If Kristeva is right, he is still unable to explain the origin of speech. For 
this very reason, Kristeva argues that Klein‘s view is more common sensible. 
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Klein radically transforms the Freudian hypothesis of an original narcissism and 
postulates from the very beginning of a baby‘s psychic life as self capable of relationship with the 
object, albeit a partial relation to the breast. Recall that for Klein, our capacity to love comes from 
the experience of feeding at our mother‘s breast. The breast is what sates the child‘s hunger and 
thirst. It conveys the feeling of plentitude which Freud so often remarked upon. The breast is also 
the prototype for all subsequent experience of desire. The infant‘s feelings are directed toward the 
maternal object in her entirety: the breast does not, claim Klein, ―simply represent a physical 
object.‖201 Neither is the breast something of which the infant is conscious or unconscious; Klein 
translates this lack of sharp distinction into a mute distinction between symbolic and a-symbolic 
and then augments the domain of the symbolic. A/symbolism comes to be the foundation of all 
fantasy and sublimation. The breast explains how an infant can eventually desire speech rather 
than milk. By adopting Klein‘s theoretical stance, Kristeva extricates herself from charges of 
over-simplified organicism, but another concern lurks amongst her feminist and post-modern 
readers. If Kristeva is not suggesting that there is a primitive sexed identity, is she in fact 
suggesting that women have an affinity for the archaic? In other words, is Kristeva attempting to 
topple a certain brand of philosophy and psychoanalysis of dualism and lack, by re-instating an 
essentialist sexual identity and origin?  
 
Our Affinity for the Archaic 
Freud considers the first attachment to mother to be a lost archeology that is nearly 
inaccessible. He likens it to the Mino-Mycenean period of ancient Greece. Likening the first 
attachment to an idyllic, self sacrificing osmosis, Kristeva wonders if his notion of narcissism is 
not really an attempt to cover over a perceived emptiness that is intrinsic to the beginnings of the 
symbolic formation as it appears to Freud as a first separation between what is not yet Ego and 
not yet an Object. Does narcissism protect it, cause it to exist, and as such, insure it an elementary 
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separation? Without Freud‘s notion of narcissism, chaos would sweep away the possibility of 
distinction, trace, and symbolization and confuse every limit. But, as Freud well knows, every 
child, especially the young child, needs these limits. There is no ―child‖ without them. The child 
needs limits not as a psychotic or an adult needs them, but in the ―zero degree of the 
imagination.‖ What preserves this emptiness? What causes the fleeting effect of enigmatic and 
creative non-sense? Kristeva claims that it is here where we must turn to notions of 
―identification.‖ 
 For Freud, narcissism must be thoroughly and wholly a supplement. Freud 
describes it as a third realm supplementing the auto-eroticism of the mother-child dyad: As 
Kristeva cites,  
The autoerotic drives, however, are there from the very first; so there must be 
something added to auto-eroticism-a new psychical action-in order to bring about 
narcissism. Accordingly, narcissism is endowed with an ‗intra-symbolic‘ status 
dependent of a third party, but which precede the oedipal ego and prompt one to 
conceive of an archaic disposition of the paternal function, but precede the Name, 
the Symbolic, and even the mirror state.
202
 
 
Freud suggests that it is not Eros, but narcissism, that dominates psychic life; as such, he 
also suggests that self-deception dominates psychic life. Our relationship to reality, already 
understood as a libidinal attachment and eventual cathexis, or ―reality testing,‖ is also self-
deceptive. Illusion, neutralized and normalized, lies at the bottom of reality. The choice of love 
object fulfills our desire for love, if, and only if, that object relates to our narcissism. It can do so 
by narcissistic reward (Narcissus as subject) or narcissistic delegation (narcissus as other, for 
Freud, the woman). Even the Ego ideal, which insures our transference of desire to a true object 
of good and beauty determined by parental and societal codes, is a revelation of narcissism. Freud 
imposes an omnipotence of narcissism to such a saturation point that it reflects again in the object. 
The tenuous nature of Freud‘s rendering of the pre-Oedipal stage causes Kristeva to wonder if 
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something such as this could have really have a relation to the other? Could a mirror stage emerge 
out of nowhere?
203
  
Freud‘s first stage in which mimetic play establishes psychic identities is a psychic play 
which Kristeva eloquently captures, ―in the dizziness of rebounds, reveals itself as a screen over 
emptiness.‖204 We analyze the symptom as a screen through which one detects the workings of 
significance (the process of formation and de-formation of meaning and the subject). The 
arbitrariness of the Saussurian sign has placed us in front of a bar which registers its arbitrariness, 
and Lacan registers its gaping hole. Kristeva champions Klein the winner because only she is able 
to transform the Freudian hypothesis of an original, empty narcissism and postulates, from the 
very beginning of a baby‘s psychic life which contains a ―self ―capable of a ―relationship with the 
object,‖ albeit partial, before the child becomes capable of constructing an object-relation to the 
―total object,‖ following the depressive position.  
Klein breaks the habit of a self which must understand itself as simply not-mother. She 
continues that, by founding child psychoanalysis, Klein did not simply barter eroticism, which 
Freud had placed at the centre of psychic life, instead, ―by focussing on the problems of 
childhood and in particular on child psychosis, Klein was the first to use psychoanalysis as an art 
of cultivating the capacity to think.‖ 205 Klein is able to move beyond biological destiny and the 
weight of family to the space where rebirth becomes possible—not only for those of us who 
create ideas, but for those of us who generate life. Klein offers a conception of rebirth which is 
differently premised on repudiation. Kristeva lingers, without following, closely behind. She does 
so by developing a tenable notion of maternal, desiring identity. 
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Who do Women Really Want? 
I began by introducing Kristeva as a thinker who, despite years of attacks from all fronts, 
maintains a steadfast belief in the manner in which organic experience informs psychic life. She 
is not alone and remarks that it has interested female thinkers from the beginning, such as 
Sokolnicka and Banaparte. She insists that women‘s interest in the organic, accompanied by their 
strong counter-transferal impulse, is worthy of our attention. Kristeva‘s constant claim is that the 
maternal is, if anything, simple; it can be understood by understanding what it is not. Firstly, it is 
not, as so many have imagined, a place where the self is lost. As has already been witnessed from 
many perspectives, it is clear that the mother-infant embrace is neither a lost time, nor one 
coloured by idyllic or self-sacrificing osmosis As she reputes in her account of Freud‘s concept of 
love, such a notion is untenable. Instead, as her vigorous and sympathetic reading of Klein 
demonstrates, the maternal-organic is where identity is made, endlessly. Despite her many 
received criticisms, it is not obvious that she has attempted to determine a final concept which 
would embrace every resonance of the notion. 
Kristeva‘s notion of the work of identity formation is laden with anxiety and aggression 
and frustration rather than simple and true satiation and gratification. There is nothing simple 
about total dependence on a seemingly omnipresent, omnipotent, diffuse corporeal entity. Instead, 
omnipotence is feared by even the very nascent. Without this fear, we would never become, we 
would never symbolize, and we would never speak. Without fear, there would be catastrophe: 
there would be no self to speak of. Our first birth is neither a paradise nor hell, but a place which 
paves the way for thinking and living. Along this same trajectory, Kristeva stipulates that the 
maternal is not an ―object‖ but ―abject.‖ The maternal is organic, and thus an object, in the sense 
that desiring, surviving beings want to consume it/her. She/it is abject in the sense that we must 
also know how to not want to consumer her/it directly. We are ambivalent because she is our 
possible gratification, but by virtue of being more than merely a vast, bottomless source of 
satiation, she refuses us: from the beginning, we have a premonition of weaning. Thus, we feel 
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repulsion. Desire works this way. Identity must too. The nipple to mouth, mouth to mouth, skin to 
skin, and sounds and smells are bitter-sweet for mother and infant.  
In every instance, Kristeva‘s notion of ―maternal‖ troubles not only the distinctions 
between mind and body, but also self and other. The point of singular importance is that the 
maternal troubles this distinction for everyone because everyone is born of a mother. In this sense, 
there is nothing uniquely feminine about the maternal. Understanding this tenant requires 
understanding yet another dimension of what Kristeva frames in terms of mothers and their 
children. Kristeva begins with the basic premise of what Freud called ―psychic bisexuality.‖ 
Freud explains bisexuality in terms of the ambiguity that occurs in a woman‘s psychic 
development. Kristeva explains that a girls tricky manoeuvrings through the ironies of her 
sexuality explain her propensity for an ―uncanny mature psychic bisexuality,‖ but also her 
propensity for hysteria, depression, and fragility.
206
 As Kristeva notes, when Klein answered 
Freud‘s question, ―what do women want?‖ she answered not, what is woman‘s object of desire, 
but concluded that her desire is dominated by anxiety. Anxiety mounts when a woman must 
confront her maternity; the experience returns her to her archaic bond with her mother. She 
recalls her dependency on other women and her rivalry with her. She recalls sensory 
communication and its primary sublimation. Anxiety and eroticism are its paramours.  
During the experience of identifying as a mother, the mother runs the risk of taking the 
role of the omnipotent matron who fulfils herself by exerting her power over her child. 
Alternatively, she might feel forever weakened by constantly experiencing vulnerability with 
respect to the other that she has delegated to the world: separate from her, impossible to master, 
her child and her love are taken from her and she risks being piteous. Of the two, the later is 
preferable because it is, at minimum, civilizing. As Kristeva remarks, it is at least a ―tendency 
towards compassion toward the other that allows the drive to renounce its goal of separation and 
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to grant itself not another goal, but simply put, is a concern for revealing the other.‖207 On this 
same basis, Kristeva, like Aristotle, concludes that motherhood forms the basis of the caring 
attitude that transforms the erotic-thanatonic drive that flings us towards others. At its best, this 
drive‘s ultimate goal is to allow the other to live in peace. 
For this reason, Kristeva suggests that motherhood is a ―personnage conceptual‖ for an 
ethic of otherness. Motherhood forces woman to confront the object in a new manner: the child, 
her first arrival, is neither abject nor an object of desire. The child is not her ―phallus,‖ a separate 
power, nor a remnant of the―mino-mycenean,‖ period of pure immanence. The child is capable of 
being the first other. The child is the first other, and the experience of motherhood is its requisite 
other. It is an interminable experience that is utterly lacking, and for that reason alone, utterly 
sublime.
208
 The child is a harbinger of an alterity that provides female narcissism a chance to 
abandon self and the mother, and to devote itself to the other, the same joys and sorrows of 
motherhood. Kristeva claims that the mother cannot tell whether her infant is an ‗other‘ in her is 
her or is not her. Mother and child are neither strangers nor a fusion of selves. The distance 
between mother and infant is characterized more by its subtle, osmotic inter-flow than it is 
extremes of distance or immanence. Thus, those who tell the story of either infancy or maternity 
are overlooking (or, if Kristeva is correct, suppressing) the knowledge of the indeterminacy 
which characterizes the early mother-infant relation. They are not separated but no longer are 
they identical. Kristeva claims the psychoanalyst shares the maternal vocation. The analyst de-
eroticizes his desire and anxiety so that he can think about them. The patient is the analyst‘s 
―different.‖ As a constant exercise in alterity, psychoanalysis transforms eroticism into tenderness 
to the truth of the other. Freud spoke of benevolence. Klein spoke of the ―sublimation that frees 
up intelligence and that formulates the logic of drives that allows access to thought.‖ Kristeva 
names this relation the ―subject in process.‖  
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Revolving Doors: Personal, Political and Poetic 
It is clear that Kristeva is often accused of essentialism. As Oliver details in her work 
Reading Kristeva, Kristeva‘s association of the semiotic Chora with the feminine and the 
maternal risks appearing as though she reduces the feminine to the maternal.
209
 Domma Stanton 
and Nancy Fraser make this claim and Judith Butler and Ann Rosalind Jones argue that Kristeva 
makes maternity compulsory for women. Elizabeth Grosz argues that Kristeva‘s rendering of 
maternity as a biological process without a subject is an essentialist notion of maternity. Butler 
adds that, because Kristeva‘s notion is universal and homogenous, rather than heterogeneous and 
singular, she reifies maternity.  As Oliver so presciently demonstrates, the mere existence of such 
multiple and contradictory readings of Kristeva‘s work could be read, by Kristeva herself, as 
symptomatic failures to engage the maternal for what ―it is‖: a discourse that calls a crisis in 
identity, necessarily, and especially to stable, unified, identity. For this same reason, Ziarek 
describes Kristeva‘s notion of the maternal subject an ―infolding of otherness,‖ and Alison Ainley 
(who we can recall from the Kant chapter) calls it ―motherhood as double.‖ What is perhaps more 
remarkable about Kristeva‘s later works, especially in her trilogy on genius devoted to Arendt, 
Collette, and Klein, is the subtlety with  which maternity eventually registers-in my estimation- in 
such a manner that any simple charges of ―essentialism‖ seems hasty and reactionary. 
Kristeva is equally interested in the individual persons who debate her work and how 
they understand their relation to one another as they undertake their critique. According to 
Kristeva, understanding this problematic is the starting point which enables us to understand the 
―conflict‖ between the condition of womankind as a whole and the self-realization of each 
individual woman.
210
 In this respect, despite the multiple movements within feminism to 
distinguish women from mothers, Kristeva claims that feminists have not departed from the 
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totalizing ambitions of the various liberation movements that arose out of Enlightenment 
philosophy. Instead, the feminist struggle moved first to the demand for political rights led by the 
suffragettes, second, to the affirmation of an ontological equality with men (as against the idea 
that women are equal but different), which led Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex to 
demonstrate the existence and predict the realization of a ―fraternity‖ between men and women 
that goes beyond their particular natural differences to ―the search for the difference between men 
and women which would explain a specific creativity particular to women in the sexual domain 
and more generally across the whole range of social practices from politics to writing.‖211  
At each of these stages, the liberation of all womankind has been the objective; rather 
than articulate the conditions necessary for the self realization of individual women, at each of 
these stages the result has hardened into an ―inconsequential form of political activism that, 
ignorant of the uniqueness of individual subjects, believes that it can encompass all womankind, 
like all the proletariat or the entire Third World, within a set of demands that are as passionate as 
they are desperate.‖212 Kristeva remarks that we know only too well the dead end to which these 
totalizing and totalitarian promises lead. Woman can appear on this stage as a brother woman as 
in the Socialist symbolic or as a father woman as in Liberal feminism but in every instance she is 
a woman in drag serving a master whose cruelty she has suffered for far too long. Both feminist 
Nationalism and Patriarchy are the natural outcomes of this symbolic struggle and, despite 
themselves, imply domination, hierarchy, superiority, exclusivity and exclusion, divisiveness and 
isolation, the silencing of others and the conquering of bodies and territories.  
For these reasons, Kristeva contends that, despite the myth since the Enlightenment that 
nation-states maintain order and democratic equality, it is a most insidious myth. Instead, 
according to Kristeva, pre-determined unity tends to foster a narcissistic crisis which can reach 
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global proportions and puts all women, including women in feminist movements, at risk. 
(Political status and equality may have no bearing on the incidence of violence against women). 
Kristeva claims that the semiotic otherness implicit in maternity allows us to overcome the 
tendency of Western discourses, including some religious, scientific and even many feminist 
discourses, to cover, contain, and control difference and singularity. 
The tragedy of woman consists in the conflict between the fundamental demands of each 
subject who posits herself as essential and the demands of a situation in terms of which she is 
inessential. Kristeva asks, how, in the feminine condition, can a human being arrive at fulfilment? 
To appeal to the genius of each individual is not to underestimate the weight of history. As 
Kristeva claims, geniuses such as Klein ―faced up to history as much and as well as any others, 
with courage and a sense of realism‖ but to attempt to free the feminine condition, and more 
generally the human condition from the constraints of biology, society, and destiny by placing the 
emphasis on the importance of the conscious or unconscious initiative of the subject faced with 
the program dictated by these various determinisms.‖ How, through the feminine condition, can a 
woman fulfil her being, her individual potential in terms of freedom, which is the modern 
meaning of happiness?
213
 
                                                     
213
 Melanie Klein, 207, 230 
 175 
CONCLUSION:  
(I) RECOGNIZE MOTHER 
 
 
Getting Personal 
The boundary demarcated by Plato between those who generate life and those who create 
ideas becomes, in my estimation, one of the most constitutive boundaries in the history of 
philosophy. This same boundary, often contested and redrawn, is intended to differentiate the 
philosophical from everything else. It is highly philosophical to demarcate such a boundary, and 
then, of course, to discuss the drawing of the boundary itself and, under this stipulation, this 
dissertation is an exercise in philosophy; however, a stricter stipulation of the term ―philosophy‖ 
would not recognize my contributions as properly philosophical because I generate life. I am a 
mother. When I first began this project, I was innocent about how various lonesome and thrilling 
it could be to write about mothers, as a mother, from the margins of philosophy.
214
 Each of the 
chapters in this dissertation is born from this emotionally charged dialectic of writing in the 
margins; I say in the margins because, as a mother, I could not fully inhabit one side of the 
imaginary boundary or the other. Mothers cannot separate themselves from what the philosophers 
term ―the generation of life‖ or the ―creation of ideas.‖ A mother who repudiates generation 
repudiates maternity and thus herself. Women, whether or not they become mothers, have to 
negotiate an ambivalent identity in the same entity which she must not-be to be. The more I 
reflect on this insanity, the more I begin to suspect that very few of us fully escape the insanity of 
repudiating maternity-not even the philosopher. I suspect that most of us only ever barely graze 
the surface of what it means to be a being from who the creation of ideas also proceeds. 
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Generation and Creation Revisited 
I selected texts on the basis of their containing any philosophical significance about 
motherhood or maternity (rather than, say, the feminine or sex-identity). I then proceeded to 
organize the works historically but soon discovered that their historical proximity in no way 
correlated to the likelihood of their having nuanced, or progressive notions of maternity and 
motherhood; instead, I identified a striking theme which was that all of the works I had chosen 
relied heavily on Plato thematic of the opposition of ‗the generation of life‘ to the ‗creation of 
ideas.‘ A second striking theme soon became apparent. Depending on the philosopher‘s stance 
towards the ‗generation of life,‘ a great deal could be predicted about what he would claim about 
the place of maternity and motherhood in the discourse and practice termed ―philosophy.‖ I used 
this second theme to help develop two, intertwined streams of thought.  
The first stream is devoted to those philosophers who include, and even privilege, the 
importance of the generation of life to the creation of ideas over and against those who deny its 
import altogether. In this category, I include Aristotle and Arendt because both challenge the 
assumption that those who partake in the event of birth are as deaf and dumb as the infans being 
born. Instead, they locate the mother‘s relation to her infant as a relation fully saturated by earthly 
immanence and, for this same reason, permeated by a radical indeterminacy which defines what 
is proper to being human. Arendt creates a concept of natality which functions to gesture towards 
that which cannot be contained by anyone or any concept and thus embodies the thought of the 
political without ever being absorbed by the political. Aristotle exceeds Arendt‘s rendering of this 
relation by describing how it permits an insight into infancy (or natality) but also a more specific, 
nuanced concept of maternity which attempts to highlight the uniqueness of the wholly non-
political relation of mother to infant. 
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Kant and Kristeva bring us to the other side of the dualism by re-conceptualizing the 
events that lead from the seemingly ―empirical‖ bloody entrance, manic scream and suckle for 
milk to the deliberate movements and articulate speech characteristic of adulthood. They 
accomplish such a conceptually laborious task by demonstrating that all that ―is‖ is a ―creation.‖ 
In other words, all that is is understood by analogy. This challenges any rigid demarcation 
between generation and creation because it makes apparent how even ―generation‖ infiltrates 
―creation‖ at its core; however, Kant (much like Arendt and Cavarero and others) limits his 
reflections to the memory of being born rather than bearing a child. What Klein manages to do, 
ultimately in a kind of conceptual proximity to Aristotle, is to discern to what extent mothers too 
understand their birth, both of their infant and their own birth, by analogy.  Birth ―itself‖ is never 
really ―itself,‖ because no matter who undergoes birth, creation is always already at play. This 
intuitively clear insight, for so long unarticulated by those writing in the shadows of Plato, is the 
first step in understanding that, for the subject, there is nothing aphasic, affective or simply 
empirical about ‗carnal birth.‘ This is equally true for those who are born as it is for those who 
―bear.‖  
Aristotle should be regarded as a genius when it comes to developing this insight. While 
Aristotle reserves several texts for ruminations on the ‗physical‘ and at times includes carnal birth 
under this rubric, he makes a distinction between carnal birth‘s physicality and its other 
resonances. On one level, he suggests that humans are but one variation of the animal kingdom. 
With his still contemporary notion of ‗sex‘, he suggests that humans, like all other animals, are 
comprised of the marriage of two forces, one masculine and one feminine; like all other animals, 
most individuals are comprised of a dominant masculine or feminine ‗force.‘ In the case of sexual 
reproduction, the dominating force determines whether he inseminates or whether she undergoes 
gestation, labour, and lactation. The human is distinct from all the other animals because, not 
because he can equated with his sex, but because s/he undergoes the generation of life as an 
ethical being. When s/he generates life, s/he is given an opportunity to accept and receive this life 
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and or refuse it. Unlike the fish, the frog or the mule, to name but a few, the human cultivates 
vices or virtues in accordance with the manner in which s/he generates life. Like any other 
physical event, the human experiences carnal birth in a uniquely human manner. For Aristotle, 
the intersection of generation and creation is not to be understood in the infant, but in total 
context in which the mother, the closest agent to the physical event, bears her young. For 
Aristotle, carnal birth makes salient the uniquely human relationship to the intersection of life, 
family, community, and the ethical. It is only very recently that thinkers have been able to reserve 
their political apprehensions in order to openly receive and benefit from his rendering of an ethic 
of maternity.
215
 
As Kristeva says of Arendt, and by implication of Aristotle, a philosophy of life which 
begins with birth tends to be one that is at one and the same time intensely libertarian and 
eminently social. In the tradition of Aristotle, Arendt interprets carnal birth‘s significance for the 
human. For her, birth expresses the conviction, as ontological as it is existential, that what is 
unique in each individual ―remains hidden‖ to ―the person himself ‖ and does not ―appear so 
clearly and unmistakably [as it does] to others.‖216 As Kristeva notes in her trilogy on genius, 
Arendt‘s eccentric anarchism-her politics without party-and her conservative spirit-her insistence 
of the collective writing of life history-is what allows her to rewrite the community of birth as 
exactly the opposite of the national community. Only Arendt‘s anarchistic conservatism allows 
the setting of birth to be the ―appearing-with proves to be necessary to the existent precisely in its 
uniqueness or in its distinction‖ rather than a site for securing biological origin with human 
identity. In Arendt‘s vision of the political, our earthly origins negate the possibility of 
determining identity by family, location or text. Arendt describes humans as socially 
interdependent beings who can radically strip themselves of any particular relation through 
speech and action.  
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In feminist circles, the affinity between Arendt and Aristotle inspires criticism. Arendt‘s 
reticence to stipulate anything more than a narrow, physical notion of sexual difference and her 
seemingly chauvinistic assumption that sexual politics is incompatible with political freedom is 
contentious to many feminists because it appears like an unstable position from which to launch 
critique and resistance against the oppression of women. Arendt is quite insistent that humans are 
born like any other natural entity is born but that being born has relevance to human freedom, not 
because it designates one‘s sexual identity, but because it designates much the opposite. In being 
born, humans promise to be unpredictable rather than predictable. The naked, nameless newborn 
is infans in the fullest sense. He does not yet speak to us, to himself, or to a set future. His birth is 
the promise to change the world, not to be a man or a woman. Arendt appreciates that we cannot 
know who we are until we have already become who they are, but as soon as we become who we 
are, we promise to undo it once more. Her notion of identity (including gendered-identity) is 
performative rather than constative. For her, our ‗sex‘ is, as Aristotle determines, an organ of 
production.  
Aristotle‘s notion of sex-difference is contentious because it requires women to mother 
against a criterion which measures her virtue a political ideal incompatible with real political 
thought and action. For Aristotle, woman is both immanent with the demands of earth, and thus 
an ill suited candidate for political participation or freedom, while, at the very same time, 
enabling her to love her infant more perfectly than two men of excellent virtue and equal rank. 
However, counter arguments which argue for woman‘s political equality tend to mirror Plato‘s 
rendering of women in the Republic in which women must renounce her maternity to achieve 
political equality. By arguing that women are capable of being political equals with men, ―carnal 
birth‖ is still represented as something which must be overcome.   
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Plato renders women guardians ―in-common‖ on at least four levels.217 First, differences 
between men and women guardians are reduced to ―natural differences‖; women are deemed 
weaker because they bear children. Once it is clear that this is the only differences between men 
and women guardians, it is clear to Socrates that women should not nor could not be prevented 
from working alongside men in all of their ventures including war, politics and the adjudication 
of justice. Accordingly, women are required to study music, poetry, war and gymnastics. To the 
extent that women are suited for an education in the arts and sciences, women are regarded as 
having the same nature as men guardians. Based on this re-conceptualization of women‘s nature, 
women are placed in common quarters with men guardians and exercise, eat and sleep in 
common quarters with men guardians. Women‘s residual difference, their natural weakness and 
capacity to bear children, maintains them at the level of the ―material.‖ They are made the 
common property of the men guardians. Socrates names this four multi-tiered ―commonality‖ a 
―close and universal proximity.‖ Under the hand of Socrates, only two differences remain 
between men and women guardians. The differences are deemed natural, ―sex differences‖, and 
not cultural, ―gender differences.‖ 
According to Socrates, natural differences ought not to determine an individual‘s sexual 
identity. All men and women are regarded as individuals, near identical in their natures, and as, 
such, all men and women are regarded as individuals belonging to the same nature, ie., ―family.‖ 
Women, by virtue of giving birth, are considered to only be different in so far as they are a 
material element. Women ―in common‖ are stripped of many of the differences that made them 
analogous to ―the material‖ elements. After Socrates redesigns woman to be ―in common‖ and 
governed by reason, she remains the property of man. Presumably she remains the property of 
man because she is still regarded as ‗material‘ and, as such, even for the progressively minded 
Plato, more similar to the ―agricultural class‖ or the material and desire producing elements. 
Plato‘s overall concern is that conflict is born from a competition of resources. Men fight for the 
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material which is woman. The business of holding women and children in common among the 
guardians is the business of regulating ―the material elements‖ of the body of the state. Men, the 
embodiment of reason, are potentially threatened by women, the material desiring element.   
Aristotle‘s feminist critics adopt a Platonic standpoint when they argue that much of what 
is culturally associated with the physical process of generating life can be stripped away and that 
woman  is significantly analogous to man. Woman is capable of being educated and prepared for 
political action, capable of being physically trained for sharing quarters with men and sometimes 
capable of participating in warfare or other activities that require physical participation. Although 
Aristotle never argues for the political subordination of women on the basis that she has a unique 
relationship to generating life, it is correct to argue that he assumes that women are ill suited for 
political membership and that she should embrace the virtues of mothering because she generates 
life. Any suspicious are warranted here but ultimately risk losing the opportunity to claim 
anything of significance about birth beyond a political point. 
  
Aristotle’s Virtue is not a Vice  
The risks associated with entertaining the possibility that something about mothering 
one‘s offspring is antithetical to the political are often considered not worth taking. I disagree. 
Despite the risks, there is no good reason for trying to solve the problem of sexual political 
inequality by ―overcoming‖ what is termed ―carnal birth.‖ A world in which mothers and others 
understood generating life to be an event that must be surmounted (in most cases by relegating 
the associated tasks of tending to dependents to the oppressed) would not be a world living in. 
Birth and parenting is a moral event worthy of reflection, a worthy undertaking, and an event and 
an endeavor which can ameliorate, rather than hinder or hamper, the human experience. I am not 
assuming that this claim is analogous, let alone identical, to the claim or the assumption that 
women should mother, rather, I am arguing that woman should mother when it is warranted.   
 Woman‘s capacity to gestate, labour, and nurse her young in no way determines her ill 
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suited for political participation. We have an excess number of empirical examples and well 
tuned arguments to maintain this as more than a sound possibility. And yet, the fact remains that 
many women who mother do not participate in politics. Across the world, women are half the 
population but almost always less, and much too often, much less than half of the political 
apparatus which forms the policies and programs which guarantee sexual equality. Whether it be 
because she is outright prohibited from doing so, indoctrinated against it, or because physical and 
political circumstances prevent it, women with dependents almost always find it harder to 
participate in politics. If we include informal politics, in those spaces where women are excluded 
from the political infrastructure proper, she is often excluded from the informal process of politics 
too. Her contributions are many, but the reality is that, in many cases, the demands of care giving 
which typically include indeterminate and indefinite numbers of hours doing mundane work and 
often in a situation of some financial dependence is distinctly different from political action and 
antithetical to demonstrating, organizing and strategizing. Political action requires-at minimum-
the liberty to think and act at some remove from the demands of necessity. In the most extreme of 
cases, political action might entail revolting against these same demands. But, for the mother, to 
revolt against the demands of necessity is, quite often, to say ‗no‘ to her own charge; this is not 
analogous to revolting against an employer or state representative.  
Without what Kittay terms the ―labour of love,‖ none of use would be here now 
discussing its possible value. Without the experience of those relations which exceed those 
demarcated by contracts between citizens, many of us would find little reason for living. Those 
who return to the experience of ―mothering‖ and ―being mothered‖ will attest that something 
about this experience is profoundly distinct from the experience of political thought and action. 
Loving and caring for an infant are oftentimes experiences that we hold dear and consider to be 
our connection to a dimension of our humanity that brings us closer to understanding, self, other, 
history, humanity. The question becomes, how do we affirm these experiences without once more 
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relegating women (those whose bodies have, across time and place, so often destined them to 
tend to necessity), to the work of handmaiden of the family, the patriarch, the earth  
Arendt suggests one possibility, but it, once more, precludes mothers from engaging in 
politics as mothers. Unlike Aristotle‘s critics, Arendt manages to make this argument without 
falling into a Platonic discourse. Instead, she argues that our carnal birth is essentially 
indistinguishable from labouring the earth. By including men and women as those who labour 
and who must labour the earth, she makes an argument for reflecting on our common beginnings 
as those who care for those beings who are their beginnings. Both man and woman must labour 
the earth, and both man and woman must do so, and only can do so by shedding their role as mere 
generators and consumers. In a sense, we must bring the revelation of ―generating‖ or ―birthing‖ 
into the political. In a sense, we can only do some by leaving something of it behind. We can only 
leave something of it behind (our selfish hungers and the work of tending to these appetites), if 
we tend to these demands. Once we have tended to these demands, (not by relegating them to 
others or mothers), can we create a space in which all persons can make an appearance which was 
afforded them at birth: this being is her beginning. Arendt articulates a thematic that opens a 
space for thinking of carnal birth without the typically over determined associations of women, 
earth, and necessity.  
For those who champion Arendt‘s spirit of contestation, her insistence on the indubitable 
distinction appears antiquated and possibly complacent to systems of sexual inequality. Women 
have been associated with the body, nature and emotion; that these terms have been opposed to 
mind, culture, and reason, which are associated with men; and that the former have been 
systematically devalued. For these same critics, Arendt‘s assertion that women labour the earth to 
produce infants, and that this labouring relegates her (as mother) to the domain of necessity and 
earthly evidence fails to escape the traps of the historical association. For Arendt, there is no 
option. The only option is to think within the determination of earthly immanence and human 
freedom; this must include acknowledging that woman‘s labouring contractions are a process 
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proper to earthly immanence. To think otherwise is to determine a most tragic fate.Arendt writes 
against those discourses which deny our earthly immanence and instead writes within the human 
condition in the context of earthly immanence and human freedom. She does so from within the 
framework of existing colloquialisms and conservative prejudices, but, when she is done, these 
same prejudices are turned against themselves. She reconfigures these same prejudices by 
reconfiguring the scene of carnal birth.  
Unlike the products of human hands which must be realized step by step, the fabrication 
thing itself has an existence that is not separate from the process through which it comes into 
being: ―the seed contains and, in a certain sense, already is the tree, and the tree stops being if the 
process of growth through which it came into existence stops. [ . . .. ].‖ Similarly, a mother births 
her infant into the earthly eternal recurrence. Her cries and spasms, like her infant‘s, cannot be 
distinguished from any other‘s cries or movements. She is his mother, simply his mother, and 
nothing else, but she is not only this intimacy with the earth. By virtue of being a human being, 
she is also someone who is her beginning. We cannot know if she will embrace or depose of her 
infant; in either case, he is her orphan. Her embrace is ―virtuous‖ because it could be otherwise. 
Her infant‘s tragic fate begins at birth. It promises nothing but to bring forth a pure beginning. He 
will be exposed but he is because he is exposed. His life and his freedom begin when her body 
expels him from his earthly immanence, which, for him, is her whole body. Her most gracious, 
bittersweet gift is milk.  
Aristotle and Arendt‘s philosophy includes generative life as an essential dimension of 
being human. Their thematic opens up a way of thinking that does not have to oppose generation 
with creation, but permits us to imagine a way of reflecting on the human condition in terms of 
nuance and distinction. For those philosophers who insist on a less rigid and self evident division 
between nature and culture, birth operates as a seemingly natural hinge between a distinction 
proper to being human and possibly free. The fact that philosophical man has confused his own 
limit of self knowledge with the limit of being born rather than bearing life is, if some critics are 
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correct, no accident. By understanding that the limitation of the adult recollecting his origins is 
really a limitation on his knowledge of self knowledge, in part because he had to forget the events 
that led to his freedom, we gain more insight into the stubborn dichotomy: men create 
ideas/women generate life.  
  
Is Ambivalence Really Necessary? 
For the feminist psychoanalyst, the philosopher‘s ambivalence towards birthing bodies is 
unsurprising. The philosopher‘s ambivalence is considered evidence of a premise central to 
feminist psychoanalysis. As Kristeva explains, the philosopher‘s ambivalence towards the female 
body is a result of the confusion between the female body and the symbolic function of the 
female body; ―the female body is a favored site to which persons have turned throughout history 
to reproduce their origins‖ because ―identities under threat tend to turn to that body to reinscribe, 
reflect on, and commit to memory subject- creating forces of negativity that first secured them in 
the world.‖218 As Kristeva describes, the literal repudiation of the maternal body is symptomatic 
of ―a subject under siege‖ who ―may deploy defensive strategies modelled on the initial 
bounding-practices of emergent subjectivity.‖ 219When the subject is unable to re-create these 
conditions in the format of the symbolic, he suffers from what Klein terms ―psychosis,‖ literally 
the inability to think in the vehicle of the symbol. Socrates‘s claim that philosophical midwifery 
―attends to men and not women; and look after their souls when they are in labour, and not after 
their bodies‖ sounds ‗psychotic.‘  
When Socrates claims that he tends to man‘s soul and not woman‘s body, his art of 
midwifery relegates woman‘s bodies to one side and men‘s to another, but the distance between 
the two is tenuous at best. Socrates intends the dual concepts of birth touch on the nodal point of 
singularity and liminal transformation, but, in their resonation, polarize like magnetic fields: their 
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supposed differences are meant to mark difference itself: nature, woman and infant; freedom, 
man himself. The barren philosopher as midwife maintains this difference. The philosopher is 
born, and born again, but never again does he bear. Challenging the ―dominant metaphysics of the 
west‖ includes challenging the picture that develops from the point of view of the point of view 
of an individual identity that cannot give birth. The tendency, even in post modern and 
contemporary thinking, is to trouble the distinction from the point of view of the adult 
recollecting his birth. It is this same disposition that shapes even Cavarero‘s otherwise genius 
reflections on birth. To adopt this subject position, no matter what the analysis, consolidates the 
prejudice that creation is opposed to generation. To adopt this subject position is to assume that 
thinking is other than mothering when instead, if my analysis is prescient, the opposite seems to 
be true.  
Cavarero claims that by making her self a spectator to another‘s birth, the self can 
surprise herself by imagining, analogically, the event of her own birth; but, for Cavarero, it can 
only be by analogy. Thus, autobiographical memory always recounts a story that is incomplete 
from its beginning. She knows ―sapore‖ with that familiar feeling that she is unique, even though 
she does not know who she is because she knows that she was born from someone.
220 
Birth 
reveals that none of us know who we are, except through others. Our most certain knowledge of 
self, the most persistent illusion, is also our connection others. As I have attempted to 
demonstrate, even Cavarero‘s remarkable reading leads once more to assumption that birth is a 
memory for he who has been born. She makes this assumption because she regards birth from the 
point of view of the adult recollecting his origins. Why an adult recollecting their infancy could 
not know this infancy seems sufficiently intuitive, although not indisputable but it begs the more 
obvious question, why is that mothers cannot be said to witness the birth? Cavarero‘s rereading 
the cannon of philosophy and psychoanalysis from this point of view remains Philosophical, what 
she terms ―Platonic and Oedipal.‖  
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“We” are Born in a Time of Crisis  
 It is only be returning to the memory of birth that we appreciate just how this return is 
not, nor could it be, a simple return. Husserl describes the attempt to return to this memory as a 
movement defined between failed and collapsed attempts and those attempts which have found 
and find new ―roots‖ and make possible understanding the present. Frequently, as Klein and 
Kristeva note, this return is precipitated by a crisis of legitimacy. The crisis tends to force us to 
turn to the past to understand the present. This struggle takes us beyond the seemingly original 
Greek of Socrates‘s configuring of carnal birth. Rather than a ―mere succession of experiences 
linked by memory, . . .it is a culminative process of reciprocal interrelations and influences‖221 
The mediation of the social, reciprocal, interrelation of influences is largely ―covered over‖ or, 
forgotten but, frequently comes to surface during times of crisis. Freud names it ―the recuperation 
of reality‖ and ―reality testing‖ and most poignantly the ―work of grieving.‖ 
If we return to the thematic in the vessel of the adult recollecting his infancy, we return to 
the thematic that long ago determined that generation would be opposed to creation. Our mothers 
would appear as silent and dumb as the infant we once were. But, if ―mother‖ becomes a life in 
memory absolutely interconnected to self knowing, understanding is recuperated. This is captured 
in Husserl‘s ―genetic reconstruction of the kinesthetic nature of the mother-child relationship 
conceived from the point of view of the child, but a child who understands that his ―theoretical 
and practical egos are gradually made possible by the constitution of a bodily mine-ness which 
gradually arises from the infant‘s affective, instinctually driven relationship with the mother.‖222 
Rather than configure the mother as inarticulate, passive matter, Husserl describes the congruity 
which, by virtue of the infant‘s sensing, subjective body, and the objective body of the mother, 
gives rise to the subject himself. The mother, in this depiction is the ―first object,‖ but she is not 
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an object in the sense that she is simply the matter which is shaped by an infant. As Jackson 
argues, Husserl‘s meticulous philosophy of reflection is embedded in a materiality which bears 
and exceeds it.
223
  
For some, this revelation on the impossibility of making hard and fast distinctions 
between the subject and the object is as an opportunity to blur the distinction between mother and 
infant. For example, Nancy determines that the event of birth is the event that we cannot know 
until things have come to their end. Birth appears in translation or in premonitions, like the 
sounds behind a wall, but we can never really ―see‖ birth.224 For this reason, Nancy describes 
birth as a ―birth time.‖ The change has to appear materially, with significance, but the passage 
itself is invisible. It is this same non-appearance that difference philosophers claim was 
suppressed.  Accordingly, Nancy suggests that birth and beginnings come ―clothed‖ with the 
traces of their ―untruth.‖ They arise without a name, without a structure, without a title. They 
arrive unable to speak or move. It is, at first, as frail as what has been dying. But its arrival is 
announced by a flash and a single stroke. In the free aerial element the subject differentiates itself 
from the materiality which nourished it. A tone, a voice, lets us know a thought is being born, or 
not. There are signs of birth. The task, thinks Nancy, is to allow the tremor register for it is here 
that thinking and living unfold. We cannot listen to or see or smell the birth time because it is  not 
some thing to make sense of. Birth is not an idea or an accretion of sense. Birth is a verb. It is to 
be born. It is, claims Nancy, a simple thought. He writes  
It is a question of what has no fruition, nor any fruit, whose consumption or 
consummation is impossible. Or rather, and more precisely, it is a question of 
what in the fruit makes the fruit: its coming, its birth in flower, always renewed. 
It is a question of the pre-venience of the flower in the fruit. There is no 
mysticism in this. It merely invites a simple thought, withdrawn and coming forth, 
careful, graceful, attentive: pre-venient. It is a question of preventing 
philosophies, of preventing appropriative thinking-it is a question of this 
jouissance, of this ―grander‖ rejoicing . . .‖  
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Nancy figures the mother and child as a matrix of a general alterity constitutive of the 
soul in general. In doing so, he writes in the well worn path of Plato, Hegel, and others we are 
know well familiar. He, like others, understands this matrix to be a nature split, not fertile, nor 
nurturing, but division by itself.
10
 The implication for Nancy is that the event of birth (thinking) 
crumbles the very distinction of mother and infant, generation and creation. Birth renders the 
distinction between mother and infant tenuous at best. At this point it matters not if I am referring 
to carnal birth or the birth of ideas. Once more, the distinction fails to matter. In all instances, 
maintaining some specificity to mothering and birth, philosophically speaking, becomes-it seems-
a possible exercise in futility or a symptom of nostalgia. Where giving birth once determined her 
to be a woman and a non-philosopher, thinking birth now leads to the revelation of birth in 
thinking. There are no grounds for asserting the specificity of the mother, nor her exclusion. Is 
there a space left to legitimate that mothers would inhabit birth differently than would others?  
Birth is neither carnal nor ideational, but what prevents thinking-living as a dualist 
representation of earth and ideas, immanence and transcendence. In this same space, maintaining 
a connection of mothers and birth would be arbitrary and conventional. Post-modern philosophy, 
a resistance to the fixed identity which seemed to serve the modernist, technological, and 
sometimes fascist agenda, and its attempts to secure identity in biology as destiny, is a startling 
conclusion to Plato‘s now ancient rendering of birth. It is startling because it ultimately leads to 
the same conclusion: mothers, or those who birthed us, are those beings who we cannot know, 
who themselves do not know what they are, nor what they do. Mothers once more appear in their 
absence upon which other identities and events are formed and established. Mothers remain a 
non-identity; mother‘s remains. . . . 
 
“We” bear 
Klein‘s unsettling genius comes in returning to the threshold which Kristeva determines 
to be a symbolic excess. Klein returns to the emergence of speech alongside the child, not as the 
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adult recovering an infantile memory, but in the polymorphous personage of the mother-analyst. 
Klein straddles that dangerous grey area between mother and analyst with an unparalleled 
audacity. While every philosopher before her claims to be the midwife of ideas, at a distance from 
the memory of carnal birth, Klein goes to its depths. It is here that weaning, rather than 
repudiation, becomes a central thematic. It is here that the tenuous divide between generating and 
creating is brought into play, rather than held apart or flattened into a totalizing homogeneity. It is 
here that we can develop a thematic of birth as an experience that intertwines the ―maternal‖ and 
the ―natal.‖ It is here that we can do what Aristotle did long ago and engage the distinctions of 
complexity of the earthly experience of generating life and distinguish it from the ethical 
experience of mothering life. It is here, and only here, that we can move beyond Aristotle‘s crude 
assumption that this same mother is unfit for thinking. Perhaps, perhaps, she is unable to think 
philosophy, but as Kristeva remarks and Klein asserts, if she cannot, then none of us are able to 
be a creative, political, genius. The creation of ideas proceeds from s/he who generates life. 
Klein, with a remarkably simple reversal, describes the mother as much more than a thing 
that lies rotting after birth. In Klein‘s re-imagining of the scene of birth, she describes the first 
moments of the first relation as an allowing and disallowing of milk. The infant‘s first cry is a cry 
for milk: milk is everything. Milk is what will nourish the child into existence, and intertwine his 
earthly existence with thinking and living. A mother‘s thoughtful, loving, creative use of her 
breasts will birth her nascent into from his dependency on her into a controlled, idealized 
abundance and unconditional acceptance, into a space where prohibition and hatred are bearable 
because they are integrated with love. The child who can grow to accept that the good breast and 
the bad breast, pleasure and gratitude, and despair and hatred, and who can recognize both breasts 
in one mother, is the child who will move into the space time of creative thinking loving and 
living. The child who knows only an erratic abundance and/or censorship is a child whose 
entrance into language will be either instrumental or effusive, an illness Klein terms ‗psychotic‘. 
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Weaning is a mother‘s greatest accomplishment. The mother births the infant once like a 
generator, and a second time as a creative mother of living, thinking and language.  
Klein the mother-analyst recognizes a deeply intimate connection between psychosis and 
fascism. Klein undoes the limits on thinking by returning to this origin and truly allowing her 
patient to be born, one more time, from his beginnings: where he had to learn to love and hate his 
own mother. This is not midwifery. This is mothering. Those who assist become background 
noise. It is with mother that the subject is allowed to kill and create: to love and to think. Being 
the mother is much more than being a body which once was, or specter which haunts. Being a 
mother requires birthing our children again and again until finally, they can be born, not from our 
bodies, but from the world itself. Creative thinking and living begins with creative mothers, on 
the terrain of her generating body. Creation proceeds from a being who is also a mother. 
Until Klein re-describes birth, even our political journalist and our feminist psychoanalyst 
are ―philosophers,‖ though radical philosophers because they think about thinking from its 
distance from carnal birth: that is, as an adult recollecting his infantile, nascent recollections 
which he cannot recollect. Until Klein comes along, we are all of us adults who were infants, and 
none of us mothers in the full sense. (Although Aristotle begins to think this duplicity, this 
intimate intertwining of generating, birthing, and ethics, but is unable to move beyond because of 
the assumption that generation prohibits genius, when in fact, generation and genius are 
absolutely interconnected). Until any of these thinkers appreciate the tenuous divide between 
being born and birthing, until the radical implication of the thought that cannot be thought, 
Philosophy rests in a kind of comfortable position. Only when birth is really unleashed does it 
tremble in the pores of every thought, only then, do we get what we might call the beginning of 
earthly immergence, connection, of thinking to non thinking, and thinking to living. Those who 
do, too often assume that where being born and birthing are, possibly, impossible to distinguish.  
Creating becomes the releasing, killing and recreating, not of difference, but of difference 
in relation. This revelation is also a revelation as to why ―women‖ cannot be ―philosophers.‖ If 
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philosophy is stipulated as the creation of true and noble ideas, then we understand that any 
thinking being who also generates life will likely find it impossible to create true and noble ideas 
because she is necessary ambivalent. She must identify with the same being which she must also 
―kill‖ in order to think and love. If we can say that this prevents her from pure and noble thinking, 
a conscious undisturbed, undivided, and unable to severe and repudiate with the same clean strike, 
then we will also say that her relation to the earth, and thinking, will always be ―dirty.‖ Of course, 
this is no reason to resign ourselves.  
Who repudiates maternity? Women who mother, women who identify with mother, 
anyone who identifies with mother, and if Klein and Kristeva are right, every one identifies with 
mother initially, we all repudiate maternity. We all must repudiate maternity and we all do it in 
the same unclean, irrational flailing of desperation. Ambivalence is laborious. Our knowledge of 
this exist sits with most of us with some discomfort. This discomfort manifests itself in every day 
speech and in the heights of philosophy. We were all once unable to distinguish ourselves from 
the mother we do not know and none of us can remember the experience fully, truly, actually. 
The revelation of being unable to know is what requires us to engage with others. We desire to 
engage with others because we desire to know and to know how it is that we do not know. This 
struggle is yearning and it is creation. We all of us had to distinguish ourselves from this same 
being who was once present for the time at which we were her. We each of us bear this relation 
differently. Our experience is differently narrative, differently historical.  
None of the experience which we recollect as adults recollecting their infancy fully 
describes the experience of the mother who witnesses our arrival as infants. She witnesses 
differently than we do. She is, if not virtuous, at least ethical in the Aristotelian sense. If we grant 
that she too was once born, then she too was once her mother (as was her partner in reproduction) 
and they too repudiated this first relation. If she ―mother‖ is different, it is merely in degree. As 
Aristotle suggests, mothers are agents –even and especially- as birthing agents. If we fail to do so, 
we can hardly say that this mother was merely an animal, and neither can we say that she was 
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fully human. Something is wrong, terribly wrong, when a mother does not engage in the event of 
birth as an ethical being. Mothers appreciate that she is not merely generating an infant, but also 
creating ideas and crating a being who creates ideas and generates life. Our offspring will affirm 
and negate us, our creation, themselves. Our mother‘s bodies will never simply be some passive 
earth which provided life. It is never so simple.  
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